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CASE STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE DIVESTMENT 
   
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This collection presents nine case studies of public enterprise divestments in late 
20th century Australia, one occurring in the mid-1980s and the other eight in the 
first half of the 1990s.  In this introduction, we explain how we came to 
undertake these particular studies, and describe the research methods we have 
used.  Other commentaries and assessments based on the research program of 
which these studies were a part are being published elsewhere, and are noted 
briefly at the end of this introduction. 
 
There is now a huge international literature on privatisation, both supportive and 
critical;  as one of the major privatising techniques, public enterprise divestment 
commands an important place in this literature.  But most available studies deal 
with the general movement, presenting argument for and against;  some of the 
most interesting items are those seeking to show how and why privatisation 
became so popular in the last two decades of the 20th century, and the paths of 
diffusion as it spread out around the world after the early attacks on the public 
sector and what it stood for by a few national leaders like Thatcher in Britain, 
Reagan in the United States and Pinochet in Chile. 
 
But this literature contains few case studies providing information about specific 
cases of public enterprise divestment.  As the program whose origin and 
development we describe below built up, we have found ourselves presenting 
papers about it at various national and international conferences and university 
seminars;  we have usually found much interest in the “stories” about the 
transitions individual enterprises have experienced as they have been affected by 
this privatising agenda, and received requests that we should make our data more 
widely available.  We have also found a few other scholars beginning to pursue 
similar paths, and getting similar responses.  We have repeatedly been told that 
such case studies provide very good teaching material for use in relevant courses, 
and it is in this spirit that we now offer our set of nine such case studies. 
 
This said, we acknowledge another rare but significant and systematic exercise in 
approaching the study of privatisation in this way, one in whose design World 
Bank officer Ahmed Galal played an important part.  Galal developed a research 
proposal  which led the World Bank to commission a series of privatisation case 
studies, and he managed the proposal on the Bank’s behalf.   He had  built on 
some exploratory work on a proposed methodology for evaluating the effects of 
privatisation in which Leroy Jones of the Boston Area Public Enterprise Group 
(or BAPEG) had played an important part,1  and the outcome was a study of four 
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countries which had, by the mid-1990s, done much privatising.  The countries 
were Britain, Malaysia, Chile and Mexico, and across these countries 12 
privatised enterprises were investigated  by World Bank and Boston University 
researchers.  The results were presented at a conference in Washington in June 
1992, and both the conference proceedings and a summary volume were 
published two years later.2 
 
Galal believed that, from a fiscal point of view, there might often be good 
arguments for divesting an enterprise.  But he warned that there was enough 
anecdotal material available to suggest that the expectations would often not 
materialise.  Nowhere in the world, he declared, ‘are we able to find even a single 
serious and balanced study of what actually happened in the wake of divestiture’ 
(Galal 1990: 8-9).  This was the huge empirical gap he wanted to rectify, and he 
designed the World Bank project with this objective in mind.  In the event, this 
project produced useful information about pitfalls in privatisation schemes, about 
policy successes and policy failures, about difficulties in attributing causes to 
changes in performance, and particularly about how privatisation outcomes 
affected different stakeholder groups in each case studied.  As we discuss our own 
methodology below, we note some points of connection between this World Bank 
study and our own. 
 
The case study program 
 
Conception and objectives 
 
The research project in which these case studies have formed a central focus 
attracted a beginning large grant from the Australian Research Council, and the 
study has been in progress for about five years.  It has been undertaken primarily 
in the Centre for Research in Public Sector Management (CRPSM) in the 
University of Canberra.  Over the period of the project, the principal investigators 
have been Jim McMaster, Dean of the University’s Faculty of Management and 
Associate Professor of Economics when the project began in the latter part of 
1995, and Roger Wettenhall, at that time recently retired as Professor of Public 
Administration in the University of Canberra and newly accredited as Visiting 
Professor in CRPSM.  They were soon joined by Dr Fran Collyer, a sociologist 
who had hitherto worked mostly in the field of health sociology, in the capacity 
of Research Officer.  The three have continued to be associated in the project 
throughout its development, though towards the end of 1999 Professor McMaster 
moved to the University of the South Pacific in Fiji and Dr Collyer to the 
University of Sydney---resulting in the need for the association to be pursued at 
fairly long distance over the past year. 
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The primary aim of the project was to show how privatisation has been impacting 
on Australia through a detailed examination of divestment action in a small group 
of enterprises disposed of by government in the period 1986-1995.  A secondary 
aim was, as far as was possible in the time and space available to us, to set these 
particular experiences against a wider picture of the worldwide movement.  
 
For most of its settled history, Australia has steadily established, and occasionally 
disposed of, public enterprises.  Except in the recent period, ideology has rarely 
been significant in this process;  mostly the relevant decisions have been taken on 
severely pragmatic assessments of socioeconomic need in areas such as transport 
and communications, electric power, irrigation and water supply, commodity 
marketing, banking and insurance, and the unlocking of the resources of the 
Snowy Mountains.  As an extension of this process, from the 1970s Australia 
embarked on a serious program of public enterprise management reform.  This 
major thrust continued through the 1980s, even as some other Western polities 
which also had many public enterprises (led by the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand) were dramatically shifting gear and selling off such enterprises to the 
private sector.  These so-called asset sales were an important part of the 
developing worldwide privatisation movement, and were matched by massive 
shifts in the countries of Eastern Europe from public sector to private sector 
orientations;  many developing countries were moving similarly, often in 
deference to pressures from international financial institutions. 
 
Australia was in no sense a leader in this privatising movement.  In 1990, 
Wiltshire described what had happened up to that time as mere ‘flirtation’, and 
four years later he found it necessary to explain why the ‘ideological drive behind 
privatisation has not really caught on’ in this country (Wiltshire 1990, p. 224; 
1994, p. 204).  But a rapid change was occurring through the middle ‘90s, so 
much so that, by March 1998, a Sydney newspaper could proclaim Australia to 
be a ‘world leader in selling public assets’.  It asserted that ‘Australia, led by 
Victoria’s Premier, Mr Kennett, is [now] officially one of the world’s keenest 
privatisers’, and quoted an investment banker who suggested that another $80 
billion could be raised from sales of public assets over the next five years 
(Hughes 1998).  The Reserve Bank had just reported that, among the OECD 
countries, Australia was second only to Britain in the value of privatisations from 
1990 to 1997;  and, relative to the size of the economy, second only to New 
Zealand (RBA 1997, p.8). 
 
This dramatic conversion was begging to be documented. We concluded that this 
task could well be approached through case studies, which have accordingly 
constituted a central focus of our research. Such case studies would provide the 
best data on how the disposal of public enterprises has been handled in Australia, 
and the best opportunity for exploring the vital question of the costs and benefits 
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of privatisation---or, put in another way, who wins and who loses from such 
disposals.  This concern with winners and losers is apparent in much of the 
international literature, and is flagged specifically in the World Bank study noted 
above (Jones 1994). 
 
What Australian literature has emerged on the subject of privatisation is---apart 
from one important book published earlier this year (Walker & Walker 2000)--- 
mostly either anticipatory or reporting on overseas experience.  Since Australia’s 
own experience is more recent, it has not yet attracted much serious analysis. We 
believe that our set of case studies will advance knowledge of what has actually 
been happening in this country. 
 
We have already indicated that there is a huge international literature on 
privatisation, even though it mostly lacks empirical case studies.  In the course of 
our project, we have exchanged bibliographies with some privatisation scholars 
in other countries.  And we are aware of a stern challenge issued by one of them, 
Peter Curwen, when he reviewed yet another book on the subject (a collection of 
nine European country studies).  So much has already been written, he observed, 
that one must ask why a further book is needed:  it should either ‘cast new light 
upon privatization; cover new ground (in this case countries);  contain a new set 
of data;  and/or be very up-to-date’ (Curwen 1996, p. 418).   We believe that this 
collection does contribute on several of these criteria. 
 
Selection of cases 
 
We began our study by selecting a single case, the Belconnen Mall in the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT), using this as a pilot to test our evaluation 
methodology.  Belconnen Mall was particularly suited for this purpose:  it was 
both the first of the Commonwealth privatisations of the recent period, and also 
easily accessible to us in our University of Canberra location.  Rather than 
assuming a priori the criteria for our case studies, we spent some time with key 
informants learning about the privatisation process and the range of divestment 
methods.   
 
From this we produced a list of nine case studies, selected on the basis of 
several criteria.  First, we wanted our cases to have gone through the full 
privatising cycle, so that we could gain sufficient history to allow some 
comparison of post-sale performance with pre-sale performance.  We still 
believe this was a good strategy---and we note that it was a significant factor in 
the selection of cases for the World Bank study (Galal 1990: 25)---even though 
it prevented us from covering some major enterprises divested more recently 
as the privatising mood has gained strength in Australia.   
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Second, we wanted our cases to display a variety of divestment methods and  
range over several Australian jurisdictions, geographical settings and industry 
sectors.  Thus we settled on cases covering four jurisdictions (New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia and the Commonwealth, with the Commonwealth 
enterprises chosen based in Canberra, Melbourne and Cooma), nine industry 
sectors (hospitals, retail, fish, grain, insurance, betting, banking, pharmaceuticals 
and engineering), and five disposal methods (trade sale, industry take-over, 
public float, management/staff buy-out, and a build/own/operate---or BOO---
concession). 
 
Third, we wanted our cases to offer examples of both ‘poor’ and ‘good’ 
enterprise performance prior to divestment.  This was more difficult for, contrary 
to what is so often suggested in political debate and in the arguments of the 
economic rationalists, many Australian public enterprises in the past have been 
reasonably successful, giving considerable satisfaction to their clients, often 
making profits and returning dividends to their owning governments, and 
contributing significantly to the cause of national development.  It was 
immediately clear that several we had selected for other reasons had been both 
profitable and reasonably efficient in their public ownership phases;  two others, 
temporarily unprofitable, were suffering because they had recently taken out 
large loans for redevelopment purposes at a time of very high interest rates.  We 
wanted a more obvious case of ‘failure’, and because we also wanted to extend 
our coverage of jurisdictions we decided to include one of the two notoriously 
failed state banks---but even there it was soon clear to us that the fall from grace 
was a late feature of what had, over more than a century, been a generally well-
regarded record in public sector ownership and management. 
 
A final consideration was our need to get some cooperation from the 
managements of the subject enterprises and from others closely involved in their 
privatisations.  In the event, the degree of cooperation we received from the 
enterprises themselves has been variable.  In some the cooperation has been full 
and unstinted, and for this we are very grateful.  All have supplied documents to 
facilitate our study, most have granted us interviews with senior management 
personnel, and some have commented readily on early drafts of the case study 
chapters.  But we have to report that, in a couple of cases, there was some 
withdrawal of cooperation as it became clear to the enterprise managements that 
we were giving serious attention to some critiques of aspects of their 
performance or of the particular sale.  In these cases we have pointed out that, as 
serious students, we could not ignore these critiques, but we have also asked the 
enterprises for their responses to them and undertaken to give careful regard to 
those responses in our case reports.  The degree of response to this request also 
has been varied. We have of course interviewed or otherwise consulted other 
people who have been involved in these disposals in one way or another---we are 
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grateful to them all, though the conventions about public service anonymity mean 
that not all such assistance can be specifically acknowledged.  It is somewhat 
ironic that, in response to circulated drafts, we have been criticised both for being 
too sympathetic to enterprise managements seeking and achieving privatisation, 
and for adopting an unscholarly anti-privatisation stance. Clearly privatisation is 
a controversial business! 
 
Research method 
 
Similar information was sought about all the selected enterprises, even though 
accessibility to information varied.  Some cases---especially where there had 
already been critical study---had been fairly well documented, so that we could 
concentrate on gathering very specific information through interviews and further 
documentary searches.  In other cases there had been little previous study or 
documentation, and time had to be spent in gathering the very rudiments of the 
case.  But we found that the cases showed such a diversity in the privatisation 
experience that each case had a 'different story to tell';  and we allowed, and even 
encouraged, the diversity of the cases to show through, thus emphasising the 
historically contingent nature of the policy process.   
 
In general we sought the following information in each case: 
 
*  the history of the organisation and the reasons for government involvement; 
*  public interest issues relating to, and community service obligations of, the 
enterprise; 
*  the management and operating systems operating prior to privatisation; 
*  the past financial performance of the organisation; 
*  the political and economic arguments put forward to support or reject the 
privatisation option, including alternative ownership options that were 
considered; 
*  the state of the enterprise at privatisation, including the physical condition, 
value of assets, capital structure, human resource management system, 
comparative advantage and position in the market; 
*  preparations made for privatisation, including legal, financial and 
workforce restructuring; 
*  significant events surrounding the actual hand-over process;  and 
*  indicators of performance after privatisation and the distribution of costs 
and benefits of privatisation to stakeholders and the wider community. 
 
Documentary sources were extremely important, particularly parliamentary 
records, government and enterprise reports, press coverage of relevant events 
and, where it already examined the subject enterprises, the academic literature. 
Telephone and face-to-face interviews with key informants were also vital: we 
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have been in touch variously with enterprise executives, government officials, 
political advisers, staff and representatives of employee associations/unions.  
Some of our best informants were those who have since retired or been 
redeployed, allowing them to speak freely about past experiences.  We found that 
this qualitative approach yielded ‘rich’ data, and we explicitly avoided the use of 
quantitative surveys to gather organisational and financial data because other 
studies of privatisation relying on these methods (such as those reported in 
Martin & Parker 1997) have produced rather ambiguous findings.  This 
ambiguity is not surprising, given that the privatisation process is a dynamic one 
in which the enterprise undergoes rapid and radical change.  As a consequence, 
the privatised enterprise is often not much like the one that existed prior to 
privatisation. As the case studies demonstrate, many of the privatised enterprises 
have changed their function, organisation, objectives and size, making the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ comparison not easily amenable to statistical measurement 
(Collyer 1996, p. 24).  The fundamentally dynamic quality of the privatisation 
process was therefore captured through a focus on qualitative methods which 
enabled us to gain an insight into the changing context within which each 
enterprise was operating.  We soon realised that Robert Walker was correct in his 
assessment that ‘[q]ualitative research reaches parts that other techniques don't’ 
(1985, p. 18). 
 
There is now a considerable literature on the case study method generally.  While 
we do not want to extend this introduction by using it to justify our own research 
method, we point to one particular observation emerging from this literature 
which deals with efforts to make comparisons across case studies in multi-case 
research projects.  Thus Bradshaw and Wallace suggest that, when the subjects of 
such studies are being compared, ‘they should be compared as wholes and not as 
oversimplified parts’ (1991, p. 162)---in other words, the contextual integrity of 
the case studies should be respected throughout the analysis.  Without this, 
meaningless analysis could occur where one or two isolated features of a case are 
removed from their context and compared superficially with features from other 
cases.  We have avoided the temptation to do this. 
 
Exercises in the evaluation of organisations or enterprises which seek to attribute 
changes in performance to a particular cause face a particular problem.  We 
wanted our case studies to show the extent to which the ownership change 
involved in the sale of a previously publicly owned enterprise affected 
performance, but we found this extremely difficult to establish.  So often, other 
changes in the enterprise’s environment may be taking place independently of the 
ownership change.  For example, there may be changes in market demand for the 
goods or services provided or in the regulatory environment.  Or other 
government-imposed changes may be occurring which have no essential 
connection with the ownership change, such debt-stripping, staff downsizing or 
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the removal of some functions or addition of others.  Galal noted in his 
preparation for the World Bank project that  a ‘critical question is:  to what extent 
are observed changes in performance due to the divestiture itself, as opposed to 
exogenous concurrent factors?’ (Galal 1990: 22).  We have not found it possible 
to solve this problem;  our battle with it has suggested rather that all such 
exercises in evaluating the outcome of ownership change in complex situations 
must produce an ambiguous answer to Galal’s question. 
 
We have already alluded to the withdrawal of some management support from 
our project when the managements realised we were taking seriously some 
critiques of their performance.  What we have been seeking to do is to assess the 
impact of an explicit type of policy ‘experiment’, undertaken by State and 
Commonwealth governments much influenced by international trends and 
economic theorising but with not much in the way of historical precedent to 
guide their actions.  Our research is thus an exercise in evaluation, and all 
evaluation is an exercise in value judgment.  As our work progressed, however, 
we were confirmed in our belief in the need for a multi-faceted approach to the 
study of privatisation that takes into account a wide range of political, social and 
economic factors.  As a consequence, our evaluation of the ‘performance’ and 
‘impact’ of each privatisation takes into consideration, but does not stop with, 
managements’ own evaluation of its enterprise.  As Considine points out, 
management measures its performance and output according to its own goals and 
objectives, and these are vulnerable to the dominant values and political concerns 
of the day (1994, p. 243).  Instead our evaluation is a measure of ‘performance’ 
across a number of social as well as economic indicators, and it identifies a range 
of ‘impacts’ of the privatisation process on groups and organisations from the 
wider community, thus taking into account differing perspectives and 
experiences.  It would thus not be surprising if our evaluation takes a broader 
perspective than that of management, and if at times it differs significantly from 
that of management. 
 
Explanatory notes accompany each case study to indicate which of us has had the 
main responsibility for that particular study.  But we have all read and 
commented on drafts as they have been produced, and we have discussed 
extensively both the general direction of the project and the circumstances of 
each case.  Since we come variously from the disciplines of sociology, economics 
and political science/public administration, it has been an interesting challenge to 
us to try to fit together the perspectives of these distinct disciplines.  In the 
outcome, we believe that our collective approach has brought an interdisciplinary 
freshness to the subject matter. 
 
Lessons from the case studies 
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A thorough analysis of the material presented in these case studies would fill 
another volume.  Nonetheless it is appropriate to point here to some of the more 
salient features of the privatising action taken in these cases and to the 
conclusions that may be drawn from them.  Primary among these must be the 
generally poor financial return to the owning government from the divestment. 
 
There are of course several methods of ascertaining whether the sale 
price was an appropriate one, and differences between them often give 
rise to heated debate.  Conventional evaluation procedures such as the 
Discounted Cash Flow method, the Price Earnings Multiple method, and 
the Net Tangible Asset method, offer significant problems when applied 
to the sale of a publicly owned enterprise.  This is because privatisation is 
generally accompanied by other organisational and market changes, such 
as industry deregulation, financial restructuring, asset stripping or 
downsizing.  None of these methods are able to take into account such 
radical changes facing the enterprise, where future earnings are highly 
unlikely to reflect previous trends.   Similar difficulties arise with 
methods based on a comparison between the final sale price and the 
stated asset value of the enterprise.  Not only does such a method fail to 
take into account the usually significant costs of disposal, but the value of 
the enterprise prior to sale is particularly difficult to ascertain when it has 
not previously existed as a saleable commodity within a competitive 
market.  Taking these difficulties into account, and acknowledging that 
offering detailed financial assessments would be highly misleading, our 
research instead is offered as an indication that buyers of enterprises have 
generally done very well (with the exclusion of the GIO), purchasing 
themselves a 'bargain'.  In contrast to the main beneficiaries of 
privatisation - the new owners and investors - the selling governments 
have lost some good income generating businesses with the potential for 
growth. In some cases, such as the PMBH and the CSL, where 
government continues to fund the service through the private operator on 
a contractual basis, the privatisations represent an on-going drain on the 
'public purse'.  Indeed in all cases it appears that the citizens of Australia 
have not been adequately compensated for the permanent loss of a 
previously collectively-owned asset. 
  
The first lesson that can be drawn from our case studies then, is that long 
term financial returns to government appear to have played very little 
part in the decision to privatise.  Given the generally poor returns to the 
public sector for the sale of a valuable asset, it is not difficult to conclude 
that governments have opted for short term boosts to the budget, and that 
decisions have been based on ideology rather than on the rational 
calculation of costs and benefits. 
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A second important lesson that can be drawn from the case studies relates to the 
economic performance of the enterprises after privatisation, which is an issue of 
concern widely addressed in the literature.  We noted above that evaluations based 
on comparing pre-privatisation and post-privatisation performance are fraught with 
methodological difficulties because of the often radical changes experienced by the 
enterprises during the disposal process and the virtual impossibility of proving that 
ownership change was the decisive factor.  We quickly became aware of the extent 
to which our nine case-enterprises were transformed---often in the lead-up to 
privatisation---and it did not therefore surprise us to see them flourishing to 
varying degrees after privatisation, given the enormous level of assistance and 
subsidisation the new owners often received from government   This assistance 
included variously downsizing, hiving-off of unprofitable units, financial and 
organisational restructuring, new technology, ongoing subsidisation of costs, and 
very significant debt-relief.  Clearly these forms of assistance---not unique to 
Australian governments---had as much to do with performance change as the 
change in ownership.  Our study thus supported findings reported elsewhere (eg 
Sundquist 1984; Walshe & Daffern 1990;  Goodman & Loveman 1991) that, 
despite the rhetoric, ownership change is itself no panacea for a failing enterprise 
nor a necessary means of enhancing an already successful one.  Business acumen 
is a prerogative of neither the private nor the public sector, and governments are 
mistaken if they see privatisation as an essential tool for increasing efficiency. 
 
A third lesson to be drawn concerns the winners and losers from privatisation.  The 
evidence here is clear and consistent from case to case:  Privatisation maintains 
and exacerbates existing class inequalities.  The winners from privatisation are the 
large shareholders, financial institutions, enterprise executives, private consultants 
and advisers, and to an extent political parties and politicians.  The losers are those 
who have lost their jobs or been reduced to the status of casual contractors, the 
public who have lost access to public spaces and services, future generations left 
without the income from public enterprises that used to pay for essential services, 
taxpayers who see their tax dollar devalued as governments have to pay more for 
the provision of those essential services, and sometimes the small shareholders 
who have little protection against stockmarket fluctuations. 
 
There is of course much more that can be drawn from a careful reading of the case 
studies, which are presented in considerable detail to enable readers to make their 
own interpretations and draw conclusions.  We will welcome comment, critique 
and discussion.  But we are confident that the case studies do point clearly to the 
ideological underpinnings of the modern privatisation movement, and to the 
conclusion that privatisation in Australia has generally not been in the national 
interest or in the interests of the citizenry-at-large. 
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Related studies and assessments 
 
As indicated above, our research has already had some exposure.  As is usual 
with such projects, we have presented various progress reports to conferences and 
university seminars, and we have published some associated articles drawing on 
the material being collected.  Of course we had prior interest in relevant topics 
that had led to earlier publications, and to an extent our pursuit of this project 
drew on that work.  We conclude this introduction with a pointer to the other 
papers which have emerged as spin-offs from our case study research program or 
which are connected with it in other ways. 
 
Thus McMaster and Collyer (both 1996) presented early commentaries on some 
methodological problems involved.  Together we drew on insights from our own 
case studies to comment on the valuation arithmetic used in the sale of a second 
tranche of shares in Telstra, previously the Australian Commonwealth government’s 
Telecommunications Commission (Collyer, McMaster & Wettenhall 1998);  and a 
jointly written chapter reviewing both the development of the Australian public 
sector and the late swing to privatisation is included in an international compendium 
on public enterprise reform and privatisation just published in the United States 
(Collyer, McMaster & Wettenhall 2001).   
 
Collyer’s earlier relevant work related mostly to the sociology of health, and she 
has written particularly on the extension of private ownership in the hospital field 
(White & Collyer 1997, Collyer 1998, Collyer & White 1998).  McMaster had 
previously explored the prospects of privatisation in Pacific Island countries, 
largely through an association with the East-West Center in Hawaii (McMaster 
1990, McMaster & Samad 1996).  And Wettenhall had earlier written on the 
development of the Australian public enterprise system (1987, 1990, 1996) and on 
the impact of the privatisation movement on public enterprise systems generally 
(1983, 1993).  More recently we have, either jointly or separately, presented 
reports on the progress of our research and on Australian privatisations generally 
to conferences of the Economics Society of Australia, the Australian Sociological 
Association, the Institute of Public Administration Australia, the Manila-based 
Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, the Korean Association 
for Public Administration, the American Society for Public Administration, the 
International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration and the 
International Public and Private Sector Partnerships Network, meeting in places as 
varied as Canberra, Sydney, Wollongong, Macau, Seoul, San Diego, Beijing, 
Birmingham (England) and Cork (Ireland);  and to university seminars in several 
Australian cities, Hong Kong, Brunei and Zimbabwe.  
 
Finally we need to record that five of the case studies included in this volume 
have previously been presented in preliminary form (Collyer 1997; Collyer, 
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McMaster & Wettenhall 2000; Wettenhall, Collyer & McMaster 1999; Wettenhall 
2000c, 2000d). 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
1.  On the earlier work of Jones and other members of BAPEG  in developing a performance evaluation system 
for public enterprises, see Wettenhall & O Nuallain 1990: 16-19. 
 
2.  The initial proposal is to be found in Galal 1990, the conference proceedings in Galal et al 1994, and the 
summary in Galal & Shirley 1994. 
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Chapter 2 
 
BELCONNEN MALL* 
 
One of the first ‘modern era’ privatisations in Australia1 was that of a publicly 
owned mall in the northern Canberra satellite town centre of Belconnen.  The 
sale---by the trade sale method---was concluded before the creation of the 
regular divestment machinery which came as privatisation firmed into an on-
going program more-or-less supported by all the major Australian political 
parties.  Indeed, the Belconnen Mall case revealed the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) in considerable disarray as arguments for and against privatisation were 
presented with considerable emotional force.  In this case the decision to sell 
was conditioned by the unusually controversial history of the enterprise in 
public ownership.2    
 
This divestment occurred at a time when the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT), where the subject enterprise was located, was beginning to flex its 
muscle as a potential new and distinct governmental entity:  it became a self-
governing territory within the Australian federation in 1989.3  At the time it was 
effected, the divestment represented the largest single property purchase in 
Canberra's history.  Initially the sale went to a public-private partnership rather 
than constituting a full conversion to the private sector.  And finally it revealed, 
for all who wished to see, the great difficulty often experienced when those 
wanting to evaluate the impact of ownership change try to proceed by 
comparing pre-sale and post-sale economic performance.  
 
The subject enterprise 
 
Why a public investment? 
 
The shopping mall in Canberra's northern suburb of Belconnen is a large 
enclosed shopping complex, on three levels and with adjacent multi-storey 
parking.  It was built between 1976 and 1978 by the Canberra Commercial 
Development Authority, a statutory corporation set up by the Commonwealth 
government, and then operated by that corporation.  The mall was a public 
sector development, seeded with public money but with the construction capital 
raised through a mix of private and public sector loans.4  It was conceived, 
designed and built before the Canberra region had self-government, when the 
Territory was administered by the Commonwealth's Department of the Interior 
and later the Department of Capital Territory and its successors.5 
 
The idea of building the mall as a community enterprise was discussed in the 
late 1960s by leading Canberra residents and by Peter Nixon, the Country Party 
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Minister for the Interior in the then Coalition government.  The Coalition lost 
office in late 1972, by which time another Country Party Minister, Ralph Hunt, 
who had replaced Nixon in that portfolio, had a submission ready for cabinet 
recommending construction of the mall.  The proposal was simply taken over 
by the incoming Labor government, and in April 1973 Minister for the Capital 
Territory Kep Enderby announced that a statutory corporation would be 
established to develop and manage Belconnen Mall;  he indicated that the 
proposal for the mall authority had been developed by the Department of the 
Capital Territory and the National Capital Development Commission (NCDC), 
with input from the ACT Advisory Council and community organisations 
(Enderby 1973). 
 
The commitment of public funds for a retail mall was justified as a way of 
correcting the existing monopolisation of retailing and development in 
Canberra.  One developer, Lend Lease Corporation, held the leases for the other 
two Canberra malls, the Monaro Mall in Civic and Woden Plaza, and was also 
involved in the development of the Coolamon Court shopping centre in Weston 
Creek.  Canberra also had little variety in retailing:  one major retailer, David 
Jones, was a major sub-lessee in both existing malls.   
 
Advocates for the 'public' development of the mall argued that a public 
authority would introduce a competitor to Lend Lease, and attract other large 
retailers to Canberra.  They argued that it alone offered the opportunity to adopt 
new development techniques;  select developers according to criteria other than 
those of financial suitability;  offer expertise which has the public interest in 
mind;  return part of the profits of consumer spending to the local community;  
offer community facilities often unavailable in privately run malls;  and allow 
public participation in development of the area, thus constituting a valuable 
'social experiment' (NCDC 1973).  Opponents, such as some members of the 
Canberra Chamber of Commerce, believed that other strategies could produce 
some of the same results (see eg Newby 1972;  Courier 1973), but they did not 
carry the day. 
 
Implementing the decision 
 
Ensuing developments indicated that there was still some multi-party support 
for the proposal.  New Labor Minister Gordon Bryant, who replaced Enderby in 
the portfolio in October 1973, pursued the project vigorously, and the Canberra 
Commercial Development Authority (CCDA) was created by ordinance late in 
1974 to design, construct and operate the mall ‘in accordance with the 
principles of sound commercial practice in so far as those principles are not 
inconsistent with the public interest’ (Canberra Commercial Development 
Authority Ordinance 40/1974, s.16).  It then fell to the Liberal Eric Robinson, 
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first Minister for the Capital Territory after the formation of the Fraser 
Coalition government in December 1975, to ensure the funding of the project 
(Sparke 1988, pp 219-20;  Grundy et al 1996, pp 65, 84, 88). Robinson also 
took the opportunity to put legislation through the Commonwealth Parliament 
requiring CCDA to pay income and sales taxes (Territory Authorities (Financial 
Provisions) Act 6/1978).6    
 
CCDA was chaired by Jim Pead, a Canberra businessman with experience in 
retail, hotels and residential development, who was chairman also of the ACT 
Advisory Council and a doughty fighter for ACT self-government.  The Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts would subsequently note that Pead had been a 
‘prime mover’ for the establishment of the mall, and that he firmly believed that 
revenues derived from it should ‘provide a means for broadening the financial 
base’ of the ACT (JCPA 1980, pp 12, 18).  It is likely that Pead’s strong 
inclination to push the ACT interest against that of the Commonwealth was one 
source of future tension. 
 
By 1976 CCDA had completed the feasibility study and loans had been secured 
for the building of the mall.  Construction began in that year.  Through 1977 
CCDA was arranging tenancies, and the  mall opened in three stages in 
February, July and October 1978.  The first stage featured 49 retail outlets 
including Woolworths, Coles and KMart, the second 70 more shops and two 
major banks, and the third notably included the Myer department store.   
 
The total cost of the project was $41m.  The Commonwealth provided $1 
million of equity capital, the balance being raised by loans from the private 
sector ($15.75m in government-guaranteed bank loans and $24.5m by public 
subscriptions in the form of government-guaranteed inscribed stock ranging 
from small $100 personal investments to $4m institutional investments).  
CCDA was expected to repay the equity capital to the Commonwealth as a form 
of dividend, and the terms of the repayment were negotiated annually with the 
minister after profits had been determined.  From its revenues, it also had to pay 
interest on loans and taxes.  
 
CCDA was given both a ‘financial’ and a ‘social’ charter.  As to the first, the 
already-quoted section of the creating ordinance was strengthened by another 
(s.26) which required it to ‘pursue a policy directed towards securing revenue 
sufficient to cover all its expenditure properly chargeable to that revenue, and to 
permit the payment to Australia of a reasonable return on the capital of the 
Authority’.  As to the second, ministerial and other authoritative statements left 
no doubt that it was to assist in the urban development of Canberra and to 
provide competition to private developers and large retailers, greater retail 
choice, and better community facilities (see JCPA 1980, pp 15-17). 
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CCDA made the significant claim that, untypically for a public developmental 
project, the mall had been constructed both within budget and within the set 
time limit.  Once it was opened and operating, it had fulfilled one of the major 
objectives of the early advocates of the mall:  it had broken the monopoly 
previously enjoyed in the ACT by the principal developer and principal retailer.  
For a few years thereafter, it was mostly valued as a public asset:  it was 
producing a sound financial return on the initial investment, and considered to 
be a unique and valuable means to provide much needed community services. 
 
At the time, it was recognised as a leader in two senses.  It was at the same time 
a core element of the business centre being established for Belconnen as one of 
Canberra’s satellite towns, and an Australian trail-blazer in the development of 
the shopping mall concept.  During the construction, its senior staff proclaimed 
that the project was ‘so exciting we get goose bumps about it’, and visitors from 
abroad rated it as ‘of world class’ in the evolving shopping mall movement 
(reported in Boling 1977).  It claimed to be a pioneer in bringing Friday night 
shopping to Australia and, through its non-exploitative public ownership, to 
have shown how the ‘Jumping Jack’ cost inflation common in private sector 
mall projects7 could be avoided.  CCDA’s own view that it was conducting ‘a 
valuable social experiment’ was shared by many in the expansionist Canberra 
community of the 1970s (CCDA 1979;  Hird 2000). 
 
A decade of controversy 
 
As a public-sector enterprise, the mall had a life span of less than 10 years.  At 
no stage during the decade was its management entirely free of the threat of sale 
to the private sector.  There were members of each successive government who 
were keen to sell it, and members of the public who continually lobbied the 
government to hand it, and the construction of other ACT developments, to the 
private sector.  But it also had some strong defenders and, as already noted, it 
was promoted on the argument that it would introduce competition into mall 
development in the ACT. 
 
It is likely that, for many members of the community, a shopping mall within 
the public sector had far less legitimacy than a public utility such as a transport, 
communication or electricity service.  The stage for ongoing instability was 
well set by Dr EDL Killen (1973), at the time president of the Canberra 
Chamber of Commerce, who reflected conservative ideology in asserting that 
the idea of a public trust running a shopping mall was based ‘on doctrine alone’ 
(see also Newby 1972). 
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CCDA’s problems were not confined to the need to placate people like Killen.  
It found itself having many confrontations with others in the public sector who 
looked askance at its efforts to behave in a way that would satisfy the 
commercial side of its charter. 
 
Battles with the bureaucracy 
 
There were many such battles;  there is space for only a few indications here.  
While CCDA had a number of powers to acquire, hold and dispose of property, 
enter into contracts, erect buildings, grant leases and engage staff for those 
purposes, it needed Public Service Board approval for the terms and conditions 
of its staff, and ministerial approval for the conduct of some relevant 
undertakings.  As a public authority, it was also expected to maintain a high 
standard in maintaining accounts and records of its transactions and affairs, to 
furnish the minister with an annual report, and generally to keep the minister 
informed about the conduct of its operations. 
 
As manager of the mall, CCDA often grew impatient over delays caused by the 
bureaucratic processes involved in getting the necessary approvals.  Thus it had 
difficulty in obtaining Public Service Board agreement to staff pay levels 
matching those of privately run retail complexes.  And, in the developmental 
stage there was tension between it and the NCDC:  there was a collision 
between the two authorities over the site plan and over the cost of site 
preparation for car parks, as well as over the amount of information CCDA was 
expected to send the NCDC.  The press picked up allegations that CCDA 
decision-making was concentrated in the hands of an ‘inner caucus’ of three 
board members, and publicised two protest resignations by other members.  
There was further criticism eg that the public had not been provided with 
information about major mall tenancies (the defence of ‘commercial-in-
confidence’ was not yet well developed!), that there had been excessive travel 
by board members and unauthorised investment in bank bills, and that CCDA 
had not followed appropriate protocols in contracting builders.   
 
For those following these developments at the time, it was noticeable that 
CCDA always had strong defenders within the Department of the Capital 
Territory (DCT) itself.  Unusual among government departments, it was driven 
by the ‘place principle’ of public administration rather than the ‘functional 
principle’ (Fesler 1949;  Stewart 1974, ch.13), and it spawned some untypical 
bureaucratic attitudes.  While it would be too much to suggest that DCT was a 
united force on such matters, it certainly housed senior officers who were 
prepared to promote the cause of ACT self-government and to shelter Pead and 
his CCDA colleagues against all the criticisms (Lawrence 1996;  Wettenhall 
2000).8 
  
 
20
 
Eventually the operations of CCDA came under scrutiny in the Commonwealth 
parliament, with investigations by both the Public Accounts Committee and the 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations.  A long 
inquiry by the first committee followed adverse comments by the Auditor-
General.  In a damaging 1980 report, it concluded that CCDA had not been 
adequately aware of the nature of the relationship between a publicly owned 
commercial operation and its political supervisors, the minister and parliament.  
There were a number of specific recommendations, mostly involving tightening 
government and parliamentary control over this statutory authority and over 
statutory authorities generally (JCPA 1980). 
 
The committee also recommended a full inquiry by the Attorney-General into 
tendering arrangements during the mall's construction (p. 13).  The Attorney-
General duly investigated the security of tenders, but found no evidence of 
impropriety.  In its own defence, CCDA repeatedly pointed to a classic problem 
for government business enterprises:  it could not act according to commercial 
principles if it had continually to seek approval from others in regard to 
investment and personnel practices.  Despite the criticisms, CCDA continued 
with the management of the mall and a number of the recommendations of the 
committee were ignored.  Financially, the mall was operating profitably, and 
members of the Public Accounts Committee were accused of conducting a 
political and ideological vendetta against the CCDA board.   
 
CCDA was not restructured as the committee had proposed, and then Minister 
for Territories and Local Government Tom Uren reappointed the existing 
chairman and deputy chairman (Pead and David Elsworth), stating publicly that 
he had full faith in their management.  Uren now explored the possibility of 
using CCDA to construct and operate a second mall in the developing 
Tuggeranong Town Centre, and as late as March 1985 this involvement was 
being actively planned (Longhurst 1985).  But CCDA and the minister both 
knew by now that they were fighting an uphill battle.  There had already been 
one attempt to sell the mall and, given the rise of the forces of ‘economic 
rationalism’, it was unlikely that there would not be more. 
 
A first attempt to sell 
 
In 1981 the Fraser Coalition government set up a Cabinet Review of 
Commonwealth Functions---conducted by the so-called ministerial Razor 
Gang---to review public expenditure generally, and the resulting report 
recommended the sale of Belconnen Mall along with many other proposals 
designed to curtail government activity (Fraser 1981, p. 8 & appendix).  Armed 
with this recommendation, cabinet agreed in April 1981 that it would sell the 
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mall and wind up CCDA, and both actions were authorised in the ensuing 
Commonwealth Functions (Statutes Review) Act 74/1981. The minister was 
empowered to give CCDA directions ‘for the purpose of facilitating the sale’, 
and there was provision for dismissal of one or more board members in the 
event that it should fail to comply (ss 7-8). 
 
A private sector consulting firm (Richard Ellis, NSW) was appointed to advise 
on the sale.  The firm completed its report in April 1982 and, despite 
considerable criticism of the decision including a promise that a future Labor 
government would renationalise it if it were sold, the mall was advertised 
nationally.   
 
But the mall failed to sell.  The government had hoped for about $68 million, 
but none of the biggest institutional investors in Australia or overseas lodged an 
offer.  In fact the only offer was made by the Belconnen Mall Traders 
Association representing the smaller traders but not the bigger department 
stores;  this was not accepted by the Fraser government.  Failure to attract other 
tenders was blamed on the general decline in the retail sector and the prevailing 
level of interest rates. 
 
The Hawke Labor government was elected in 1983, with Tom Uren as Minister 
for Territories.  He recommended that the mall be withdrawn from sale due to 
the general lack of interest and the sole low tender, and the government 
accepted his recommendation in June 1983.  We have seen that Uren became 
sympathetic to CCDA, so for the time being it was able to carry on.   
 
By 1985 CCDA had built up an asset valued at about $80m;  it owed $34m but 
had repaid $6m of loan capital, and paid $25.8m in interest, $2m in land rent, 
and $3m in dividends to the Department of Territories.  Its net income for 1984-
85 was $7.2m, out of which it expected to pay $1m in taxes, leaving it with 
around $10m in reserves (reported in Longhurst 1985a, 1985b).  Also--as a 
measure of its effort to satisfy its secondary social mission---it gave Belconnen 
a child-care centre in the mall, provided space for various volunteer and 
community groups, housed Legal Aid and Meet Your Neighbour groups, and 
sponsored many local competitions and charities.  These were valuable 
initiatives given the dearth of such facilities in the ACT at the time.  Moreover 
it charged comparatively low rentals to tenants and so contributed to the growth 
of small business in the ACT;  it broke the monopoly of developers and large 
retailing;  and it amassed a great deal of experience in the community 
development function---which is why it was proposed for the Tuggeranong 
development (eg Wedgwood 1985). 
 
The sale 
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Labor changes its mind 
 
Within two years, however, the mall was again on the market.  In a clear policy 
reversal announced in the May 1985 economic statement (described as a ‘mini-
budget’), the Labor government declared its intention of selling the mall and 
having Tuggeranong Town Centre developed and operated by the private sector 
(Keating 1985, p. 2320).  The decisions provoked howls of outrage from Labor 
interests in the ACT.  Thus Ken Fry, former Labor MHR for Fraser (one of the 
ACT electorates in the federal parliament), said he was ‘disgusted and angry’ 
about the reversal:  ‘I never thought I would have to fight this campaign again, 
and never against a Labor Government’ (Fry 1985;  see also Wettenhall 1988, 
pp 250-1). 
 
Labor’s change of tack was so easy to demonstrate.  During the 1982 election 
for the ACT House of Assembly, the Labor Party had taken out advertisements 
in the newspapers to show its strong opposition to the sale of the 'community-
owned' mall.  Early in 1986, the Canberra Times printed a copy of a 1982 
election dodger to show the inconsistency (see Box 1).  More generally Bob 
Hawke, now Prime Minister, had castigated the Liberals for espousing 
privatisation---as he put it, a ‘big, ugly, distasteful word ... which is just a flash 
way of  saying they would flog off the assets of the people to their rich friends 
in private enterprise’:  that too was remembered in 1986 (see Box 2). 
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But the government went ahead despite these protests, in part because federal 
Labor had little sympathy for what it regarded as its left-leaning ACT branch, 
but mostly because of the rising dominance of the new political philosophy of 
economic rationalism---which had already virtually captured the Coalition 
parties and was beginning to make inroads in the Labor Party. 
 
Asked to explain the decision to sell, the then Minister for Territories, Gordon 
Scholes, stated publicly that the divestment would free capital invested in the 
mall to be available for more urgent priorities and provide ‘further scope for 
productive investment, job creation and growth by the public sector’ (Scholes 
1985).  Another ‘government source’ added that ‘it was difficult to see any 
advantage, either to tenants or shoppers, in the continued “government 
ownership” of the mall’ (reported in Longhurst 1985b).  And of course, 
although this was not stated, advantage was seen in distancing the government 
from an enterprise which was always controversial and had, from time to time, 
challenged the authority of other government agencies. 
 
Outside Canberra, the government got support from Canberra-hating journalists 
working for Sydney and Melbourne newspapers and feeding the prejudices of 
Canberra-hating politicians.  Supremely indifferent to the early sponsoring role 
of Country Party ministers, these reporters dubbed it ‘Whitlam’s white 
elephant’ (Bowers 1985;  Humphries 1995) and 'a monstrosity [which was] 
Gough Whitlam's contribution to the theory of retail socialism' (Costigan 1985).  
One of them (Humphries) did, however, have the grace to concede that, while 'it 
had lived those years in the strange surrounds of public ownership', it had 
returned, 'despite the doubting Thomases, a fair cop to Government coffers'. 
 
CCDA made its own disappointment very public in its 1984-85 annual report.  
First, it criticised the decision to allow the Tuggeranong Retail Mall to be 
developed by private enterprise on changed ‘parameters’, so wasting $600,000 
of direct CCDA costs already incurred in developing that project.  And second, 
it argued that the decision to sell Belconnen Mall deprived the people of the 
ACT of a major source of revenue and an appreciating asset (CCDA 1985, pp 
3-4).  This public criticism resulted in a flurry of activity within the ministry 
and the bureaucracy, both of which considered it inappropriate for a public 
authority to make such a statement. 
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The Labor Party in the ACT now suggested that the CCDA should be turned 
into a company and floated, with the people of Canberra invited to invest in it.  
Then, ‘a future ACT government could buy shares and gain revenue from the 
venture’, just as the States did from their commercial enterprises.  ‘The ACT 
has none of these, and the Commonwealth is withdrawing its one successful 
venture’ (quoted in Longhurst 1985b).  In the (still advisory only) ACT House 
of Assembly, members reminded themselves that CCDA had been created ‘to 
give Lend Lease a run for its money’, and that it had ‘become a valuable capital 
asset only because the people of Canberra had supported it’.  On an Australian 
Democrat’s motion, the Assembly voted to ‘strongly condemn’ the 
Commonwealth decision (CT 1985b).  The ACT Trades and Labour Council 
also mounted a campaign against the sale (CT 1985a).  Others explored ways of 
satisfying ‘philosophical requirements’ that ownership of the mall ‘be vested in 
the people of Canberra’ (Longhurst 1985c).  But all to no avail. 
 
The sale process 
 
At this time there was no central government machinery, such as developed 
later, to handle asset sales.  Almost immediately after Treasurer Keating had 
announced the decision to sell, an inter-departmental committee was set up to 
handle the sale, under the chairmanship of  Tony Hedley, who then headed the 
Department of Territories’ legal division.  Some traditional Labor values were 
still present:  the committee’s first decision was to exclude private enterprise 
from the process in order to minimise costs (it was estimated that the previous 
attempt to sell had cost $348,500, most of which was paid to private agents, 
lawyers and accountants).  This time the government decided to use its own 
resources.  The valuation was conducted by the Commonwealth Valuer's 
section of the Australian Taxation Office, the legal work by the Attorney-
General's Department, and the marketing by the Department of Territories and 
the Department of Local Government and Administrative Services (from 
departmental files).  
 
The national advertising campaign began on 29 June 1985, inviting expressions 
of interest from prospective purchasers who could demonstrate the financial 
capacity to purchase the mall.  Applicants had until the end of July to register 
their interest.  To ensure that only serious tenderers would register their interest, 
the Commonwealth asked for a security of $400,000 to be lodged with the 
registration.  The deposit would be returned to unsuccessful bidders. 
 
At the same time, the government began a public campaign to encourage a 
positive community response to the sale.  Fierce public criticism of the sale 
continued, now raising issues such as the likely loss of the community services 
provided by CCDA and the further community facilities for the Belconnen area 
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it had been planning;  the director of Belconnen Community Service suggested 
that the threatened services were worth $200,000 a year (CT 1985a).  There 
were several government announcements aimed at reassuring the public that 
these facilities would be provided despite privatisation. 
 
This time there were 17 registrations of interest.  Applications were then 
evaluated and eligible parties invited to lodge formal tenders within 90 days.  
Firms were provided with relevant financial details of the mall's operation, 
current income, projected income, further development opportunities, lease 
details and a copy of the sale contract.  This was rather like the prospectus or 
information document which became a standard feature of later privatisations, 
although it is likely that CCDA played little or no part in the preparation. 
 
At some time in this period an event occurred which was to effect profoundly 
the further processing of the sale and lead to a protracted litigation process.  As 
established in subsequent court proceedings, a ‘millionaire Adelaide 
businessman’, Guiseppe Emanuele, approached Hedley through an associate, 
offering a bribe in exchange for inside information about tenders submitted by 
other parties;  it was reported that Emanuele’s plan ‘was to submit a series of 
tenders at $2 million intervals and for Hedley to take the lowest tender 
necessary to beat any other tender and discard the rest’.  Hedley reported the 
matter to his superiors, who called in the Australian Federal Police and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions.  Hedley and a hotel room used by Emanuele 
were wired for sound, so that when Emanuele paid Hedley the first instalment 
of the bribe the proceedings were recorded.  In November 1985 Emanuele and 
his associate were arrested and charged with attempted bribery;  eventually---
much later---Emanuele was found guilty, but then his counter-claim of 
‘entrapment’ earned him a quashing of the conviction (Campbell 1993, 1995).   
 
After the 90-day period had elapsed, the Department of Territories presented a 
short-list for consideration by cabinet so that it could make a decision about the 
buyer.  The decision was announced on 2 December 1985.  Not surprisingly, 
the lodged Emanuele bid from South Australia had been disqualified.  The 
highest offer, from a Perth-based property trust, was for $102 million, but it 
involved staggered payments.  The government preferred a lower tender of $87 
million, submitted jointly by the Commonwealth Superannuation Fund 
Investment Trust (SFIT:  responsible for holding and investing the retirement 
funds of Commonwealth government employees throughout Australia9) and 
Westfield Property Trust, because full payment could be received in the 1985-
86 financial year (Longhurst 1985d, 1985e;  Hawke 1986, p. 322).10  
 
Each of the tendering partners would become a half-owner.  They had seven 
days to sign the contract and 90 days to settle the account.  Once the contracts 
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had been exchanged, comprehensive statements of revenue and expenditure had 
to be prepared in order to wind up the sale of the mall.  These were to ensure 
adjustments of revenue and expenditure between buyer and seller and enable a 
smooth transition to the new owners.  An accounting consultant was then 
engaged to prepare these statements, to be ready by 14 March 1986.  Settlement 
occurred speedily on 26 March, thus beating another legal challenge (see more 
below).  The Minister for Territories was a signatory to the contract for the sale 
of the mall on behalf of the Commonwealth.  The sale price of $87m 
represented a very good return on the Commonwealth’s initial capital 
investment of $1m;  the Commonwealth also acquired the $10m held in reserve 
by CCDA.   
 
The mall passed into the ownership of this public-private partnership on 1 April 
1986.  However the management would henceforward be fully private, this 
function going to Westfield Shopping Centre Management Co. (ACT) Pty Ltd 
as agent of the joint owners (WSC 1986). 
 
This first sale of a public enterprise by the Hawke Labor government had 
significant precedent value.  That government was still unable to persuade the 
ALP at its 1988 National Conference to water down its general prohibition on 
privatisation.  But Belconnen Mall, as a lesser known public enterprise, had 
already been sold, and with that precedent behind it the government was able to 
move fairly easily to dispose of other small enterprises such as the 
Williamstown Naval Dockyard and the Defence Service Homes Corporation 
(Wettenhall & Beckett 1992, pp 276-7). 
 
The fall of CCDA 
 
CCDA had opposed the sale, but had carried on in caretaker mode for several 
months.  In light of the government’s decision, however, it decided that its 23 
staff should be offered redundancy packages equal to double the amount 
prescribed for public servants under the Public Service Regulations.  The two 
departmental officers on the seven-member board had opposed the decision, 
and reported it forthwith to the minister.  The Prime Minister and Minister for 
Finance were consulted, and the immediate abolition of CCDA was decided on.  
This happened on 27 February 1986, a month before the sale settlement.  
Former CCDA Chairman Pead protested as did the staff unions, but to no avail.  
The decision meant that the financial assets and management of the mall 
reverted to the Department of Territories for the interim period, and the about-
to-be retrenched staff became employees of that Department (Wettenhall 1988, 
pp 238-9).   
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This decision to abolish CCDA was heatedly criticised in the Canberra press, 
and was challenged in the Federal Court:  the challenge was mounted by the 
Administrative and Clerical Officers’ Association (ACOA) on behalf of 
members formerly employed by CCDA and CCDA’s former promotions 
manager, Harold Hird.11  ACOA’s original intention was to obtain an injunction 
restraining or preventing the sale settlement.  The government’s very quick 
action in settling with the new owners scuttled this plan, so the union instead 
sought a declaration that the abolition of CCDA was null and void and that the 
redundancy payments it had decided on should go ahead (Campbell 1986).  The 
challenge was, however, unsuccessful. 
 
 
 
Sale wrap-up 
 
The cost of running the mall during this transition period was about $2.5m, 
which was offset by a payment into consolidated revenue of $2.4m which was 
in the accounts of CCDA at the time of its abolition.  The Department of 
Territories continued to finalise dealings with creditors and debtors after the 
sale, this process extending through to June 1986.  The related decision not to 
use the expertise of CCDA in the development of facilities in Tuggeranong 
Town Centre resulted in a delay of 18 months in establishing those facilities. 
 
Many members of the ACT community who were battling at this time to 
achieve self-government for the Territory were angered by these actions of the 
Commonwealth government.  They complained that its ‘solution’ to the 
problem of the mall had insured that the large windfall gain from what was 
essentially a financially successful operation conducted by local residents went 
into Commonwealth coffers and so did not bring direct benefit to the Canberra 
community.12 
 
The litigation concerning the Emanuele bribery charge extended into a court 
saga which took so long to resolve that it came to be seen as constituting the 
‘most protracted legal proceedings in ACT history’ (Campbell 1998).  After the 
initial arrest and long proceedings in the ACT Magistrates Court, Emanuele was 
found guilty and given a suspended sentence.  But he had claimed that he had 
been affected in his judgment by the entrapment activities that followed the 
initial contact with Hedley, and initiated civil proceedings against Hedley and 
various police officers (Campbell 1991, 1993).  Eventually the conviction was 
overturned on appeal in the ACT Supreme Court in 1995, and a year later 
Emanuele received a small contribution towards his legal costs.  But his 
corporate empire had collapsed with debts of around $240m, and he and two of 
his companies re-activated the civil proceeding against a number of defendants, 
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notably Hedley and the Commonwealth, who were blamed for that collapse and 
sued for $240m damages.  But the claim was dismissed in December 1996, with 
the liquidator of Emanuele’s companies ordered to pay costs on the ground that 
he knew the companies had no way of covering costs and should therefore not 
have allowed the case to proceed.  Emanuele now appealed against the Supreme 
Court verdict to the Federal Court, but in June 1998 it dismissed his appeal, 
declaring it to be ‘malicious’, ‘fallacious’ and ‘hopeless’.  Then the liquidator 
appealed to the Federal Court, and in September 1999---more than 14 years 
after the sale process began---it upheld his appeal on the argument that he was 
not guilty of ‘serious delinquency’.  All now fell on the already-bankrupt 
Emanuele (Campbell 1998, 1999a, 1999b). 
 
Post-sale experience 
 
The private Westfield Property Trust was the operator of a number of other 
large shopping complexes throughout Australia, and the other partner, the 
public SFIT, was content for it to absorb the Belconnen operation into its 
national structure and to establish a subsidiary company to act as managing 
agent.  Just three of the CCDA staff took up employment offers from Westfield;  
the rest took redundancies or were redeployed in the public service.  Some 
administrative functions, particularly accounting, were reassigned to Westfield 
head office and so lost to Canberra.   
 
Tenancies were continued until their agreements came up for renewal.  When 
this time came, some were discontinued as the new management sought to 
introduce a greater variety of shops, and there were complaints (hard to verify 
because tenancy rentals are a commercially sensitive issue) that rental rates 
were increased.  It was also soon being alleged that, whereas CCDA had 
supported many small family-owned or individually owned businesses, 
Westfield had a policy for all its malls of letting shop-space only to tenants who 
are themselves parts of networks and so are backed by the security of those 
networks.  It is likely that there was merit in this complaint, but also that the 
change was consistent with industry-wide practice in privately managed malls. 
 
The centralising of the accounting function meant that precise sets of accounts 
for Belconnen Mall were no longer maintained.  Though we had the goodwill of 
the new mall management, we did not find it possible to collect data that would 
allow a close comparison of pre-sale and post-sale financial results over an 
extended period.  Indications are that there has been a gradual growth in both 
turnover and profitability, but this growth was already evident in the period of 
full public ownership so that the effect of the ownership change has been 
continuity rather than reversal.  There has also been gradual expansion, evident 
most notably in the addition of a cinema complex;  but CCDA also had plans 
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for expansion, so that this also points to continuity rather than reversal.  Now, 
however, the government had to find money for new community facilities of the 
kind that used to be provided out of shopping revenues;  in place of the site 
rental previously paid by CCDA, the new owners were committed only to pay a 
peppercorn rental of 10c per annum if and when demanded (file reference 
85/5449); and profits mostly left Canberra to swell the coffers of the new 
owners. 
 
The 50/50 ownership contract between the joint purchasers has continued to the 
present day (WH 1999, p. 26), though there have been some changes in the 
status of the two partners.  First, the publicly owned SFIT:  consistently with 
the treatment of several other Commonwealth enterprises, that statutory 
authority was converted to the company form in 1991 as Commonwealth Funds 
Management (CFM) Ltd;  and then in 1996 it too was privatised, by a trade sale 
to the (previously privatised) Commonwealth Bank of Australia.  So the public 
ownership element in Belconnen Mall was finally eliminated by another 
divestment. 
 
Second, the Westfield Trust, which is described in Westfield documents as one 
of ‘three property entities managed by Westfield Holdings Limited’ (WH 1999, 
p. 15).  The Westfield commercial empire gains much notice in the commercial 
press both for its international expansion and for the very high stipends it pays 
its executives.  There has been much recent expansion overseas, particularly in 
the United States through Westfield America Trust.  Thus the parent firm, 
Westfield Holdings Ltd, whose affairs are dominated by a single family, claims 
to have grown from ‘simple beginnings as a small Sydney company’ into ‘one 
of the world’s largest shopping centre companies.  We are a fully integrated 
shopping centre group with expertise in every aspect of the shopping centre 
business’ (WH 1999, pp 1-2).  In 1998-99 it was reported that Westfield 
Holdings had experienced ‘38 years of unbroken profit growth’  and was ‘a 
quality long term investment’ (Were 1999).  As its chairman, Frank Lowy13  
retained his position as one of ‘Australia’s highest paid executives’ in that year, 
with total remuneration of $A7.68m;  in the same year son Peter got $US1.4 as 
Westfield America Trust president, son David got $A1.4 as Westfield Holdings 
managing director, and son Stephen got another $A1.4 as Westfield Trust 
executive director (reported CT 1999).  So a large part of the profits from 
Belconnen Mall since the divestment have gone to support the Lowy family and 
its shareholding associates. 
 
Final word 
 
At the broadest level this case illustrates how political and policy fashions 
change.  The Belconnen Mall project began when it was still generally 
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acceptable to propose that public initiatives could be applied usefully not only 
in designing and constructing but also in operating  commercial enterprises in 
the proud Australian ‘development stimulator’ tradition.14   But that was soon to 
change, and with the change it was inevitable, particularly in this industry, that 
a movement would develop to shift this enterprise into private management and 
eventually full private ownership. 
 
There were important lessons in this public-to-private transition that deserve to 
be heeded by all those who accept uncritically the mantras disseminated by 
economic theorising and international capitalism about the inevitability of 
public enterprise failure.  First, this public enterprise was established not to 
create a state monopoly but to break a private monopoly.  Second, the process 
of creation showed how private capital could be raised to contribute to such a 
public project, keeping the government’s own investment to a very modest 
level.  Third, the period in full public ownership showed an innovative 
enterprise management making important contributions to the social 
development of its community as well as proving profitable by commercial 
standards.  Fourth, however, the experience also showed that a highly commited 
management seeking to behave commercially and competitively was likely to 
face major frustrations in dealing with a central administration more interested 
in maintaining total-system conformity.  Fifth, the experience also contained the 
fairly distinctive feature that, in the run-up to a significant constitutional change 
(the establishment of the self-governing ACT) this management directed its 
primary loyalty to the Canberra community rather than to the owning 
government.  And sixth and notwithstanding, the federal treasury was the major 
winner from this trade sale, along with the buying group whose assets and 
profits benefitted materially from it. 
 
The privatisation was probably inevitable, but these ingredients of the 
Belconnen Mall story mostly demonstrate that there can be no single, universal 
pattern of public enterprise performance and no single, universal justification 
for divestment of such enterprises.  Each case should be considered on its 
merits, and we should beware of establishing policies which assume that such 
universalities exist.  It has sometimes seemed that these lessons have not been 
learned, as privatisation has risen to be a major policy objective in its own right 
and as special government machinery---not in existence at the time of the 
Belconnen Mall sale---has been created (in the form of an Office of Asset Sales 
within the Department of Finance and Administration15) to implement that 
policy. 
 
Summarising, the main stages in the evolution of this enterprise have been: 
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1974-1986:  a free-standing public enterprise planned, constructed and operated 
by a ststutory corporation, the Canberra Commercial Development Authority. 
 
1986:  sold to a partnership joining the private Westfield Property Trust and  the 
Commonwealth’s Superannuation Fund Investment Trust (SFIT:  another 
statutory corporation), and thereafter operated on their behalf by the private 
Westfield Shopping Centre Management Co. (ACT) Pty Ltd.  Subsequently 
SFIT became a government-owned company and was then itself privatised.  
 
NOTES: 
 
1.  There were, of course, occasional Australian privatisations before the onset of the modern reform period: see 
Wettenhall 1983, pp 16-18. 
 
2.  Our study of this case is based on a careful review of reports and commentaries in the Canberra press over 
the period of public ownership of the mall and the subsequent sale, and of relevant files of the old Department 
of Capital Territory/Territories, on which see note 6;  we are grateful to officers of the ACT public service for 
this access.  We thank also the post-sale Belconnen Mall management for access to many of their documents, 
and Harold Hird, formerly Promotions Manger for the Canberra Commercial Development Authority, for 
giving us access to his scrap-book of cuttings and papers relating to the mall and its sale.  Only very specific 
items are separately referenced in our report.   
 
3.  The story of the long march to self-government in the ACT is told in Grundy et al  1996. 
 
4.  This money-raising process was not unique:  previous Australian public sector projects such as those 
organised by the Telecommunications Commission and state power authorities had raised funds by the same 
method. 
 
5.  The omnibus Department of the Interior had been broken up on the formation of the Whitlam government.  
On the state of ACT government at this time, see Grundy et al 1996, ch. 6. 
 
6.  Such  ordinances, made under the Seat of Government (Administration) Act 1910, were a type of delegated 
legislation, and were the standard form of law-making in the pre-self-government ACT.  However doubts arose 
in the early 1970s about the legal 'power' of an ordinance to deal with financial issues, leading to the passing of 
Territory Authorities (Financial Provisions) Acts in 1973 and 1978:  see Robinson 1978, p.120. 
 
7.  ‘Jumping Jack’ is a term coined to describe a system in which interlocked private companies sell and resell 
properties such as shopping malls to each other, with spiralling valuations and therefore purchase prices, and 
consequent inflationary effects.  The establishment of Belconnen Mall under a distinctly different ownership 
enabled its management to put a brake on that system. 
 
8.  Though the Department of Capital Territory lost its separate identity when the Hawke government was 
formed in 1983 (being merged into Territories and Local Government, then just Territories, and after 1987 Arts, 
Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories), this remained a characteristic of the staff group attending to 
ACT affairs under subsequent ministerial/departmental arrangements up to the granting of self-government in 
1988-89:  see Grundy et al 1996 for more detail. 
 
9.  SFIT had itself been a very controversial Commonwealth authority in an earlier period:  see Wettenhall 
1986, pp 98-104. 
 
10.  This particular decision received surprisingly little attention in the Canberra press, being trumped by 
another decision announced on the same day by the same minister, Minister for Territories Gordon Scholes, to 
establish an ACT Council as a way of conferring a very limited measure of self-government on the ACT.  This 
version of a form of self-government was, however, bitterly contested and failed to pass the Parliament:  see 
Grundy et al 1996, ch. 11.  It was left to former Labor Minister for the Capital Territory Gordon Bryant to note 
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the incongruity:  the mall ‘was established as an endowment for the people of Canberra’, but it was ‘being taken 
away’ from them by a government claiming to give them self-government:  Bryant 1985. 
 
11.  Hird was unemployed for a time after the abolition (Castle 1986), but was eventually elected to the ACT 
Legislative Assembly, where he sits at the time of this writing. 
 
12.  Pead, CCDA’s former chairman, was another casualty.  He had won much respect in the Canberra 
community because of his long championing of its interests against those of the Commonwealth (see Grundy et 
al: 12-13ff).  On the larger issue---the fight for ACT self-government---he was on the eventual winning side, 
but his experience with Belconnen Mall had left a bitter taste in his mouth (‘Gang Gang’ 1986).  He was soon to 
leave Canberra altogether, and has since returned to it very occasionally and with considerable reluctance. 
 
13.  Frank Lowy presents a classic ‘rags to riches’ story.  He arrived in Australia in 1952, a young Slovakian-
born holocaust survivor who had served in the Israeli army, and rose to become one of Australia’s richest men.  
He was celebrated for that achievement with a Year 2000 Australia Day award as Companion in the Order of 
Australia, and his biography published soon afterwards (Margo 2000a) was seen by some in Australian business 
circles to be ‘part of the public canonisation of Frank Lowy’ (Signy 2000; also Margo 2000b, Harley 2000). 
 
14.  Defined in this way by Liberal statesman RG (later Lord) Casey (1949, pp 7-9), the tradition  had been well 
accepted by all Australian political parties before the onset of economic-rationalist thinking in the 1980s 
(generally see Wettenhall 1987, 1996). 
 
15.  Now Office of Asset Sales and IT Outsourcing. 
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Chapter 3 
 
STATE BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA* 
 
The State Bank of South Australia was a composite of two former banks 
owned by the state government which had, up to 1983, operated successfully 
for a combined total of over 220 years.  The decision to sell occurred after 
the public had been made aware of spectacular losses incurred in a few short 
years following the merger.  The state government was eager to be free of 
this apparent source of mounting public sector debt, and privatisation was 
offered in 1995 as part of a state debt management strategy.  The privatised, 
and much smaller, bank continues to operate in the state as a savings bank 
under the trading name of BankSA and under the control and authority of a 
private bank which acquired it in a trade sale. 
 
The case is unusual among Australian privatisations because it relates to a 
public enterprise in deep financial trouble before the rearrangements of 
which the sale was a part.  Notwithstanding that this was a rare experience 
following on the heels of the Tricontinental and State Bank of Victoria 
losses1, the case had an enormous impact on how politicians, officials and 
the public came to think about public enterprise and privatisation over the 
next decade.   
 
At the outset, it needs to be explained that there were really two State Banks 
of South Australia.  The first operated in parallel with a state savings bank 
for several decades;  the second was constituted by a merger of the original 
bank and the savings bank, and was the one which came to point of collapse 
at the end of the 1980s.  As this account will show, the bank which was a 
product of the reconstruction implemented to cope with that collapse, and 
was the one which was actually sold in the early 1990s, was called BankSA.   
 
A long history 
 
SBSA had a long history, being the second publicly owned bank to open in 
South Australia (SA).  The first was the Savings Bank of SA, which opened 
in 1847 and focused its operations on the needs of its depositors.  The 
original SBSA opened in 1896, and was established as a result of a failed 
attempt by the Kingston government to use the Savings Bank ‘as a channel 
for government loans for farmers and local government’.  The parliament 
instead gave approval for the creation of a second state bank---the State 
Bank of South Australia or SBSA---with a charter to facilitate rural 
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development and encourage home ownership through low-interest loans 
(Radbone 1995, p. 39; 1996; 1997). 
 
The two banks operated successfully in parallel for nearly 90 years, and 
SBSA became a key instrument in state development (Radbone 1996, pp. 
56-61; Sykes 1996, p. 472).  In the 1980s a new trend emerged in Australian 
banking to merge the savings with the general banks.  In part these mergers 
resulted from a policy decision ‘by the Reserve Bank to apply regulations to 
full banking groups rather than maintaining a separate set of rules for each 
component banking activity’ (Valentine 1996, p. 383).  Somewhat ironically, 
the formal writ of the Reserve Bank did not extend to banks established by 
Australian state governments, leaving them less regulated than the private 
banks. 
 
The SA government followed this trend.  In 1981 Liberal Premier and 
Treasurer David Tonkin asked the two banks to investigate possible merger, 
and this request was pursued by Labor Premier and Treasurer John Bannon 
after the 1982 state election.  In May 1983 Bannon announced that the two 
banks were moving towards merger, and a merger bill was introduced into 
the state parliament in November 1983.  It had been decided that a combined 
and larger bank would be better able to succeed in the emerging deregulated 
national financial market, and in speaking to the bill the State Treasurer 
referred to the expectation that the new, larger State Bank of South Australia 
would become an ‘active, innovative and effective participant in the South 
Australian economy and financial markets’ (quoted Radbone 1995, p. 39).  
The legislation required the new combined bank to operate both to promote 
'the balanced development of the State's economy' and 'the maximum 
advantage of the people of the State', and to operate 'in accordance with 
accepted principles of financial management and with a view to achieving a 
profit' (State Bank of South Australia Act 105/1983, s.15).   
 
Throughout the 1980s all Australian banks grew rapidly.  The assets of the 
big banks grew at an average of 17.7% annually over the period 1985-90, 
but SBSA  ‘grew even faster’ (Radbone 1995, pp. 40-1).  Its group assets 
(total loans) grew by an average of over 40% per year over this period, and 
by 1990 it was no longer just  a South Australian bank because two-thirds of 
its assets were held in other Australian states or overseas.  This phase also 
saw the bank transformed predominantly from a retail bank into a wholesale 
one, sourcing funds for other financial institutions.  SBSA also acquired 
subsidiaries such as a large Australian finance company (Beneficial Finance 
Corporation Ltd or BFC), a trustee firm and a real estate firm, half a 
stockbroking firm, and a small New Zealand bank;  and it opened branches 
in Hong Kong, New York and London.  In Radbone’s words, the single 
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biggest factor in explaining the increased scale of operations was ‘simply a 
far more aggressive lending policy’.  Over the period, its trading activities 
diversified into finance, investment, insurance, property and business 
services---far beyond the beginning objective of facilitating rural 
development and home ownership. Yet it did so with initial apparent success 
until the late 1980s, receiving the plaudits alike of the Australian financial 
press, the local media and the international credit-rating agencies (1995, pp 
40-1). 
 
Like the forerunners which merged to create it, SBSA was structured as a 
conventional Australian statutory corporation, with a part-time board 
reporting to a minister and through him to the state parliament.  In the later 
1980s the minister was John Bannon, holding the Treasury portfolio as well 
as the premiership;  SBSA was formally an outrider of the Treasury and so 
reported to Bannon in that capacity.  One of the board’s responsibilities was 
to appoint the managing director, who had executive control of the 
organisation (subject to the board).  Timothy Marcus Clark, with private 
banking experience and a Harvard MBA, became managing director;  he 
demanded a seat on the board as a condition of his appointment but was not 
its chairman.  His personality was dominating and aggressive and, whether 
because of this or independently of it, the chairman chose to take him along 
when he went to see the minister;  Clark’s dominance over the board was 
thus enhanced (Radbone 1997, pp.  125-7, 133; Sykes 1996, p. 474;  Bills 
2000).  Clark was the only board member with professional banking 
experience;  he acquired that experience mostly with the old Commercial 
Bank of Australia, where he was a key figure behind that bank’s disastrous 
expansion into acquisitions and lending which forced it into a merger in 
which it was the junior partner (Bills 2000). 
 
Obviously Clark was a problematic choice as managing director.  However, 
as indicated, his early expansionist activities were greeted with applause.  He 
was reappointed in 1986 and 1988. 
 
The collapse of SBSA 
 
How the problems were revealed 
 
Doubts about the bank’s financial health were first expressed early in 1989, 
after the collapse of  two private institutions, Equiticorp and the quaintly 
named National Safety Council (NSC, on which see Thomas 1991).  In each 
case, SBSA was one of the main creditors, and in each it had no security.  
Equiticorp had no current audited accounts, but Clark was a personal friend 
of its chief and one of its directors, creating a classic conflict-of-interest 
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situation.  The accounts of NSC had been subject to audit qualification.  
When the news broke, analysts asked what this suggested about the quality 
of SBSA’s loan book, but the bank continued to expand for another year. 
 
There were many corporate collapses throughout Australia in 1989, and the 
losses of the State Bank of Victoria and its merchant banking subsidiary 
(Tricontinental) were announced in February 1990.  Treasurer Bannon knew 
that SBSA shared many of the same customers as the Victorian bank, and he 
had already been advised of the South Australian Auditor-General’s 
concerns about the lack of adequate audit scrutiny of some state enterprises 
like SBSA which had been allowed to use private auditors.  Through 1989 
Liberal and Democrat MPs began asking questions in parliament about the 
bank’s activities, and by early 1990 Bannon’s own economic adviser and the 
Adelaide press were also expressing concern.  However evidence before the 
subsequent royal commission indicated that Bannon refused to initiate any 
inquiry about possible parallels with the Victorian bank (Bills 2000). 
 
A significant article in the Adelaide Advertiser at this time sought to draw 
lessons from the Victorian collapse which, by implication, had great 
relevance for the situation developing in SA.  The article recorded questions 
asked in Victoria about why the state government was ‘picking up the tab’ 
on the State Bank/Tricontinental debacle, and observed correctly that ‘as 
owner and guarantor’ the government had no choice.2   It went on to suggest 
that ‘a government owning a financial institution’ made some sense when 
that institution was, like the ‘old’ State Bank of Victoria or its ‘bigger cousin 
the Commonwealth Bank, ... primarily a people’s bank, particularly in the 
almost exclusive provision of home finance ... there was [then] a very direct 
link between the people as borrowers and the people as guarantors of the 
bank’s balannce sheet’.  But all that changed when the banks went 
entrepreneurial and developed a ‘more exclusive clientele [of] spivs and 
main-chancers’.  In these circumstances, accepting the loss and selling the 
bank was the only sensible solution (McCrann 1990). 
 
Also early in 1990, the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Opposition, 
Dale Baker and Stephen Baker, and their Senior Adviser, Kym Bills, met 
with Clark and other SBSA executives for a luncheon briefing.  Bills was 
convinced that Clark lied in answering questions about the bank’s relatively 
low level of provisions.  Bills was thus provoked to give intensive attention 
to SBSA’s loan portfolio, and he prepared over 100 questions probing the 
bank’s financial health which were asked in parliament during 1990, mostly 
as questions without notice.  He also wrote the Leader of the Opposition’s 
1990 budget reply speech which suggested that a key reason for the bank 
causing concern was the ‘principal/agent problem’:  the government 
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principal (Bannon/Treasury) was unable effectively to monitor and control 
its SBSA agent (principally Clark).3  As Bills summarised the position, 
SBSA’s assets grew from $15 billion at 30 June 1989 to $23 billion at 30 
October 1990, even though Clark had conceded in August 1989 that the 
bank had reached ‘critical mass’---Clark’s bank: 
 
bought bad business from other people to keep the cash flow going, and of course when the crunch came it 
was perhaps three times as large as it would have been otherwise ... (it) was behaving like a gambler 
borrowing on his credit card and doubling his bets to try to win back past ruinous losses (Bills 1997, 2000).  
 
Poor management information systems helped to conceal knowledge about 
the true state of the bank’s affairs until it was forced to announce a severe 
drop in profits anticipated for the year 1990-91.  Members of the board 
began to have doubts about their managing director, but were not yet ready 
to tell the minister and, amazingly, they gave Clark a pay rise and extended 
his contract.  In late 1990 the board commissioned a firm of investment 
bankers to conduct an inquiry, and its initial report early in 1991 revealed 
the need for an injection of $1 billion to keep the bank afloat.  By September 
1993, after further reports, it was known that the total amount needed to 
cover SBSA’s losses was $3.15 billion, representing ‘the biggest single 
financial disaster to hit any government in Australia this century’ (Radbone 
1995, pp 37, 41-2, 1997, pp 131-2; Sykes 1996). 
 
The Premier/Treasurer sought the managing director’s resignation 
immediately the initial report was available, and all board members soon 
followed.  The government appointed a new board and, after prodding from 
the parliamentary opposition, appointed a royal commission of inquiry in 
March 1991 and also set up an inquiry by the Auditor-General.  The 
Auditor-General was also appointed as the bank’s auditor, replacing the 
private auditors who had previously served in that role.  Until now probably 
the most popular and best respected of the Australian state premiers of the 
period, Bannon was attacked mercilessly for his failure to understand and 
control what was going on in this leading state enterprise, and his August 
1992 resignation from the premiership is generally seen as the consequence 
of this failure.   
 
Explaining the collapse 
 
Most published accounts of the financial demise of the bank focus on the 
mistakes, inadequacies, and misdeeds of individuals and institutions.  
Particular culpability was attributed to Premier and Treasurer John Bannon, 
general manager Timothy Marcus Clark, the SBSA board, other bank 
executives, the private auditors and the Treasury.   
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The Premier was the public focus of much of the criticism.  While many 
defended his personal integrity, he was accused of being too accepting of the 
generally popular dictum ‘let the managers manage’.  Thus he had been 
unwelcoming when the Treasury Department had sought to alert him to 
developing difficulties.  Also he had approved various SBSA acquisitions 
even after concerns about the bank’s loans portfolio had become very clear, 
and he had not been above letting it be known that the government would 
like the bank to behave in uncommercial ways when it suited the 
government’s political agenda.  Bannon was similarly criticised for allowing 
another SA Treasury outrider, the State Government Insurance Commission 
(SGIC), to enter into a major risk in relation to a Melbourne construction 
project, one which eventually cost SA taxpayers hundreds of million of 
dollars and was seen by the SA Liberal Opposition as a measure taken to 
support a Victorian Labor government facing an election (Jacobs 1992, p. 
390-1; AG 1993a;  Radbone 1995; Bills 2000).  
 
A major political science review of ‘the Bannon decade’ emphasised the 
Premier’s ‘restrained’ style and, in the matter of the SBSA debacle, saw him 
mostly as the victim, though with an inadequate plan for controlling the bank 
(Parkin 1992, pp 339-42).  But a press and TV political reporter was not so 
kind, writing critically of the Bannon style which he saw as similar to the 
‘facadism’ of recent architectural development in the city of Adelaide---
buildings with attractive facades but a highly speculative over-supply of 
space, leading to ‘collapsing towers’.  This reporter also attached much 
blame to the South Australian media which, in lauding the entrepreneurs of 
the 1980s, was also focusing on the facade rather than the substance (Kenny 
1993, pp 5, 50, 74).  Bills (2000) extends this criticism to the Adelaide 
business community generally:  in his view, at this time it ‘had a huge chip 
on its shoulder’, ‘unrealistically wanted to view Adelaide as a world 
business and financial centre’, and so ‘closed ranks about any problems, 
encouraging a lack of openness and accountability’. 
 
General Manager Clark was shown by the royal commission to have been an 
ineffective manager, allowing the various organisational sections to remain 
isolated from one another and failing to coordinate the bank into an 
operational whole.  The Auditor-General described him as professionally 
aggressive and entrepreneurial, but without sufficient appreciation of the 
need for prudent banking controls and good management (Sykes 1996, p. 
472).  A writ was taken out against Clark, with the state quickly winning a 
damages suit for $81.2 million---but it was a Pyrrhic victory as Clark was 
bankrupt.  Other SBSA executives were criticised, the Auditor-General 
finding them generally to be incompetent and ‘happy to follow where their 
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chief led’ without exercising independent professional judgment (Sykes 
1996, p. 472;  BRW 1997, p. 100). 
 
What of the SBSA board?  The royal commission found that it had failed in 
four ways:  it failed to exercise due care in making important decisions; it 
failed in its dealings with the general manager; it failed to inform the 
minister about the circumstances of the bank; and it failed to protect the 
bank from the minister’s attempts to influence its investment decisions 
(Radbone 1997, p. 128).  The Auditor-General argued that the board of 
directors was ‘out of its depth’ and, on many occasions, unable or unwilling 
to exercise effective control (Sykes 1996, p. 472).   
 
The state government recovered $2.75 million from the professional 
indemnity insurer of the former SBSA directors, and another $120 million in 
a settlement of its claim that the private auditors of the bank and its BFC 
subsidiary, KPMG and Price Waterhouse, had failed to exercise due 
diligence;  it had, however, demanded much more (BRW 1997, p. 100).   
 
The Treasury Department was another to receive strong criticism from the 
Auditor-General and the royal commission.  One problem was that, although 
it should have put a representative on the bank board, it played a low-key 
role because it understood that was what its minister wanted.  In its stead the 
Department of State Development put forward a government representative, 
and this official was more interested in economic growth than in prudential 
management.  In addition, the Treasury was more interested in the cash flow 
to the government than in the quality of the bank’s performance;  and 
(through the South Australian Financing Authority with which it was closely 
associated) it actually:  
 
encouraged the unrestrained growth of the Bank by the uncritical supply of capital upon demand, but on 
terms that were favourable to [it rather than the bank] (Jacobs 1992, pp 390-1; AG 1993a). 
 
The decision to sell 
 
Not long after the collapse of the bank had been made known to the general 
public, the SA Labor government under new Premier Lynn Arnold (who had 
succeeded Bannon in September 1992) announced that it would privatise 
SBSA as part of a state debt management strategy.  The state debt had 
become a problem that could no longer be hidden.  Prior to the collapse the 
state was in debt to the tune of $4 billion (at June 1990), but with the 
inclusion of the losses of the bank and SGIC state indebtedness rose to $7.9 
billion by June 1993.  While the size of the debt was about the same as that 
facing Victoria after its bank collapse, on a per capita basis SA taxpayers 
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were massively worse off, and SA had a less robust economy and so would 
find recovery more difficult than would the neighbouring state.  The 
financial credibility of the state depended on drastic remedial measures 
being taken, and the decision to privatise the bank has to be seen in this 
light. 
 
But the role of the Commonwealth Labor government under Prime Minister 
Keating must also be factored in to explain the decision to sell.  This 
government agreed to a financial ‘bail out’ package of $600 million over 
three years providing the bank was sold.4   This package helped to persuade 
the state government toward the option of sale.  The agreement was signed 
in April 1993 by the Arnold government, accepting all terms and conditions, 
including the fact that the sale would occur in a ‘timely manner’, with NSW-
style corporatisation5 preceding privatisation so that the bank would be 
subject to Commonwealth tax by July 1994.  The assistance package was 
understood to be both an inducement for the state government to ‘reduce the 
size of government’ and a commitment to substantially reduce state debt 
(summarised by Baker 1994c, p. 9;  1995, p.1461-2). 
 
In the event, there were three major stages to this divestment. 
 
Stage 1:  splitting the bank 
  
Before the close of 1992, the Labor government divided SBSA into a ‘good’ 
bank and a ‘bad’ bank, terms that quickly gained wide currency in SA.  The 
‘good’ bank continued operations under the chairmanship of Nobby Clark 
(who had recently retired as managing director of the private National 
Australia Bank:  no relation to the former SBSA managing director), and 
was relaunched as BankSA.  The ‘bad’ bank, comprising all the bad and 
doubtful assets and loans, became the Group Asset Management Division 
(GAMD:  Sykes 1996, pp 513-4).  GAMD began operating from 1 July 
1992, with its own board and its losses to be met by the government.  
‘Doubtful’ assets included the State Bank tower, Beneficial Finance (and 
Southstate Insurance, of which it was the sole shareholder), the Myer-Remm 
project in downtown Adelaide, and a property at 333 Collins Street in 
Melbourne in which the bank and SGIC had both invested heavily.6  
 
This division of the bank into two entities meant that GAMD became the 
focus of the state’s debt management strategy.  In 1993, its first year of 
operation, GAMD reported a loss of $287m, while the ‘good’ bank, 
BankSA, reported a profit before tax of $108m (AG 1993, vol.1 p.3).    
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Both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ banks were thoroughly reorganised.  GAMD 
dealt with its under-performing loans and bad debts by selling them off or 
rehabilitating them.  It also reduced its staff from 132 to 63, and it wound up 
its operating subsidiaries.  The ‘good’ bank began a program of downsizing, 
replacing the board and senior executives, establishing new reporting 
methods, and targeting markets that had been successful in the past.  The 
‘good’ bank thus returned to its previous focus of providing banking services 
to South Australians rather than involving itself in the big national or 
international corporate arena.  
 
At first this division into two banks was merely an administrative one, 
causing critics to declare that this ‘accounting change’ was unlawful and 
inappropriate.  However the division was soon ratified by parliament, 
representing the first of three phases of legislative activity required to 
process the enterprise through corporatisation and eventual sale. 
 
In April 1993, the government had established a steering committee to 
progress the corporatisation and sale process.  The first part of this work was 
completed by August, and the first legislation was immediately introduced.  
Becoming the State Bank of South Australia (Investigator’s Records and 
Preparation for Restructuring) Act 70/1993, it included a number of 
technical arrangements which would enable the corporatisation and sale 
process to proceed, including a direction requiring bank directors and 
officers to supply relevant information without fear of breaching the 
confidentiality provisions of the State Bank Act, but also prescribing tough 
new penalties of up to $50,000 for leaking confidential information. These 
amendments were aimed at protecting customer information during the 
process of preparing the bank for sale (Ferguson 1993a).7 
 
The division of the bank into a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bank was a clever political 
strategy that allowed the government to present the State Bank as a viable 
enterprise in the face of its shocking debts.  But perhaps not clever enough:  
a state election was held in December 1993, and the Labor Party lost 
government with a swing of almost 9.5% against it.  This outcome was not 
surprising given the heated political debates over the losses of the State 
Bank, the fact that Premiers Bannon and Arnold and the State Labor Party 
became common targets for derision in the parliament and the media, and 
the mounting of an effective ‘scare campaign’ by the Liberals warning of the 
grave economic dangers to come if Labor were returned to office.  
Overshadowing all the positive achievements of the decade (such as the 
staging of the Australian Formula One Grand Prix in Adelaide, the 
development of a Science Park, and winning a major contract for the 
construction in Adelaide of new submarines for the Australian navy) was the 
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very public, multi-billion dollar ‘bail-out’ of the state.  In the eyes of the 
voters, the government had lost all credibility---it was seen as incapable of 
successfully managing the state economy.  At every conceivable opportunity 
the electorate was reminded that, under the Labor government, the bank had 
lost $6000 for every South Australian, that taxpayers would be paying for 
the bank’s debt for at least a decade---from its collapse in 1991 until the year 
2000 (eg Ferguson 1993b, 1993c, 1993e;  also eg Bauer & Read 1993).   
 
Election promises by both major parties were consequently focused on the 
strategies they would use to eliminate state debt.  Thus the Liberal Party 
promised to increase the asset sales program, selling the State Government 
Insurance Commission, the Adelaide Entertainment Centre, the Central 
Linen Service, the Pipelines Authority and several other assets (Ferguson 
1993f). 
 
Stage 2:  turning the ‘good’ bank into a company 
 
The second legislative phase followed swiftly.  On 22nd February 1994 new 
Liberal Premier Dean Brown held a press conference to announce the formal 
transformation of the ‘good’ bank into the ‘new’ Bank of South Australia 
Limited (to be known as BankSA) and launched the new bank’s logo.8  On 
the same day new Treasurer Stephen Baker introduced a bill to enable the 
new bank to come into existence on 1 July 1994 (Baker 1994b, pp 210-15).  
All parties in the parliament, including the Australian Democrats, supported 
the bill, which became law as the State Bank (Corporatisation) Act 17/1994. 
 
It created a corporatised entity for the ‘good’ bank, and approved the transfer 
of necessary assets and liabilities (so that customers would not have to 
transfer their business to the new bank), and of the majority of staff.  
BankSA would be a company capable of being listed on the stock exchange, 
formally supervised by the Reserve Bank, come under the Commonwealth 
Banking Act, and pay Commonwealth tax.  The new BankSA was to be 
smaller than the previously undivided bank, with a capital base of between 
$400 million and $500 million compared to $600 million at February 1994.  
The bank would continue to be government-guaranteed, and have a funding 
facility of about $3 billion, for a transitional period.  It would no longer be a 
government agency, as is ‘appropriate for an entity which will be privatised’.  
In addition, the board and its management were to be ‘strengthened’, with 
new appointments made.  
 
The statute provided further that, while the ‘good’ bank was thus to become 
a new corporate entity, the old statutory authority would continue to 
function.  It would be renamed, but would take over the operations of 
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GAMD.  So the ‘bad’ bank, previously GAMD, became the South 
Australian Asset Management Corporation (SAAMC).  SAAMC retained 
those staff associated with activities that had been ‘wound down’, and those 
associated with the GAMD. It would continue the operations of the GAMD, 
involving the wind-down of performing assets and of SBSA’s government-
guaranteed liabilities to the capital markets.  All SBSA entities outside South 
Australia, particularly those overseas, would remain within SAAMC.  
Outstanding interstate loans would be divided between the new bank and 
SAAMC, depending upon their performance.  The newly named authority 
would be subject to the direction and control of the Treasurer, while the 
capital of the bank would be held by the Treasury-related South Australian 
Financing Authority and transferred to the Treasurer.  SAAMC would 
provide wholesale financing to BankSA and was expected to have a life of 
approximately three years (after which the Treasury would auspice residual 
loans). 
 
In the debates on the ‘corporatisation’ bill, one issue was of paramount 
interest to many members---the impact on SBSA employees.  Prior to 
corporatisation, the former Treasurer had given an undertaking that staff 
would retain existing terms and conditions of work, including access to the 
State Superannuation Fund.  After the new Liberal government had been 
elected, but prior to corporatisation, bank staff were informed that this latter 
condition would no longer be supported.  Staff would have their entitlements 
transferred into a new scheme.  There was also considerable concern that 
corporatisation would lead to the loss of 800 jobs.  The new government 
acknowledged the possibility of staff losses at the bank, but argued 
rationalisation was occurring throughout the banking industry.  New 
Treasurer Baker stated that the preference was for a public float as this 
would offer greater job security than would an early trade sale to another 
bank.  It was estimated that selling to an existing bank would be likely to 
result in more branch closures through rationalisation.  The government was 
‘absolutely committed to retaining SBSA under its new name as a viable 
entity in this State, and will ensure that that happens’ (Baker 1994a, p. 148). 
 
In April, negotiations between the employees, the union and the bank 
resulted in an agreement relating to superannuation.  Its essence was that 
employees could remain with the State Superannuation Scheme until 1999, 
at which point their benefits would be preserved at their existing rate.  
Certain redundancy issues were also clarified at the same meeting, resulting 
in an amendment to the 1994 statute. 
 
Stage 3:  selling  
 
  
 
46
Notwithstanding all the electoral hype before the introduction of this 
legislation, there was a good deal of common ground between the debt-
reduction plans developed in the twilight period of the former Labor 
government and the corporatising and privatising objectives of the new 
government.  However, not all members of the state parliament or the 
general community were in sympathy with the proposition that sale was the 
necessary end-point of this reconstruction.  Thus a number of petitions were 
signed and sent to the parliament to ask the government not to sell the bank, 
and a telephone poll of 500 residents showed that only 18% supported the 
sale (Altmann 1995).   
 
A good deal of public debate focused on the role of public banks and the fact 
that SBSA had managed to operate successfully and commercially from its 
commencement in 1896 until the financial disaster of the late 1980s.  Some 
described the disaster as merely an ‘aberration’ which need not be repeated, 
and a lone National Party MHA opposed the intended sale because of the 
fallacy of assuming that,  
 
if (the bank) is no longer owned by the State, there cannot be another disaster.  If the new owners of the 
bank get into trouble, it will be those new owners who will bear the pain and not the taxpayers.  There is no 
doubt that the State Bank got into trouble because it did not have the appropriate competent board and 
senior management, and it is my view that we should fix that problem now rather than throwing the baby 
out with the bath water (Blacker 1993, p. 438). 
 
He argued further that the State Bank problem had been caused by 
imprudent financial deregulation during the 1980s and reductions in 
Commonwealth resources to the states, forcing the state banks to seek large 
profits rather than provide services.  The sale of the public bank, forced on 
the states by the Commonwealth, would compound the problem rather than 
fix it, because the banking sector was inadequately regulated, and private 
directors ‘are free to repeat the disasters any time they get such a whim’.  On 
the other hand, public banks can be a ‘useful agent of Government’, 
particularly during drought or depression, delivering public subsidies and 
rescue packages to those in need without conflicting with the interests of 
shareholders.9 
 
Other opposition to the governmental plans focused on concerns that the 
bank would be sold to foreign investors, that this would result in the loss of 
jobs for many of the 3,000 bank employees, and that the state would lose the 
revenue stream.  Some believed that the bank should be retained as a public 
bank and, with prudent management and Reserve Bank regulation, be 
allowed to trade out of its current situation over a period of 15-or-so years;  
others argued that, in proposing to sell the ‘good’ bank, the government had 
over-reacted to the problem, had under-estimated the performance of many 
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of the doubtful debts, and as a consequence was under-estimating the value 
of the bank. 
 
But the die was cast before the Labor Party lost office in the state.  As the 
Liberal Treasurer pointed out in February 1995, there ‘was no going back’ 
on the sale because reneging on the agreement with the Commonwealth 
would require SA to pay back the $650 million tax compensation package as 
well as foregoing the sale proceeds of the bank (estimated at that time to be 
worth between $550m and $750m).  This he argued, would mean an extra 
$145m per year in interest payments on the debt and, after allowing for the 
yearly profit of $35m from the bank, would result in a net cost of not selling 
the bank amounting to $110m per year (Baker 1995, p.1462).  
 
It is worth remembering that in this case---unlike some others we have 
reviewed---converting into a company and privatising were coupled in a 
single reforming drive.  So preparation for the sale of this public enterprise 
(and, indeed, other SA public enterprises) proceeded simultaneously with 
that conversion, and in 1994 the Brown government established an Asset 
Management Task Force answering directly to the Treasurer, to set up a 
protocol for asset sales.   
 
The Liberal Party, both while in opposition and later in government, 
consistently stated a preference for sale via a public float.  This, they 
suggested, would offer greater job security to employees than would an early 
trade sale to another bank, because it would maintain the bank’s 
independence, ensure that the bank’s future headquarters would be kept in 
South Australia, and allow the bank to be rated by international agencies.  In 
the early stages of sale preparations, the opposite case was put by Labor 
MHA Kevin Foley, who argued that, if the bank had to be sold, a trade sale 
would be preferable to a float because it would attract a higher price. 
 
In the event it seemed easier to work within the banking industry, so that 
Foley’s preference prevailed.  In April 1995 the government and its principal 
advisers (CS First Boston) released information to a number of interested 
parties (including some overseas banks).  The Treasurer expected a sale 
price of between $550m and $750m, given that the bank had assets of $7.2 
billion, held 30% of the SA market and had shareholder’s funds of $441 
million.  There was an initial show of interest from 15 banks, but this soon 
narrowed to three: Advance Bank, Westpac and St George. 
 
On 6 June 1995 the government announced that it had entered into an 
agreement to sell BankSA to Advance Bank Australia Ltd for $730m.  
Advance Bank had a strong presence in its home state, New South Wales, 
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was newly established in south-east Queensland, and was the market leader 
in the Australian Capital Territory.  It had operations in all states but did not 
have an extensive branch network in SA.  Advance paid for the acquisition 
through a new share offer (72.7 million shares at a cost of $7.75 each:  
Advance Bank 1995a).  The merger enabled it to expand its customer base, 
access new markets and expand geographically.  Advance had kept its 
interest in the purchase very quiet, and most market analysts had believed 
Westpac to be the only serious contender.  Advance had not been expected 
to win the bid against Westpac, given that its asset base was about $12 
billion compared with Westpac’s $94 billion.  However industry sources 
suggest that Westpac’s bid was about $80 million under the successful bid 
(Gibson 1995). 
 
With the sale of the bank by the government, a facility of $1.2 billion was 
made available to Advance Bank, with an agreement to repay by the end of 
1995.  This was repaid (a few months early) to SAAMC.  The sale of the 
bank also enabled the state government to receive its final $80 million 
instalment from the Commonwealth, the completion of a rescue package 
totalling $675 million that was contingent on the bank’s sale (Kelton 1995).  
 
The third-phase legislation---Bank Merger (BankSA and Advance Bank) 
Act 41/1996---was required to facilitate this sale.  It was necessary 
particularly because of the Reserve Bank’s policy requirement that all 
banking groups have only one banking authority.  The Bank Merger bill was 
introduced to enable the transfer of most assets and liabilities to the Advance 
Bank, and to enable one of the banking authorisations to be surrendered 
through a merger process.  In introducing the bill, Treasurer Baker explained 
that the Bank Sale Committee had won a change in federal banking policy 
that would allow Advance Bank, under this legislation, to operate the 
banking business under the name of BankSA or Bank of South Australia, 
using the Advance Bank authorisation (Baker 1996, pp 1488-9).  The merger 
legislation also finalised the transfer of staff to the Group Employer.  This 
legislation was supported by the Opposition and the Democrats. 
 
Wider impact 
 
For many the SBSA case, taken together with the collapse of the Victorian 
state bank, came to define the ‘problem’ with the public enterprise system.  
The faults and failings of the two banks came to feed a growing anti-public 
sector rhetoric that arrived with the neo-classical economic revival of the 
1980s.  Proponents of this position argue that public enterprises are unable to 
function effectively in the market place, that they are unable to match the 
productivity and efficiency of the private sector, and that they carry great 
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financial risk but do so without the appropriate controls and restraints found 
in the private sector.  With great glee, the proponents grabbed at the 
financial failure of the two banks as ‘evidence’ that their theories had at last 
been ‘proven’.10  
 
This effect was well in evidence as we interviewed for other case studies as 
part of our research project.  The matter of the risk governments entertain 
when they operate commercialised public enterprises was raised alike by 
senior officers of the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Canadian 
public services and, almost inevitably, the cases of the Victorian and South 
Australian state bank collapses were brought out to show that the actualising 
of such risk is no mere theoretical possibility.  
 
Yet the failure of the bank is in significant part due to the failures of the 
general manager, Timothy Marcus Clark.  He had come direct to SBSA from 
a position in one of Australia’s older private commercial banks but, as 
already noted, it was one which had its own shortcomings.  He had no 
previous public sector experience and no sense of a special kind of public 
sector ethics.  On the contrary, he fitted easily into the bold entrepreneurial 
environment of the 1980s which produced a considerable number of 
dramatic commercial successes followed by equally dramatic collapses;  
several of the entrepreneurial leaders of the period ended up in Australian 
prisons or dodging extradition orders overseas.  Clark’s fortunes were more-
or-less matched by those of Ian Johns, managing director of the State  Bank 
of Victoria’s subsidiary merchant bank Tricontinental (see Armstrong & 
Gross 1995).  For public administration, the ultimate tragedy is that the 
managerial behaviour of these imports from the private sector did so much 
to create general and widespread disillusionment about the ability of the 
public sector to operate businesses successfully.  In today’s polity and 
economy it does no good to point out that there have been many successful 
public enterprises, and that the publicly owned banks in Victoria and South 
Australia had given broad satisfaction over a period of a century or more.  
Conservatives are reinforced in their view that this can’t be done, and even 
Labor Party leaders and senior public servants are brought to the same view. 
The now-rampant ideology of privatisation thus gets immense comfort and 
support from two aberrant cases. 
 
The case should instead be used for some serious reflection on the role of 
public enterprise and the damage that can be done when the unique qualities 
of the public sector are ignored and the public enterprise is expected to act as 
a private sector company.  To some extent this view was expressed by Bills 
(1997): 
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The worst of all worlds is where you have a corporatised entity which regards itself as an empire separate 
from the government, but yet which has an implied or actual government guarantee, which has no share 
market discipline, cannot effectively go bankrupt , and hence the financial sector doesn’t give it the same 
scrutiny as in the private sector.  You have political appointees on boards which means that you normally 
have weak boards, and that people use it as a personal plaything, which is what happened with the State 
Bank of South Australia.  
 
Others have long recognised the value of the public enterprise system, but 
fear the consequences of forcing public enterprises to function like private 
ones, which is a leading objective of the modern corporatisers.  Thus, as 
already noted, journalist McCrann (1990) saw a case for government 
ownership in banks that were primarily ‘people’s banks’, but not in banks 
that had gone ‘entrepreneurial’.  In somewhat similar vein, radical historian 
Humphry McQueen has asked (1994): 
 
What point is there in the State running its own bank if that institution mimics the corporate ones? A State-
owned bank becomes part of a socialist project only when its policies contribute towards social equality. 
 
For Radbone, who has chronicled the SABA story in some detail, both the 
early SA state banking institutions 
 
had a clear purpose and ... this purpose was not primarily commercial.  [To recall McQueen] they were not 
here to mimic the private banks.  They had clear social objectives.  The commercial objective was clearly 
subordinate.  Neither bank returned lots of money for the government and neither grew dramatically.  But 
this was not their purpose ... So if there is a lesson from this, it is that a successful public enterprise should 
have two features:  a non-commercial reason for existence and clear understanding of the limits of 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Radbone 1996, p.61). 
 
Bills responds (2000) that the two state banks in their later years not only 
mimicked McQueen’s ‘corporate ones’ but ‘made worse decisions due to 
political influence and had riskier loans due to naive expansionism’. 
 
It is a great pity that those who eagerly select new managers for our public 
enterprises based on their reported private sector skills have so often failed 
to consider the damage that can be done when the non-commercial functions 
of the enterprises are ignored or under-rated.11  The fall of SBSA led not 
only to the loss of South Australia’s only state bank, but the stigma of failure 
helped to silence the voice of support for public enterprise.  With mounting 
public debt, proponents of privatisation gained a free hand to assess the 
monetary value of the state’s assets and, with little consideration of the 
needs of future generations of South Australians, entered into a blind rush to 
sell as many other public assets as possible.  The ‘privatise or perish’ 
mentality was the true legacy of the State Bank saga. 
 
The bank since the sale 
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In accordance with the sale agreement, Advance Bank was committed to 
maintaining the trading name and market presence of BankSA for its South 
Australian operations, and the acquired property and staff functioned as a 
distinct organisational division within the expanded Advance Bank Group.  
Much effort was, however, invested in establishing ‘a consistent focus and 
common policies, procedures and products’ (Advance Bank 1995b, pp 6-7; 
1996, p. 8).  As a result it was not possible to identify separately the ongoing 
financial performance of the South Australian operation in a way that would 
enable convincing long-term pre-sale and post-sale comparisons to be made. 
 
Advance Bank was itself soon to be the subject of another take-over, as a 
result of which it merged with the Sydney-based St George Bank in January 
1997.  So the question of retaining a separate identity for the now-privatised 
SA state bank re-emerged very quickly after the initial public-to-private 
conversion.   
 
It would appear that it was again settled in a manner fairly satisfactory to the 
interests of the state.  St George retained BankSA as a separate division 
trading under its own brand name for its operations in SA and the Northern 
Territory and, indeed, it readily took on board the celebration of the 150th 
anniversary of the birth of the original BankSA predecessor, the Savings 
Bank of South Australia, in the year of the merger (St George 1998, pp 7, 
30).  In 1999 it could report that, ‘through our BankSA franchise’, it had 
more customers in SA than any other bank (St George 1999, p. 13).  The 
separation does not, however, run to the publication of distinct financial 
information for BankSA, which is treated as an integral part of the 
‘consolidated entity’ for reporting purposes. 
 
With partial deregulation, banking in Australia has become a volatile 
industry outside the four protected major banks (the privatised 
Commonwealth, Westpac, National Australia and ANZ).  So there is much 
speculation at the time of this writing (mid-2000) about the possibility of 
another take-over likely to affect this South Australian banking trail:  
National Australia and ANZ have both been increasing their shareholding in 
St George, and the financial press gives considerable credence to the 
possibility that both banks see a potential take-over of St George as a way of 
furthering their own expansion in the industry (Were 1999).  Whether the 
BankSA identity will survive for much longer is therefore a moot point. 
 
Summarising, the main stages in the organisational history of the enterprise 
have been: 
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1847:  Savings Bank of South Australia established as a public enterprise 
under statutory authority management. 
 
1896:  State Bank of South Australia established as a second banking 
statutory authority to facilitate rural development and home ownership 
through low-interest loans. 
 
1983:  The two publicly owned banks merged as the new State Bank of 
South Australia, and thereafter expanded rapidly but disastrously as a 
supposedly strengthened statutory corporation. 
 
1992:  Divided into two parts---a ‘good’ bank renamed BankSA and a ‘bad’ 
bank restyled as the Group Asset Management Division (GAMD) to take 
over all the bad and doubtful assets and loans. 
 
1994:  BankSA becomes a government-owned company, formally the Bank 
of South Australia Ltd;  GAMD reconstituted as a statutory corporation, the 
South Australian Asset Management Corporation. 
 
1996:  BankSA sold to the private Advance Bank and incorporated into its 
business, though with BankSA recognised as a separate division;  a year 
later Advance Bank itself taken over by the private St George Bank.  
 
Notes: 
 
1.  On the Victorian experience, see particularly Armstrong & Gross 1995 and Holmes 1995. 
 
2.  In the Victorian case, the government guarantee was explicit for the State Bank itself, having been 
written into the legislation establishing that bank as a statutory corporation.  This was not so, however, with 
the Tricontinental subsidiary, an existing company which the bank had bought.  Nonetheless, the 
government took the view that it had no option but to assume the guarantee applied also to the subsidiary.  
In an exploration of such ‘implied guarantees’, the South Australian Crown Solicitor indicated that the 
same situation applied in his state:  Selway 1995. 
 
3.  Having uncovered many of SABA’s problems, Bills subsequently spent 18 months at the Jacobs royal 
commission briefing the QC representing the Leader of the Opposition and helping write the Leader’s 
submission to Commissioner Jacobs. 
 
4.  The package was described as a tax compensation package, because once privatised, a bank pays tax to 
the Commonwealth rather than tax equivalent returns to the state.  The Commonwealth offered one such 
package to each state for the privatisation of a financial (banking or insurance) enterprise. 
 
5. On the NSW notion of corporatisation and its New Zealand antecedent, see Wettenhall 1998, esp pp 246-
7. 
 
6. In part this was similar to a technique used in the restructuring of the debt-laden Japanese National 
Railways in 1987.  The old nation-wide public corporation was then split into six regional passenger-
carrying companies, one nation-wide cargo-carrying company and the JNR Settelement Corporation ‘to 
bear the financial burden and help settle the debts of the former JNR’;  the Settlement Corporation also had 
to carry 23,600 surplus staff who failed either to find jobs in one of the new streamlined companies or 
  
 
53
elsewhere or to retire (see Nakamura 1995, pp 45-8).  There has since been argument about whether this 
Japanese reform constituted privatisation;  since large elements of public ownership remained, it would 
seem that it was rather a case of reform by disaggregation and to an extent regionalisation. 
 
7. The Arnold government had also set up a Task Force on the Reform of Government Trading Enterprises 
and, in the light of its recommendations, legislated (Public Corporations Act 36/1993) to establish a 
monitoring regime for all statutory corporations deemed to be ‘public corporations’ under the provisions of 
that act.  The aim was to ensure that the problems which had led to the collapse of SBSA would not recur.  
However Radbone expressed doubt that it would have prevented the SBSA disater even if it had been in 
existence before matters began to go wrong in the bank (Radbone 1997, pp 136-7). 
 
8.  Removal of the word ‘State’ from the bank’s name was necessary given the intention to sell the bank to 
the private sector.   
 
9.  Fairly similar arguments were mounted in the upper house of the SA parliament by Australian Democrat 
members Ian Gilfillan (1993, p. 372) and MJ Elliott (1994, p. 597).  
 
10.  Kym Bills, who supported this privatisation, nevertheless reminded us that the corporate greed which 
followed financial deregulation in the 1980s and contributed so heavily to the losses of the South 
Australian and Victorian state banks did considerable damage also to some of Australia’s private banks.  In 
particular, ‘Westpac’s $3b losses ... show that state banks did not have a monopoly on such greed and 
stupidity’ (Bills 2000).  
 
11.  For a general discussion of this problem, see O Nuallain & Wettenhall 1987, esp. pp 10-11. 
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Chapter 4 
 
NSW GRAIN CORPORATION* 
 
The privatisation of this enterprise holds particular interest for several 
reasons. First, it presents a major example of industry buy-out: that is, while 
the methodology was essentially that of a trade sale, in this case the 
government announced its preference to sell the organisation to the 
concerned industry, represented by a single buyer. How to inject any real 
competition into such a sale is a central issue: here the government 
proceeded by way of a 20-year loan to the buyers, and valuation of the 
business was complicated by the risks and uncertainty associated with the 
cycle of New South Wales wheat harvests which vary widely according to 
weather condition. 
 
Second, this privatisation occurred at a time when the wheat industry was 
undergoing deregulation as state and federal governments embraced 
microeconomic reform promoted by National Competition Policy. New South 
Wales was moving in line with other grain producing states (notably South 
Australia, Western Australia and Queensland) where ownership was being 
transferred from government to industry, but it was also pioneering in that this 
was the first public enterprise to be brought within the terms of the NSW State 
Owned Enterprises Act passed by the Greiner government in 1988. Its 
conversion---before sale---from a statutory authority-corporation to the company 
form completed the process of corporatising it according to the then-current 
NSW philosophy and provided the government with what it regarded as an 
ideal legal entity for producing major organisational change such as writing off 
bad debts, negotiating changes in workplace practices with unions, and 
implementing management-initiated measures to prepare the way for 
privatisation. 
 
Finally the case deals with an enterprise which has evolved through the full 
cycle of organisational types.  From its origins as a branch within a 
department, it was progressively transformed into a statutory authority, a 
government-owned company and a privatised company with its shares 
traded on the exempt stock market, through to its present form as a public 
company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
 
Pre-sale organisational evolution 
 
Branch of a department 
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Government involvement in bulk wheat handling in New South Wales 
began in 1916 with the passing of the Grain Elevator Act that authorised the 
construction of a grain elevator system.  The then state government decided 
to construct permanent grain silos, in response to the demands of wheat 
farmers who had suffered heavy losses of wheat during the period of the 
First World War.  The losses were caused by lack of secure storage 
facilities, wet weather, plagues of mice and weevils and the disadvantages of 
handling and storing grain in bags.  A Commonwealth Royal Commission 
of Inquiry in 1917 recommended the construction of permanent grain 
storage facilities, and, in the Wheat Storage Act of the same year the federal 
parliament provided for advances to be made to states for the construction of 
wheat elevators.  Construction of a network of 28 silos alongside railway 
lines in the NSW wheat belt commenced in 1917, and construction of the 
Sydney export terminal elevator commenced a year later.  During the 1920s 
this network of grain elevators expanded rapidly, the number standing at 84 
in 1929.  For 30 years, the Grain Elevators Branch of the NSW Department 
of Agriculture had responsibility for the handling and storage of this wheat;  
it traded under the name ‘Government Grain Elevators’ (OYB 1929, p. 584;  
1955, pp 859-60).  
 
Statutory authority on representational basis 
With their growing experience of representation on the many marketing 
authorities established by various Australian governments to promote and sell 
primary produce, wheatgrower organisations were increasingly urging the NSW 
government to set up a board for the management of the elevator system on 
which they could be similarly represented. This action was taken by the Cahill 
Labor government in 1955, Minister for Agriculture Graham having advised 
parliament that, with ‘continued expansion over recent years, the bulk handling 
system had reached the stage of becoming a public utility of the most vital 
concern not only to wheatgrowers, but also to the community as a whole’ 
(Graham 1954, p. 1722). The second stage in this enterprise’s evolution thus 
arrived when the Grain Elevators Board (GEB) was established as a conventional 
statutory authority under the Grains Handling Act 1954 to take over the 
functions of the old Branch The existing branch manager became full-time 
chairman and chief executive of the board, with part-time members representing 
the State Treasury, the State Railways (which carried the grain away from the 
silos) and wheatgrowers (two representatives).  
GEB undertook a range of functions related to the transport and storage of 
grain, including operation of grain export shipping terminals.  Its largest 
customer was the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) which operated in both 
domestic and export wheat markets:  under National Security Regulations 
during the war and then the complementary Commonwealth and State 
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Wheat Industry Stabilisation Acts of 1948, an organised marketing scheme 
and wheat stabilisation plan were established to provide security to the 
industry on a continuing basis.  AWB was established as the central 
exporting arm of the industry with export monopoly powers, and within 
NSW the GEB acted as its agent, receiving, testing, storing and loading 
grain for shipment while the AWB arranged sales and shipping programs. 
Through the 1970s, however, problems emerged in the running of the 
elevator system. Increased wheat production, developments in wheat 
growing and harvesting technology, a deterioration in industrial relations, a 
new state accounting system and a new financial agreement with AWB all 
focused attention on GEB efficiency, and in 1980 the Wran Labor 
government established a major inquiry to investigate the grain handling 
system and make recommendations for its improvement. In a first report, the 
inquiry pointed to the inability of the existing board to face up to these 
challenges because of the lack of general business experience of the 
majority of its members, and their preoccupation ‘with country operations to 
the detriment of terminal operations, financial controls and industrial 
relations’ (Cunningham 1980, p. 4). In a striking pre-run of the arguments 
used by federal Primary Industry Minister John Kerin in restructuring 
Commonwealth marketing authorites a few years later (see Kerin 1986 and, 
for comment, Wettenhall 1988: 197-9), the Wran government determined 
that GEB needed to be reformed to provide ‘a high level of management 
skill and experience’, with board members having the ‘range and depth of 
skills to make policies in all areas and evaluate the management 
performance’ (Day 1980, pp 3152-5).  
The outcome was the replacement of GEB by a new Grain Handling 
Authority of New South Wales (GHA) under the Grain Handling 
Amendment Act 1980. There would still be grower representatives, and also 
union representatives in line with the then-current policy of the state 
government, but there would also be members with expertise in business 
management and industrial relations, and the offices of chairman and chief 
executive would be split to give a better balance between policy and control 
on the one hand and executive management on the other. GHA was 
described quite specifically as ‘a corporation’ by its creating minister (Day 
1980, p. 3154), and it was generally put on a much firmer business basis: the 
processes of its creation indicated that at least some of the components of 
the policy to be described as corporatisation’ by later NSW governments 
had already arrived. 
 
Strengthened statutory corporation: 1981-1989 
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At the time of GHA’s establishment, the grain handling system consisted of 
some 480 bulk storages located in over 270 centres throughout the NSW 
wheat belt, linked to shipping terminals at the ports of Sydney and 
Newcastle. 
 
The Cunningham inquiry also recommended that urgent consideration be 
given to the building of a third seaboard terminal.  From the outset the new 
GHA board gave high priority to the determination of the need for and 
location of this third terminal:  a variety of options included upgrading the 
existing terminals or planning for a new terminal taking into consideration 
factors such as rail congestion, changes required in the rail network and the 
likely impact of the drift of nearby pollutants.  In 1982, Coopers and 
Lybrand were engaged to undertake an independent financial evaluation of 
eight specified options:  they provided a cost analysis comparison for 
handling NSW grain exports up to the year 2001, and recommended 
building a new terminal at Port Botany and closing the existing Sydney 
terminal when the new terminal became operational (GHA 1981; Coopers & 
Lybrand fidings reported in GHA 1982).   
 
Following the release of the Coopers and Lybrand study, the GHA board 
invited submissions from interested parties.  An early reaction came from 
interest groups in Port Kembla, particularly the Port Kembla Task Force and 
the South Coast Labour Council, proposing a new terminal at Port Kembla 
as a ninth option.  GHA noted that the State Rail Authority’s decision to 
proceed with the construction of the Maldon-Dombarton rail link greatly 
enhanced Port Kembla’s claim, and the Ministry of Transport undertook a 
costing of the various options including the new option of Port Kembla 
(GHA 1983). 
 
A record harvest of 8 million tonnes in 1983-84 placed great strain on the 
two export terminals and hastened a decision on the new terminal, and in 
February 1984 the state premier announced that the new terminal would be 
built at Port Kembla (GHA 1984).  The state government agreed to provide 
a grant of $28.5m for the provision of rail and shipping facilities and the 
Commonwealth provided a grant of $18.7m.  The decision in favour of Port 
Kembla was strongly influenced by the problem of high unemployment in 
the Illawarra Region and the availability of the grant for this site from the 
federal government.   
 
Financial impact of the Port Kembla Grain Terminal 
 
The Port Kembla grain terminal commenced operation in August 1989, but its 
financing went close to crippling the GHA.  The cost of construction---$230m--- 
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was substantially above the original estimate.   It was argued that the terminal 
was over-designed with expensive high-quality technology and that a cheaper 
design would have been a more cost-effective solution.  Not only did the new 
terminal provide an export capacity well in excess of contemporary average 
annual export levels;  its cost placed a greatly increased interest burden on GHA, 
which found itself with a crippling debt at the end of the construction period---
and this in a period of record high interest rates.  In most years the GHA had 
made sound profits, but these turned into losses in 1986-87 and 1987-88;  in the 
latter year, the debt reached $222m. 
 
Two were two significant related factors.  First, deregulation had been 
proposed by the 1986 Royal Commission into Grain Handling, Storage and 
Transport, ushering in a period of major change and uncertainty in that 
industry.  And second, the Greiner Liberal-National Coalition government 
elected to office in NSW in March 1988 adopted the so-called 
corporatisation policy considered in Chapter 5.  We have already noted that 
the reorganisation which produced GHA in 1981 involved a substantial 
tightening of management and business expertise in this state enterprise;  
now the state would proceed to reorganise it once more in the light of that 
policy. 
 
In May 1988 the GHA board accepted the major recommendations of the 
royal commission;  it requested the state government to restructure the 
organisation financially to enable it to be more competitive, and to amend 
the governing legislation to enable it to operate commercially.  Then, in 
September 1988, the Deputy Premier and National Party leader, Wal 
Murray, announced the decision to ‘corporatise’ GHA under the new policy, 
to convert $95m of its existing debt into equity (reducing its debt-servicing 
costs by $12.5m annually), and to ‘consider offers from established private 
companies in the grains industry and the Australian Wheat Board’ to buy the 
enterprise.  Commenting on the decision, Premier Greiner made much of the 
former Labor government’s ‘outrageous’ decision to build the Port Kembla 
Terminal, and estimated (on the basis of figures produced by his 
Commission on Audit) that the likely return from a sale---$190m---would 
result in the state’s taxpayers losing between $85m and $87m.  The GHA 
Managing Director, Vince Graham, responded by welcoming ‘the decision 
to establish the GHA as a commercial and competitive organisation through 
corporatisation’ (all reported in Lagan 1988). 
 
GHA was the first state-owned enterprise to be processed under the terms of 
the State Owned Corporations (SOC) Act 134/1989;  in fact, its own 
conversion legislation followed that act very closely (Grain Handling 
Authority (Conversion) Act 135/1989).  The immediate effect was to turn 
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GHA into NSW Grain Corporation Ltd (almost immediately shortened to 
GrainCorp), a company incorporated under the NSW Companies Code.1  
The two ministers holding the shares of GrainCorp under the SOC system 
were authorised to appoint the corporate board:  it was to comprise a 
chairman, three directors selected for their commercial expertise, one for 
industrial relations expertise, three as grower nominees, and the chief 
executive. 
 
 
Preparation for sale 
 
No one was in any doubt that, under the Greiner government, privatisation 
was to follow.  GrainCorp introduced a comprehensive range of 
management strategies to modernise the organisation in preparation for this 
sale, and the government wrote off some $250m of its debt to establish a 
realistic asset base.   
 
It made an operating surplus before tax of $5.2m in its first year even though 
the 1989-90 season recorded the third lowest wheat harvest for two decades.  
1990-91 returned another profit of $22m, and in this two-year period $11m 
was paid to the NSW government in lieu of taxes and another $11m as 
dividends.  Some $28m was expended on capital items, together with an 
$18m payment for the Port Kembla Terminal completion.  The new terminal 
was officially opened in February 1990 after a six-year construction period;  
the Sydney terminal had already been decommissioned and was transferred 
to the books of the state government.  In 1991-92, however, GrainCorp 
recorded a deficit of $6.5m. 
 
There was a strong drive for productivity improvement.  In 1989-90 
GrainCorp reduced staff by 15% to 460 personnel, and its annual reports 
claimed a doubling of productivity at the Newcastle terminal and the 
development of innovative manning arrangements at silos.  New industrial 
awards were negotiated, based on structural efficiency principles and 
significantly streamlined employment conditions:  they provided for much 
improved operational flexibility, staff skills development and progression 
opportunities.  Ship turn-around times at the Port Kembla Terminal were 
more than halved, following new arrangements for extending ship-loading 
hours introduced by the Australian Wheat Board.  Despite deregulation 
GrainCorp retained a strong position in NSW, with approximately 95% of 
the export wheat market and more than 70% of the domestic wheat market 
(GrainCorp Ltd 1990-1992). 
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These were impressive achievements, but they were made while the 
enterprise was still in public ownership and give rise to the inevitable 
privatisation question:  given a similarly resolute government and similarly 
resolute management, could they not also have been made in an enterprise 
intended to remain in the public sector? 
 
The sale process 
 
The divestment got under way in February 1991, when Minister of 
Transport Bruce Baird announced a two-stage trade sale.  The GrainCorp 
board had produced an Information Memorandum for potential purchasers 
containing information on the process to be followed and the business, 
financial position and history of the enterprise.  In the first stage potential 
buyers were invited through national and international advertisements to 
submit expressions of interest by 28 June 1991, being asked to indicate how 
much they were willing to pay and what was their proposed means of 
financing the acquisition. The parties were also required to indicate: 
 
• how they would propose to manage the business including their 
intentions regarding the future employment of current employees and the 
terms and conditions of their employment; 
• what arrangements, if any, they would they be prepared to make to 
permit NSW grain growers and the employees of GrainCorp to 
participate in its ownership or profits or those of the purchaser. 
 
The second stage involved selecting a short list of parties who demonstrated 
a serious interest in purchasing the company.  Detailed discussions were 
then held with each of the short-listed parties and arrangements made for 
them to be given access to corporate information, the senior managers, and 
material contracts.  A draft contract of sale was provided at that time.  These 
short-listed parties were now requested to make final offers and to disclose 
any amendments they would seek to have made to the draft contract 
(GrainCorp Ltd 1992).  The negotiations extended over a considerable 
period after receipt of the bids, indicating that the process of arranging a 
satisfactory sale was a complex one. 
 
Despite the international advertising, it was soon clear that the government 
intended to sell GrainCorp to the grain growers with some possibility for 
staff-share participation.  The terms of the invitation to express interest 
aimed to discourage bids from private corporations without strong industry 
associations, and that was also likely to discourage foreign buyers, even 
though they may have had the capacity to pay more.  Rothschild Australia 
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was appointed to advise the government on the sale, and it estimated that 
GrainCorp was worth between $90m and $120m.  
 
Eventually GrainCorp was sold, on 30 September 1992, to Prime Wheat 
Association Ltd (PWA).  PWA was widely representative of the NSW 
grains industry, having over 8,000 members representing approximately 
90% of the industry.  Sale to this group attracted widespread industry 
support (O’Meara 1998a), and the Labor opposition agreed that, if it had to 
be sold, there could not be a more desirable purchaser.  What debate there 
was centred mostly on the rights and welfare of GrainCorp personnel, and 
strong feeling within the Illawarra region agaist sale of the so-recently 
constructed Port Kembla Terminal. 
 
Initially PWA paid a minimum purchase price of $90m though, 
dramatically, that sum was actually lent to PWA by the government.  
Depending on the level of grain receipts, the sale price under the contract 
was capable of being increased to $110m.  The final price was $100m. Also 
the state government retained GrainCorp residual cash of around $12m plus 
its head office, which was estimated to have a value of $5m.  The terms of 
the sale provided for the debt repayment costs to the NSW Treasury to be 
spread over two decades, with provisions for reduced payments in poorer 
seasons (mostly from PWA 1992; for background, see also PWGA 1970).   
 
The sale of the issued share capital to PWA was conditional on the passing 
of enabling legislation.  The effect of this legislation (NSW Grain 
Corporation Holdings Limited Act  31/1992) was that GrainCorp ceased to 
be a state-owned corporation but remained a corporation under the 
Corporations Law.2  The act also protected the position of GrainCorp's 
remaining employees and ensured that they were not prejudiced by the sale:  
their entitlements were preserved and PWA was required to undertake to 
honour all existing contracts and awards.  Also in relation to superannuation, 
all accrued benefits of the employees were preserved by regulation.  It was a 
condition of sale that PWA should establish a superannuation scheme for 
GrainCorp staff on no less favourable terms than the state scheme.  
 
At the time of privatisation GrainCorp owned and operated 664 bulk 
storages at some 270 rural sites in NSW’s grain growing regions, with total 
storage capacity of 11.2 million tonnes.  The majority of storage sites were 
located on rail lines operated by the State Rail Authority and linked by rail 
to the seaboard terminals at Newcastle and Port Kembla, which GrainCorp 
also owned and operated. 
 
Since privatisation 
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The privatisated management focused quickly on the need to accelerate 
repayment of the debt to government;  to raise equity through a shareholding 
system which would provide incentives in the form of rebates to 
shareholders linked to the tonnages of grain they deliver to GrainCorp;  and 
to achieve further productivity improvement and increased flexibility in 
staffing to allow greater adjustment in drought years.  It wanted also to 
develop the exempt stock market and trading in shares, and to introduce 
other incentives for growers who use its storage system (O’Meara 1998a). 
 
Three classes of shares were set out in GrainCorp’s articles of association:  
one non-transferable ‘foundation’ share held by PWA, conferring two-thirds 
of the total number of votes and the right to appoint six directors, and 
serving much as a golden or kiwi share in other privatisations;  Class A 
Ordinary shares issued to the public (mostly wheat growers, but some also 
held by GrainCorp) under a prospectus dated 29 September 1993;  and Class 
B Ordinary shares held by PWA but not conferring voting or dividend 
rights.  In expanding the Class A share issue, GrainCorp listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in mid-1997 as an ‘exempt stock market’, 
with the consulting firm KPMG providing share-registry services.  It 
became the first agribusiness in Australia to operate such a market:  the 
arrangement provided greater convenience and security for buyers and 
sellers of these Class A shares, which were trading at $6.90 in December 
1997 (GrainCorp 1998c). 
 
The expansion of the share base provided much greater financial stability, 
reducing the cost of funding, and facilitating early repayment of debt to the 
NSW government.  PWA had no debt before it purchased GrainCorp and its 
asset base before privatisation amounted to only $2 million; after the 
purchase, it had a $90 million debt to the government.  Debt reduction 
commenced in the first year after privatisation, and in 1993 GrainCorp 
negotiated a credit facility with the National Australia Bank at competitive 
market rates which enabled it to repay this debt fully in 1998, with the aid of 
a year of record profit (O’Meara 1998b). 
 
The financial performance of GrainCorp is influenced very largely by the 
size of the annual NSW wheat harvest, which fluctuates greatly.  So climate-
driven rises and falls in profitability are to be expected, and GrainCorp 
explored further cost reduction measures:  thus one review of the optimal 
quantity of storage required identified 62 sites surplus to requirements, and a 
process of disposing of these sites began. 
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In June 1995 GrainCorp purchased a 25% stake in Vic Grain Ltd, which had 
purchased the former Grains Elevators Board from the Victorian 
government a month earlier.  This investment enabled GrainCorp to spread 
financial risk and enabled the cross-utilisation of resources between Victoria 
and New South Wales.3  Other diversification measures have included 
GrainCorp’s movement into the area of fertiliser distribution, enabling the 
back-loading of grain-to-port trains.  Successful joint ventures have been 
established for the operation of fertliizer facilities in Parkes and Junee 
(O’Meara 1998a).   
 
A dividend re-investment program was launched in 1995, enabling 
shareholders to re-invest dividends back into the company and so improving 
GrainCorp's capacity to reduce debt.  There have been more improvements 
in labour productivity, and many functions have been devolved to the 
district level;  also computerisation has greatly reduced the volume of paper 
records and eliminated the very labour-intensive tasks under the old system 
that involved manual record-keeping and physical checking of loads at 
weighbridges---though the sceptic would observe that this would surely 
have happened whether the enterprise was within the public or the private 
sector. An employee share acquisition plan came in 1997 (O’Meara 1998b). 
 
In 1998, GrainCorp listed fully with ASX, requiring an amendment to the 
articles of association and the cessation of the exempt stock market.  The 
change was intended to facilitate trading in the Class A shares and enable 
their ‘true’ market value to be established.  But PWA retained its 
‘foundation’ share and continued to hold about 74% of the Class A and 
Class B shares (GrainCorp 1998, p. 26;  Martin 1998).   
 
The grain handling enterprise thus became a fairly normal private trading 
corporation, having travelled through a virtually full range of organisational 
forms since its establishment in 1916 as a branch of a public service 
department.  
 
Summarising, the main stages in GrainCorp’s organisational evolution have 
been as follows: 
 
1916:  New South Wales’ grain elevator system commenced as a branch of 
the state’s Department of Agriculture. 
 
1954:  a statutory authority known as the Grain Elevators Board (GEB) 
established to take over the running of the system. 
 
  
 
66
1980:  a strengthened statutory corporation, the Grain Handling Authority of 
New South Wales, replaces GEB, and is later transformed into NSW Grain 
Corporation Ltd, the first NSW government-owned company established 
under the State Owned Corporations Act 1989. 
 
1992:  the company sold to Prime Wheat Association Ltd, a private 
company representing NSW grain growers and now the principal 
shareholder in the main operating (holding) company, which was renamed 
GrainCorp Ld in 1993. 
 
Notes: 
 
1.  However the legislation provided for the eventual establishment of a second state company, NSW Grain 
Corporation Holding Ltd, with GrainCorp to become its operating subsidiary.  This restructuring was 
completed in September 1990 (NSWGCH 1990, p. 1).  The legislation also established a Grain Handling 
Ministerial Corporation to hold and dispose of assets, rights and liabilities excluded from the property of 
GHA before the conversion. 
 
2. At time of sale NSW Grain Corporation Holding Ltd was renamed GrainCorp Services Ltd, and the 
operating subsidiary, NSW Grain Corporation Ltd, became GrainCorp Operations Ltd.  Post-sale 
restructuring was completed on 1 October 1993.  The group structure now comprised GrainCorp Ltd as the 
principal company and two “controlled entities”, GrainCorp Services Ltd (wholly owned by GrainCorp), 
and GrainCorp Operations Ltd (wholly owned by GrainCorp Services).  Most of the assets and liabilities of 
PWA were effectively transferred to GrainCorp Operations in exchange for over 450,000 Class A shares, 
while certain testing activities previously performed by PWA resurfaced as a division of GrainCorp 
Operations (GCL 1994, pp 5, 23). 
 
3. Eventually this Victorian business was formed into another controlled entity. 
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Chapter 5 
 
THE SYDNEY FISH MARKET* 
 
This is the second of our industry buy-out case studies.  As in the case of 
GrainCorp, the privatisation occurred in the context of plans to deregulate what 
had been a protected industry. Formerly owned and operated by an authority of 
the New South Wales government, the market was sold to a joint-venture 
partnership established by the two main sectors of the state’s fishing industry, the 
catching sector comprising the commercial fishermen and the wholesale/retail 
tenants at the Sydney Fish Market (SFM) site.  
 
It is the largest fish market in Australia and the second largest seafood market in 
the world for variety of fish;  an average of 65 tonnes of seafood is sold every day 
at a rate of 1000 crates of fish every hour.  The new company has repaid the debt 
incurred at privatisation and has implemented measures to reduce operating costs 
and charges to suppliers and buyers.  It has established a good reputation with 
customers and the suppliers. 
 
Before the sale 
 
Prior to 1949, the marketing of fish in New South Wales was conducted at SFM 
by licensed fish agents, or by unlicensed operators elsewhere in the state.  
However, in 1945, fishermen had complained that the agents were not passing on 
to them reasonable returns fron the sale of fish, and eventually the state 
government responded by amending the Fisheries and Oyster Farms Act 1935 to 
require that all fish would be sold through a recognised market, either SFM or 
fishermen’s cooperative trading societies in other coastal locations.  The Chief 
Secretary’s Department manged SFM from 1949 to 1963.1 
 
In the latter year management passed to the NSW Fish Authority (later Fish 
Marketing Authority or FMA),2  a statutory corporation whose board was 
composed mainly of licensed fishermen from the catching sector and which was 
responsible to the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries .  It administered an 
orderly marketing system comprising SFM, the cooperative trading societies and, 
in locations not serviced by them, a scheme of approvals under which individual 
fishermen and retail/wholesale outlets were given permission to buy or sell 
outside those markets.  FMA derived all its revenue from commissions charged on 
sales of fish product, property rentals and other miscellaneous services.   Except 
for those holding exemption approvals, all professional fishermen were required 
to sell their catches to SFM or to one of the cooperative trading societies. 
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FMA inherited an old market conducted in premises rented from the Sydney City 
Council in Haymarket, close to the centre of the city.  But in 1966 it moved the 
market to its present site at Blackwattle Bay on Sydney’s inner harbour.  Then in 
1982 it purchased a paper store building adjoining that market with a view to 
developing the site as a new, modern market.  This development plan would 
eventually bring FMA to a severe financial crisis;  however, from 1966 to 1988 it 
operated sucessfully as a financially independent and self-funding organisation, 
regularly making small profits on its operations ( FMA 1963-94; Skepper 1996, 
1998a). 
 
Work on relocation and development commenced early in 1988, the cost of the 
work estimated at the time to be $14 million.  A contract worth $11.9 million was 
awarded for the refurbishing of a warehouse building to provide facilities 
including a large auction room, cold storage, and retail, wholesale and office 
facilities.  The handling systems and facilities were designed to meet export 
quality assurance standards, and to allow the introduction of a computer-
controlled Dutch auction system similar to those operating in produce markets in 
Holland, Denmark, the USA and Canada---it would be the first such system in 
Australia. 
 
The new market was completed in 1989.  Its efficiencies enabled FMA to 
rationalise its staffing arrangements:  thus 35 differnt job classifications in the old 
market were replaced by the single classification “market floor operator” at five 
different levels.  The new auction system speeded up the sale process and the 
transmission of data, stabalised selling prices on the day of the sale, and generally 
provided a better service to buyers and sellers. 
 
FMA continued to pursue the cause of excellence in its work.  In 1989, its general 
manager and a board member undertook an overseas tour to learn about the most 
recent developments in handling practice and in training buyers in the operation of 
computerised marketing systems.  And in the same year the scope of the 
construction project was extended as the result of a decision to upgrade the 
refrigeration, processing and storage facilities.  The refrigeration system that 
resulted was the only one of its kind in Australia, and it was constructed to the 
highest standard (FMA 1989). 
 
But all this placed FMA under substantial financial pressure.  The full cost of 
redevelopment was $27 million, well in excess of the original budget of $14 
million.  It was financed by a loan from the NSW Treasury Corporation with a 
fixed interst rate of 19%.  FMA now incurred large losses.  The cause of the 
deterioration in financial performance was of course the sudden acceleration in 
these debt-servicing costs, the capital investment coinciding with a period of 
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abnormally high interst rates.  A severe cash flow crisis resulted, the industry lost 
confidence in the market, and it appears likely that a black market developed with 
catchers selling high-value low-volume seafood such as prawns and lobsters 
directly to retailers (Skepper 1996, 1998).   
 
This downturn was one of two factors now drawing the NSW government’s 
attention to SFM.  The other was the prevailing climate of microeconomic reform, 
which encouraged effort to reduce the high degree of industry regulation in 
primary product industries.  The marketing monopoly FMA held in Sydney was 
antithetical to the new spirit of National Competition Policy;  and it was observed 
that fish marketing in other states was in the private sector. 
 
Towards privatisation 
 
In 1991 a loss of $4,172,463 was incurred mainly as a result of the debt servicing 
costs.  In that year new general manager Graham Crouch submitted reports to the 
government recommending strategies to enable FMA to trade on a commercially 
viable basis, and it engaged the consultanting firm Coopers and Lybrand to 
conduct a managerial review, with wide terms of reference covering the 
management structure, core and non-core activities and financial matters.  Among 
other things its report pointed to possible staff reductions, and FMA reduced its 
staff from 78 in 1991 to 47 in 1992 (FMA 1991, 1992). 
 
For its part, the Greiner Liberal-National Party Coalition government now in 
office in New South Wales commissioned a number of studies into the operation 
of fish marketing.  One report by the Centre for International Economics 
recommended that the government should consider the complete deregulation of 
the industry, including withdrawal of the state from fish marketing activities, sale 
of the market site, and dissolution of FMA (reported by Skepper 1998). 
 
The government’s decision was announced by Premier Greiner when he visited 
the market on 17 March 1992.  First, it would transfer SFM from public to private 
ownership and management, but not sell the market site;  and second, it would 
remove restrictions on the marketing of fresh seafood in the County of 
Cumberland, the planning area that covered the Sydney metropolitan region 
(Greiner 1992). 
 
The sale 
 
The privatisation process commenced when the government issued a consultation 
document entitled “Reform of the Marketing of Fresh Seafood in New South 
Wales” that set out information including: 
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· information on the bidding process and the timetable for transfer; 
· who was invited to express interest; 
· preferred criteria; 
· details of non-binding expression of interest; 
· information on the consultation process and audited financial statements of 
FMA.  
 
Parties submitting non-binding expressions of interest were required to specify: 
 
· their interests in and association with the fishing industry; 
· their financial and management credentials including an indication of likely 
sources of finance to fund the purchase of SFM; 
· the intended ownership structure;  
· the basis on which they intend to operate the wholesale market and whether 
they intended to continue the established operational processes; 
· the terms and conditions upon which they proposed to acquire the enterprise. 
 
The intention was to privatise SFM by a trade-sale process using a two-round 
bidding process. 
 
The next step was a call, issued on 22 September 1993, for non-binding 
expressions of interest from parties wishing to place bids.  Six such expressions of 
interest were received by 17 January 1994 at the close of the bidding period.  
They were then evaluated within the NSW Treasury, and three were chosen to 
proceed to the next stage of the privatisation process:  SFM Tenants and 
Merchants Pty Ltd;  NSW Fishermen’s Co-operative Association Ltd;  and a  
group of licensed fishermen from the NSW South Coast. 
 
Following a series of meetings, the two main industry stakeholders agreed to join 
together and lodge a combined bid.  They formed a company called Sydney Fish 
Market Pty Ltd, and at the close of tenders on 13 April 1994 this was the only 
remaining bid, the other bidder (the South Coast fishermen’s group) having 
withdrawn from the contest.  It is a joint-venture company with 50% owned by 
the SFM Tenants and Merchants Pty Ltd and 50% owned by the commercial 
fishermen of NSW through a holding company and unit trust.  The catching sector 
was unable to pursue its own separate proposal because it lacked the financial 
resources necessary to fund a successful bid.  The tenants’ and merchants’ 
company, owned by groups already operating at SFM, was in a stronger financial 
position. 
 
Legislation was required to facilitate the sale and dissolve FMA.  Minister 
Causley explained to parliament that his government believed it was not a proper 
function of government to run fish markets, and also that the industry itself was 
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capable of managing its own affairs and should be given the opportunity to do so 
(Causley 1994, pp 1908-9).  For the Labor opposition, J Martin complained that 
the consultants hired by the government in 1991-92 had been spreading the word 
“that the Sydney Fish Market was up for a fire sale”;  he also commended the 
industry itself and his own party “for waging a campaign to ensure that this 
market did not fall into private or foreign hands” (obviously, in this view, the 
industry was not private!).  The opposition now generally supported the proposed 
changes, but moved amendments relating to the deregulation process and to 
provide a transition period for the employees to ensure “that they are given a fair 
go” during the transition (Martin 1994, pp 2585-6).  The legislation passed both 
houses of the state parliament on 13 May 1994 (Fish Marketing Act 37/1994).3 
 
The sale took place on 31 October 1994 and was announced in the Government 
Gazette on 28 October 1994.  Sydney Fish Market Pty Ltd purchased the business 
operations of FMA from the NSW government for the sum of $3 million.  Placing 
a market value on SFM had been complicated by the planned deregulation of the 
industry, which created concerns about the long-term future.  Delaying 
deregulation by three years was seen as a way of giving the new owners an 
opportunity to establish a good reputation before this further change arrived 
(Skepper 1998). 
 
The sale contract provided for: 
 
.   purchase by the company of the assets of FMA including plant and equipment, 
computer     software and inventories; 
.   the granting of a concurrent lease of the SFM site to the company for a term of 
40 years with an option to renew for a further 10 years at an annual rental of 
$1.5 million; and 
 .  the offer to all 47 FMA staff of employment on similar terms and conditions 
with a guarantee of employment for at least 12 months. 
 
The government provided the joint-venture company with a reduction to its 
commercial risk by agreeing in the contract of sale to reduce the annual rent if 
there was any substantial reduction of supply of fish to the market for a limited 
period after deregulation.  The agreed rent was, in any case, much less than a full 
market rent for the property and represented an on-going subsidy to the owners.  
The government also wrote off FMA’s accumulated losses and debt. 
 
To finance the purchase of the market and provide working capital, the company 
borrowed $5 million from the State Bank of New South Wales, partly as 
overdraft, partly as a bank bill facility, and partly as a fixed-interest term loan.  
The bill facility and term loan were repayable over 2 1/2 years, with the final 
instalment to be repaid in April 1997. 
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After privatisation 
 
The new company board comprised two members nominated by each of the joint-
venture partners and three independent members.  The SFM finance and 
administration manager, who had 20 years’ experience under the old Authority 
and retained his position after privatisation, has reported that the leadership of this 
board has been much more commercially focused since the transition: 
 
There is now a strong customer and cliect focus to all operational issues.  The real competition that deregulation 
has introduced has provided a stronger incentive for the Market to sharpen up its act in terms of providing the best 
possible management and service to all stakeholders ...The independent board members have provided very 
valuable commercial experience and, along with the retailers, have given the strong commercial leadership.  The 
members from the catching sector have provided the board with extensive practical knowledge of the supply side 
of the business.  The unique combination of skills and knowledge of board members from the different 
perspectives has given the company an excellent balance between industry issues and commercial priorities 
(Skepper 1998). 
 
As a consequence of the deregulation, since 1997 the fishing cooperatives have no 
longer been required to sell their catches through SFM---they can choose to 
bypass it and sell directly to the large retail chain stores.  But of couse their part-
ownership of SFM is a disincentive for them to do that, so long as they believe it 
is operating with reasonable efficiency.  The new management reduced handling 
charges to fishermen to make selling through it more attractive to them, and it 
handles the greater part of the NSW catch.  Increasingly, it also imports fish 
supplies from outside NSW, partly to obtain tropical varieties of fish and partly as 
a means of conserving the long-term sustainable yield from NSW waters. 
 
The government’s waiving of the old debt placed the new owners in a much better 
financial position than their predecessors, and the company was soon well ahead 
of schedule in its repayment of the debt undertaken to finance the purchase.  The 
final payment was made in April 1997 (SFM 1997):  to facilitate this quick 
discharge, it paid no dividend in 1995, but dividends flowed to the two 
shareholders in following years.  In the years since the sale, SFM has pursued the 
aim of establishing the company ‘as the focal point of the industry’ and of 
developing the site ‘into Australia’s Seafood Centre of Excellence’.  As the 
deregulation process has continued, SFM has consistently returned profits after 
tax of just over $1 million per year (SFM 1995-99). 
 
Brief assessment 
 
A quick assessment of this privatisation shows that it has been broadly successful 
in meeting the Greiner government’s objectives, and also that it has furthered 
National Competition Policy objectives.  It is likely also that the two joint-venture 
purchasers have regarded it as a good investment. 
  
 
74
 
However an issue in many Australian privatisations is whether the price at which 
the enterprise is sold represents the real market value.  When one considers the 
actual post-privatisation profit performance of SMA, the purchase price of $3 
million was a real bargain for the industry.  The annual rent of $2 million from the 
retail shops at SFM exceeds the annual rent of $1.5 million that the government 
charges for the whole site.  In hindsight, the terms of the sale can be seen as 
generous, particularly because they took into account the risk factors accociated 
with deregulation. 
 
Summarising, the main stages in the Fish Market’s organisational evolution have 
been as follows: 
 
1949-63:  the Sydney Fish Market managed by the NSW Chief Secretary’s 
Department. 
 
1963:  management passed to the NSW Fish Authority, a statutory corporation 
mostly representing fishing interests, which was renamed Fish Marketing 
Authority (FMA) in the late 1960s. 
 
1994:  sold to Sydney Fish Market Pty Ltd, a private consortium joining the 
commercial fishermen of NSW and the tenants and merchants at the market. 
 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
1. More information on these  early arrangements can be found in FMA 1971a.  This account makes it clear that 
there has long been, within the fishing industry, a strong desire to have marketing conducted by a fishermen’s co-
operative. 
 
2. NSW Fish Authority established by Fisheries and Oyster Farms (Amendment) Ast 20/1963;  name changed in 
the late 1960s. 
 
3. In common with other NSW privatising acts of this period, this legislation also established a “ministerial 
corporation” (in this case, the Fisheries Administration Ministerial Corporation) to hold assets, rights and liabilities 
excluded from the sale.  Other such ministerial corporations are noted in our case studies of the GrainCorp and 
GIO divestments. 
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Chapter 6 
 
GOVERNMENT INSURANCE OFFICE OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
GIO AUSTRALIA * 
 
 
This case is of particular interest for four reasons.  First, it was the first in 
Australia to use the public float method to secure the divestment of a whole 
public enterprise, and so became an exemplar for subsequent divestments of 
this kind.  Second, the enterprise that was sold was both a competitor in a 
heavily contested commercial field and widely regarded as successful in its 
public ownership phase.  Third, notwithstanding its subsequent exemplar value, 
it was a case in which few decisions were clear cut, and some of the steps that 
were taken were contested by the main actors:  the range of activities of the 
enterprise itself, what ‘corporatisation’ meant, whether to sell by trade sale or 
float, and what potential shareholder market to target.  And fourth, because 
these contests occurred, it is likely that personalities were more important in 
this case than in most other privatisations.  The sale itself was a messy affair, 
but it showed Australian public administration grappling with a new kind of 
challenge and having to learn as it worked through the sale process. 
 
The subject enterprise came ‘unstuck’ several years after the sale, and this will 
no doubt be seen to support those who argue that the public sector should not 
engage in risk-taking commercial activities.  For those who care to look, it will 
also highlight the risks being entered into, mostly unconsciously, by all the 
small investors (in the Australian idiom, ‘mums and dads’) who buy shares in 
these public floats.  But these are post-sale features:  they do not affect the 
perceptions held at the time of the sale and in the early years afterwards that 
GIO was successful as a public enterprise and that, through the sale conditions, 
the state conferred a considerable benefit on those who bought into it.1 
 
A successful public enterprise 
 
Government insurance activity in New South Wales (NSW) began in 1891, 
when the state began insuring its properties and activities---and soon those of 
government contractors2---against risk through a special fund created in the 
Treasury.  From 1926 the state required all employers to insure their workers 
against workplace injury, but private insurers either refused to cater for this 
business or charged high premiums;  the state decided to expand its own 
operation to take on this business and exert competitive pressure on the rates 
charged by the private insurers.  In 1927 legislation formalised the Treasury 
insurance branch as the Government Insurance Office (GIO) under a statutory 
general manager. 
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The operations soon became politically controversial.  Reflecting the 
embarrassment often felt by conservative governments when public enterprises 
are successful, efforts were made to restrain GIO’s competitive activities in the 
1930s.  But, under a Labor government in 1941, it was authorised to write life 
insurance, incorporated as an independent authority, and required to make 
payments to the owning government in lieu of the taxes it was exempted from 
as a state authority.  Also in the 1940s, the state made third-party motor vehicle 
insurance compulsory and GIO entered that business.  Rising court-awarded 
damages in motor vehicle accidents soon made this business unprofitable for 
the private insurance companies and by 1977 GIO, aided by its government 
guarantee, was conducting 97% of this class of business.  This was regarded as 
‘social insurance’, and for this business alone GIO was exempted from the 
requirement to make the tax-equivalent payment and later (in 1984) given a 
monopoly:  here government wanted to use GIO to influence the level of court 
verdicts in road accident damages cases. 
 
Otherwise it was progressively commercialised, with separate life, third-party 
and general insurance divisions.  A board of directors was provided in 1978, 
with the general manager becoming full-time chairman and part-time directors 
appointed for their industrial, commercial and investment experience.  GIO had 
become ‘one of the largest and most influential insurance offices in Australia’ 
(Renshaw 1978, p. 1742).  In 1982, the board was reconstituted so that it was 
more aligned with the constitutions of leading insurance companies, and in 
1985 it was given a subscribed capital and required to pay dividends to the 
owning government;  consistently with the treatment of most Australian 
statutory corporations, its staff was now separated from the NSW public 
service, requiring the management to deal with employment and industrial 
matters independently of the Public Service Board and as an insurance provider 
rather than a public service agency. 
 
Crucial for this case was the election of the Liberal-National Coalition 
(conservative) government under Premier Nick Greiner in 1988.  This 
government quickly formulated its ‘corporatisation’ policy and tried to impose 
that policy on GIO.3  On the one hand, it acknowledged that GIO has been 
performing well as a public enterprise.  It was, it soon reported,  
 
a significant earner of funds for the NSW Government, with Group after tax profit for 1988-89 of $118.4 
million (expressed in 1989-90 prices).  In total through tax payments, dividends and increases in net worth of 
the enterprise, the State of NSW benefited by some $234 million (in 1989-90 prices) from GIO’s 1989-90 
activities (NSWG 1990, p.27).4 
 
According to Labor leader Bob Carr (1991, pp 3188-89), Greiner had said, 
when Leader of the Opposition and before becoming Premier, that GIO was 
  
 
78
‘precisely the kind of efficient and legitimate government enterprise which 
should not be sold off’.  On the other hand, the Greiner government 
commenced a series of actions whose end-result would be the privatisation of 
GIO. 
 
The divestment 
 
How to explain the decision to sell? 
 
As part of its increasing commercialisation, GIO had been building up a new 
management team.  Three actuaries who had worked for the large Australian 
Mutual Provident Society (AMP) but had become dissatisfied with that 
employer moved to GIO in the late 1970s;  they were highly motivated to 
demonstrate that a public enterprise could compete successfully with a private 
enterprise in its own field, and they worked well and constructively with the 
GIO board.  One of them, Bill Jocelyn, became General Manager in 1983;  his 
managerial style was often provocative and aggressive in support of the general 
aim to build up the enterprise to be one of Australia’s leading insurers.  For 
much of this time the board chairman was Stan Howard, brother of the then 
Liberal (ie conservative) leader and now Prime Minister John Howard.  It 
would have been difficult now to write GIO off as a pampered Labor creation, 
but that did not prevent the private insurers, hurt by GIO’s competitive 
endeavours, from exerting political pressure to have those endeavours curtailed.  
Jocelyn and his colleagues were convinced the private insurers were bringing 
such pressure to bear on the Greiner government.5 
 
By 1990 GIO had symbolically ‘gone national’ by adopting the trade name GIO 
Australia.  It had opened offices in some other Australian states, and it had 
seized the opportunity offered to many insurers by the collapse of Lloyd’s of 
London to enter the reinsurance business.6   So it became a competitor in an 
international business, and its senior staff often needed to travel abroad.  It 
made every effort to learn from the mistakes of others, and its general 
performance was spectacular.  An assessment of its achievements in 1990-91 
showed that, in that year, it wrote single premium policies worth $461 million;  
it ranked fourth in the whole country as a general insurer, seventh as a life 
insurer and eighth in the annuity market;  it had assets of over $8 billion, 
compared to $4.9 billion four years earlier; and it declared a net profit of $95 
million, tax expenses of $92.6 million and a dividend of $30 million (Casey & 
Dollery 1996, pp 19-20).  It is remarkable that it could do all this as a public 
enterprise.  But its rapid growth was placing great strain on its relationship with 
its owning government.  
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Jocelyn argued, in annual reports and elsewhere, that frequent political 
intervention was inimical to the business interests of such an enterprise.  He was 
dealing with the long term, but the Greiner government took exception to his 
statements which it regarded as illustrating the propensity of an enterprise 
management to speak out or gather support in its own interest against proper 
government strategy-setting.  Greiner, who was both head of government and 
Treasurer with ministerial responsibility for GIO, was soon objecting publicly 
both to its spread of business into other states and to its move into off-shore 
reinsurance;  indicating a desire to extract extra dividends from GIO to help 
alleviate budget problems in other areas;7  and demanding that his government’s 
corporatisation policy be applied to GIO.  With much logic on his side, Jocelyn 
expressed puzzlement about this;  he believed GIO had been corporatising over 
several years---but of course it was a statutory corporation, not a company, and 
so did not satisfy the New Zealand test of corporatisation which NSW 
legislation had now adopted.  Generally Jocelyn did not respond warmly to 
Greiner’s attacks, and so he attracted rebukes from Greiner and the hostility of 
some of the latter’s advisers. 
 
It seems likely that the Treasury, which carried direct responsibility for the 
eventual privatisation of GIO, was mostly concerned about the risk factor.  
Trained as an economist, Mike Lambert, who was Deputy Secretary and then 
Secretary to the Treasury in the early 1990s and played a leading part in 
preparing for the GIO privatisation, argued simply that governments should not 
be required to accept the degree of risk involved in the entrepreneurial initiatives 
being taken by the GIO management at that time;  Treasury was particularly 
conscious of this factor for the reason that all the insurance business being 
captured by GIO was still underwritten by government guarantee.  The collapses 
of the Victorian and South Australian State Banks were still of recent memory, 
and in this view they provided strong evidence of the need for caution.  Lambert 
also expressed the very general view that governments are not good at 
ownership, for which the harsh disciplines of the marketplace are necessary 
(Lambert 1997).  It is ironical, as our companion case study of the State Bank of 
South Australia is revealing, that these Australian enterprises had mostly given 
many decades of safe and satisfactory service under public ownership and in the 
public interest, and that the failings to which Lambert and others now attached 
so much attention arrived only with their importation of private sector 
entrepreneurs and private sector operating styles in the heady days of the 1980s. 
 
Gary Sturgess, who is widely regarded as the architect of the NSW 
corporatisation policy and was now Cabinet Secretary, opposed Jocelyn for 
another reason.  He became very cross at what he saw as a ‘subversion of the 
policy process’ by GIO’s senior managers.  He believed strongly that they were 
‘thumbing their noses’ at the government and that they had no right to adopt and 
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publicise a view different from the government’s;  indeed, he thought they had 
got so far out of line that they were worthy of sacking (Sturgess 1997).  
Elsewhere he referred to the ‘the strains which globalisation is placing on our 
traditional concepts of the state’ as a further explanation of the tensions which 
had developed: 
 
The government faced the difficulty of explaining to the taxpayers of NSW why they were reinsuring satellites 
and the merchant navies of several Asian countries.  In recent years the GIO has lost [money] as a result of 
Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina in 1989, ... Storm 90A in Europe later the same year, ... Florida’s Hurricane 
Andrew ... and the fires in California in 1993.  How does a Premier stand up in Parliament and explain to the 
people of NSW that there will be no dividends from the GIO this year because of a hurricane in South Carolina? 
... As government businesses outgrow the geographic boundaries of the nation (or sub-national) state, 
territorially-based governments are being forced to relinquish their interests (Sturgess 1994, pp 9-10,  see also 
Wettenhall 1998a, pp 97-9).8 
 
The impulse to move down the path towards privatisation now came quickly, 
and quite as much from within the enterprise itself as from the government to 
which it reported.  In March 1991 Lambert prepared and Greiner signed an 
instruction to GIO to get out of the reinsurance business (see Appendix).  
Lambert has explained that he fully expected Jocelyn to fight for what he saw as 
the best interests of the enterprise under his management, and that he drafted 
this letter somewhat tongue-in-cheek, using the direction deliberately as a means 
of forcing GIO to decide once and for all either to subordinate itself to the 
government’s wishes or to get out of the public sector.  He rather expected it to 
take the latter course (Lambert 1997).  Within GIO the direction was seen as a 
declaration of war, and Chairman Howard told the press his board ‘was keen for 
GIO to be privatised’, and that ‘it had already commissioned private consultants 
to help it mount its arguments for privatisation’ (quoted in Larriera, Ellis & 
Moore 1991).  
 
Around this time Jocelyn gave several public addresses.  He made no secret of 
the fact that he had battled various agencies of the state such as the ombudsman 
in what he regarded as the best interests of his own organisation.  One important 
message was that, while GIO showed it was possible to be successful under 
government ownership, that outcome could only be achieved if a public 
enterprise management was prepared ‘do its own thing’ and fight against various 
kinds of control exerted by central agencies.  As for ‘corporatisation’ as 
proposed by Sturgess, he said both that turning statutory authority-corporations 
into companies ‘may be a neater way for central control to be exercised over 
monopolies; ... (but that) of itself ... it will not secure any behavioural change’;  
and that, while it may be done with good intentions, it is not possible ‘to prevent 
governments re-intervening ... while you are in public ownership, you can’t keep 
focused only on the profit motive’ (Jocelyn 1989a; 1989b; 1990, p.11; 1996).  
 
How to sell? 
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Since both parties wanted the divorce, events could now move rapidly.   But the 
question how to sell produced more controversy. 
 
Once the agreement to privatise was known publicly, there was pressure on 
Greiner to approve a trade sale rather than a public float.  The GIO management 
was convinced that private insurers were exerting such pressure through Liberal 
Party channels, seeking to break up the enterprise and have it sold it in bits;   
through buying the bits, they could add to their own empires and eliminate a 
powerful competitor (Jocelyn 1996).  Sturgess (1997) also favoured a ‘direct 
sale’, though for another reason.  He was, as we have seen, strongly opposed to 
the tactics employed by the GIO management to force their view on the 
government;  now he believed a float would pass effective ownership into the 
hands of that management since, in his view, a mass of small shareholders 
would not provide significant counterweight within the post-privatisation 
enterprise.  Lambert (1997) indicated that the Treasury investigated both 
approaches:  it concluded that a trade sale would net a bigger return to the 
government, and initially favoured it for that reason.  Fairly obviously, ‘the 
trade’ would have paid well to eliminate a rival. 
 
The evidence that GIO was doing well in its own right as a viable and 
innovative insurance enterprise was, however, compelling.  Working against the 
pressure for a trade sale was the growing commitment, by all the major 
Australian political groupings, to the competition ethic.  Also NSW Treasury 
research into the British privatisation experience was suggesting that it was 
possible to minimise value loss from a float by adopting a ‘book building’ 
approach which relies on market bidding for shares instead of the underwriting 
approach based on a pre-determined value for each share sold, with the 
underwriters taking up the shortfall at what is effectively a discounted price if all 
shares on offer are not sold on the open market (Lambert 1997).  So there were 
also arguments in favour of floating GIO and so ensuring its continued existence 
as an independent enterprise.  Greiner still had to decide what his exit strategy 
should be. 
 
A GIO Sale Task Force was established, charged with preparing the enterprise 
for sale.   This work included several valuations of GIO:  Greiner was still 
saying he considered it important to ensure that the retention value to 
government was not greater than the sale value.  A major task was to obtain 
parliamentary approval for a quick, clean sale.  It seems likely that the 
government had armed itself with several versions of a draft bill, and likely also 
that the GIO representatives on the task force were not fully aware of all the 
planning that had gone on.  When the bill eventually came to parliament, 
Opposition Leader Carr asserted not only that Labor had earlier forced Greiner 
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to ‘back off’ from his plan to raid GIO reserves but also that, just two weekends 
before the bill was introduced, it had blocked the government’s plan ‘to flog off 
the GIO by tender’ by drawing public attention to that plan.  So, according to 
Carr, the provision for a float was hastily incorporated into the final version of 
the bill to be presented to parliament (Carr 1991, pp 3187-8).  Introducing the 
bill for Greiner, Minister George Souris indicated that, ‘in the event that a 
public float proves to be not possible or financially attractive’, the government 
would return to the parliament to seek approval for an alternative approach 
(Souris 1991, pp 2480-3). 
 
As the Government Insurance Office (Privatisation) Act 38/1991, this legislation 
converted GIO from a statutory corporation into a public company limited by 
shares, with a nominal share capital of one billion $1 shares and the new name 
GIO Australia Holdings Ltd.  To this end all the older legislation was repealed 
and the new company made subject to the national Corporations Law.  The 
state’s existing equity in GIO was replaced by the issue to the state of fully paid-
up shares, with machinery provisions to enable the state to receive the proceeds 
of sale of the enterprise by a public float (ss 5-19).  The float would dispose of 
the shares initially issued to the state, with the maximum initial shareholding of 
any one purchaser limited to 10 per cent (ss 29-33).  Another provision 
continued the state guarantee in respect of existing or pre-sale policies, but 
removed it for post-sale policies (s.16).9 
 
While the minister claimed that the sale ‘will represent the first complete float of 
any public trading enterprise in Australia’ (Souris 1991, p. 2483),10  the act 
contained a precautionary provision authorising him to exclude from the 
projected sale any part of the business undertakings of GIO or its subsidiaries 
(‘residual assets’ which might detract from the good balance and saleability of 
the whole), and establishing a NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation to accept 
and manage any such excluded undertakings (ss 24-8).  This provision was used 
to establish a vehicle for the ‘run-off’ of old third-party insurance scheme 
liabilities, which GIO would henceforth manage for the government on a fee-
for-service basis (Green 1997). 
 
The company came into existence on 1 January 1992, and a new board was 
appointed retaining six of the nine former members and adding five new ones.  
A new corporate structure was established, aligning the parts with the relevant 
federal regulators (notably life versus general) so as to minimise possible 
administrative complications.  Within GIO, it was understood that several of the 
new board members had been briefed to get the float going and then dump 
Jocelyn, so the management remained very watchful. 
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GIO proposed that the government should underwrite the float, offering shares 
to policy-holders first, then the public and finally the institutions.  This method, 
Jocelyn believed, would both demonstrate loyalty to GIO’s own customers and 
prevent the exercise becoming an expensive ‘free-for-all’.  As he subsequently 
told Business Review Weekly’s  Robert Gottliebsen, who reported critically on 
the float (1992, pp 46-8), GIO:  
 
was still under threat of being sold to [its] rivals.  By the time [Jocelyn] was certain the NSW Government would 
float the company, a multitude of highly paid people swarming around the NSW Government were able to howl 
him down. 
 
Gottliebsen’s account continued: 
 
without [Jocelyn’s] restraint, it became a free-for-all:  institutions, brokers’ clients, the public and policy-
holders would be encouraged to compete against each other for a share of the action, and there would be fees 
galore ... Jocelyn, who did not believe the float should be advertised, expressed his opposition as a member of 
the privatisation committee.  ‘I don’t like advertising campaigns much’, he says.  ‘I said my piece and then shut 
up.  The advertising was overdone’. 
 
The task force negotiated with the Commonwealth about tax compensation for 
the loss of substantial revenue to the state:  NSW would lose dividends and tax-
equivalent payments from its profitable enterprise, whereas the Commonwealth 
would gain a new income tax stream from the privatised company.11   And 
Jocelyn, who survived much longer than some of the new board members, 
turned his energies towards negotiating a take-over---in the event, highly 
beneficial for GIO---of the Victorian State Insurance Office. 
 
Conducting the float 
 
The task force and the government opted for a saturation advertising campaign 
designed to ‘soften up’ the general public and attract the small investor, selling 
it as ‘the mums’ and dads’ float’.  The drafting of the sale prospectus was a 
major task, and ‘members of the financial services industry’ earned big fees for 
their contribution (Walker & Howard 1992, p. 17).  There were extensive 
discussions with Australian Securities Commission (ASC) officers relating to an 
application for relief from Corporations Law restrictions on pre-prospectus 
advertising of projected floats, and from the requirement to allow adequate time 
for investors to examine prospectus information.  While the ASC authorised 
some relaxation for the GIO float, it felt compelled after the float to express 
misgivings about the way it had been conducted, particularly with respect to the 
advertising campaign (Walker 1992, p. 17). 
 
There were detailed technical briefings of members of parliament, GIO 
customers and GIO staff, and the government launched a $2.5m advertising and 
public relations campaign (Larriera 1992).  Through January and February 1992, 
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the government pushed the message that ‘privatisation is for everyone’, 
featuring the slogan ‘Share in the future of NSW’.  This provoked serious 
questioning about how far such polemical publicity was an acceptable charge 
against the public purse:  though it had accepted the GIO sale in principle, the 
‘loyal opposition’ (Labor) in the state was vehemently opposed to this 
generalising of the alleged benefits of privatisation.  The advertising also 
produced a spate of complaints from members of the public who asserted that 
they already owned the assets they were now being pressured to buy (eg 
McGregor et al 1992).  The campaign entered a new stage in May, when 
advertising attention became focused specially on the GIO float.  Now the 
central message was that ‘everyone can own a piece of GIO Australia’.  Press 
and television advertisements, as well as brochures widely distributed through a 
mail-out campaign, advised that the sale prospectus would soon be available and 
gave advice on how to obtain copies. 
 
Launching the prospectus on 22 June, Premier Greiner hailed this disposal as 
‘the model for future privatisations’ (CT 1992).  As the first total divestment of a 
public enterprise by public float in Australia, it was certainly breaking new 
ground.  But there was too much haste, with the end of the financial year so 
close:  the government had been hoping to bring the proceeds into account in 
that year’s financial accounts. 
 
The share offer was to open on 29 June 1992, but just days before ‘reserved’ 
copies of the Prospectus had still to be mailed out.  This part of the operation 
was heavily criticised on three grounds.  First, prospective investors who got it 
had little time to study it.  Second, many requests for it were never answered.12   
And third, it was said to be badly organised and difficult to follow, and it 
contained conflicting profitability estimates from the GIO directors and from the 
investigating accountants hired by government, Coopers & Lybrand and Ernst & 
Young, about whose role Jocelyn was very critical.  ‘“There have been 15 
ceremonial burnings of ... [their] $8-million report”, he says with some passion’ 
(Gottliebsen 1992, p. 48).13 
 
The float lasted less than two days, using---for the first time in Australia---the 
‘constrained open price’ tendering system in lieu of underwriting (Mychasuk 
1992).  In that 32-hour period, as Gottliebsen reported it: 
 
128,000 Australians wrote cheques worth a total of $2.2 billion in a mad scramble to get shares in GIO 
Australia---$1 billion more than was needed to fill the issue.  If the issue had remained open for its full term, 
another $1 billion would almost certainly have been subscribed.  It was the biggest public float in Australia, and 
it showed the enormous latent demand for stakes in big Australian undertakings ... The ill-judged handling of 
[this] recent mammoth float has damaged the climate for further big issues and privatisations.  Woolworths and 
Qantas will need to avoid GIO’s big mistakes ... Those who missed out on the shares were so angry that they 
threatened to sue the GIO, their brokers, Australia Post or anyone else they thought could be blamed for 
depriving them of the chance to make a certain killing. 
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Observing journalists variously accused the government of generating ‘retail 
euphoria/hysteria’ or complained that ‘television viewers were treated to the 
spectacle of hordes of people stampeding to get their share’, and that 
‘newspapers carried a blunt message of greed’ ((McCrann 1992; Frith 1992). 
 
Eventually 127,200 shareholders held 500 million shares after paying $2.40 per 
share, the top feasible price within the authorised range of $2.10 to $2.40.    This 
represented a ‘taking’ of $1.2 billion.  Most shares went to the small investors, 
customers (30% of shareholders) and employees (6 million shares through the 
concessional staff share plan, with another 10.1 million taken up by staff on a 
non-concessional basis).  Another  35% was allocated to the ‘institutions’ 
(banks, superannuation and investment funds and the like), which individually 
took far more shares than any of the ‘mums and dads’:  when a shareholders’ 
census was taken in September 1992, after just a few months of secondary 
trading, 1.85% of the shareholders held nearly 43% of the shares  (GIO 1992, 
p.21).  As GIO itself reported, ‘there was inevitably a large number of 
subscribers whose applications could not be granted in full’.  Moreover, ‘a large 
number of potential investors ... were taken by surprise by the overwhelming 
public support ... [and] failed to submit applications before the offer was closed’ 
(GIO 1992, pp 6, 8). 
 
GIO refund cheques---sent to those whose applications could not be completely 
filled---had notes attached suggesting that investors might consider buying GIO 
stock on the open market, and stockbrokers quickly prepared lists of alternative 
investment options for their disappointed clients.  However brokerage and 
stamp duty would now have to be paid---mostly those who bought in the initial 
float escaped those charges (Laurence 1992). 
 
The NSW government netted altogether around $1.8 billion:  the $1.2 billion 
from shares sold, plus about $600 million from the tax compensation agreement 
negotiated with the Commonwealth and certain other assets transferred to the 
state in lieu of various state taxes.  It was all applied to the reduction of state 
debt.  Notwithstanding the furore at time of sale, the operation was soon judged 
‘a success’ by the NSW government, and as such it ‘paved the way for the 
privatisation of the State Bank’ and other enterprises (from new Premier John 
Fahey, who replaced Greiner in June 1992:  quoted in Thomas 1992).  Lambert 
had little doubt that a trade sale would have produced a bigger ‘take’, but he 
concedes that the float produced a ‘halo effect’ with a high degree of public 
participation and eventually much goodwill, and ensured retention of the 
Sydney base for the enterprise (Lambert 1997). 
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Though they were not shouting out their satisfaction, the various participating 
members of the private financial services industry---the legal, consulting and 
sharebroking firms and their allies in advertising and marketing---had done very 
well.  Academic analysis, eventually accepted by the minister in charge of the 
float, showed that the costs of this sale amounted to $71.3m (or 5.94% of the 
sale proceeds), much of it going to these sale ‘facilitators’ (Walker & Howard 
1992;  Walker 1992).14   The size of this ‘bill’ was attributed in part to the 
dissension between the enterprise and the owning government, as a result of 
which each party had engaged its own consultants.  It is incontrovertible that 
this Australian industry was discovering just how lucrative the privatisation 
process was proving for it, and so was developing a vested interest in 
persuading governments to undertake more privatisations.  To further this 
interest, it began recruiting from the ranks of officials who understood the 
process from inside government:  as a fairly direct spin-off of the GIO case, 
Lambert from the NSW Treasury joined the private firm BZW Australia Ltd,15  
and became heavily involved in many other divestment projects.. 
 
After the sale 
 
Stage one:  continuing good performance 
 
After the sale GIO continued to expand for several years and, earning many 
accolades, Jocelyn stayed on as chief executive until his retirement in June 
1998.  In the year of his retirement, GIO was able to report that the value of an 
investment of $2,400 at time of sale (for 1,000 shares) would have grown to 
$6,298 at 30 June 1998, representing a compound return of 18% per annum 
(GIO 1998a, inside front cover).  Leading stockbrokers (eg Were 1997) and 
academic commentators (Casey & Dollery 1996) alike were supporting this sort 
of analysis.  GIO was now described as ‘the second largest general 
insurer/reinsurer in Australia’, and it won an upgraded assessment from 
international ratings agency Standard & Poors based on its ‘strong business 
profile and sound financial structure’ (Morrissey 1998). 
 
This represented continuity of good performance through the move from public 
to private ownership.  GIO had performed well in its public phase;  now, under 
an essentially unchanged management, it was continuing to do well in its private 
phase. 
 
Managerial restraint 
 
Jocelyn’s leadership was distinctive also for the restraint that was shown in the 
matter of directors’ and senior executives’ remuneration.  First, this case of 
privatisation produced a compact in which neither the managing director, the 
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deputy managing director nor any of the non-executive directors were given 
options to purchase GIO shares.  Second, Jocelyn was content to see his own 
salary limited to around $600,000 pa at 1996-97 levels, so holding down the 
salary packages of other top executives.  Directors’ share options and 
extravagant executive salaries have become highly controversial features of top 
management in many Australian private companies (including recently 
privatised ones), but that sort of controversy was totally absent in the GIO case.  
A GIO communication commented modestly that ‘GIO has certainly not been a 
leader in this respect’ (Green 1997), and Jocelyn’s own annual salary restraint 
was publicly acknowledged in a survey of executive salaries in major Australian 
companies: 
 
Salaries range from Frank Lowy’s $5.6m for running Westfield Holdings16   to $600,000   for GIO’s Bill 
Jocelyn.  Jocelyn, ranked one of the most successful company chiefs in Australia, has received no increase in 
salary since July 1, 1995 (Young 1997). 
 
In the year of his retirement, Jocelyn observed the demutualisation of AMP, the 
insurer he had left to join GIO 20 years before and whose current managing 
director, the American George Trumbull, was reported (CT 1998) to be 
collecting nearly $2.5m per annum as base salary and a share packet worth 
$18.9m by the year 2000.  In a parting shot, Jocelyn expressed the view that, 
‘generally speaking, the chief executives in the financial services industry are 
overpaid relative to what it is the community ought to pay them’;  criticised the 
AMP demutualisation for not delivering benefits to the community;  and 
suggested that there was now ‘an unholy alliance between shareholders and 
senior management’ which removed the focus from customers (ie policy-
holders in the insurance industry).  All this, he said, had caused him to have 
second thoughts about the privatisation of GIO, over which he had, of course, 
presided:  he now thought that ‘a government organisation that actually works 
as a mutual, that looks after the people who are doing business with it, ... that 
ploughs the benefits back to the people who use it ... is probably the best 
approach of the lot’ (Jocelyn 1998). 
 
Stage two:  the collapse 
 
Notwithstanding all this, 1998 was to become a crisis year for the privatised 
enterprise.  There were two causes, separate in their origins but becoming 
entangled as events unfolded.  First, the reinsurance business soured as a spate 
of major natural disasters around the world took heavy toll of all reinsurers.  
And second, stung by serious problems relating to its own floating on the stock 
exchange (an inevitable part of the demutualisation process) and no doubt also 
by Jocelyn’s unkind comments about it and its chief executive, AMP made a 
take-over bid for GIO, unleashing one of the most bitter and expensive 
struggles in Australian corporate history.17  Millions of words have been written 
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about these issues in the Australian press;  only a very summary outline is 
presented here. 
 
Serious studies have suggested that the world has suffered an unusually heavy 
incidence of natural disasters and technological mishaps in the last few years of 
the 20th century (eg Radford 1999, Hanna 1999).  Thus GIO declared a first-
time loss of $743 in 1998-99, and suspended payment of dividends for that 
year.  Subsequent disasters worsened its financial situation, and the value of its 
shares took a severe battering.   
 
The impact of this spate of disasters has been disastrous for many reinsurers, 
though it is also clear that after several reorganisations of this enterprise the 
GIO board had lost effective control of that part of its business.  Sadly, Jocelyn 
now speculates that his holding on to the chief executive position for ‘too long’ 
may also have contributed:  it may have ‘created scope for the next level of 
management to focus on the succession, rather than on the business’ (Jocelyn 
2000). 
 
The AMP take-over bid was quickly recognised as hostile.  It led to several 
court confrontations, and huge expenditure by both sides in publicising their 
respective positions (notably AMP 1998;  GIO 1998b, 1998c;  and massive 
press advertising by both).  The small shareholders---the ‘mums and dads’---
remained loyal to GIO, but by early 1999 sufficient of the institutional 
shareholders accepted the bid to give AMP a controlling 57% interest in GIO.  
As the devastating impact on GIO finances of the crisis in the reinsurance 
business became apparent, a class action was commenced against the GIO 
directors who had encouraged their shareholders to resist the take-over.  In late 
September 1999 AMP announced plans for a ‘mop-up’ of the remaining 
independently held shares in GIO, intended to give it 100% ownership;  and this 
came to pass in December 1999.  GIO was de-listed on the stock exchange, its 
remaining shareholders receiving one AMP ‘income security’ for every 36.4 
shares still held.  The value of those shares, at the end, was very nearly the same 
as that paid by investors in the original float;  all subsequent gains had been 
lost, and anyone who had bought GIO shares after the float suffered badly.  As 
the business and staff of the two organisations were integrated and the 
reinsurance operation phased out, there were many retrenchments.  Several 
board members departed, and Trumbull made an early return to the United 
States, albeit with a princely ‘pay-out’ reported by the company itself to total 
$13.2m (Smith & Wardell 2000).  AMP was now also a loss-maker and its 
share values tumbled.  Its intervention has been widely regarded with distaste:  
eg variously as ‘disastrous’, as a ‘debacle’, as a ‘mistake by a combination of 
foul means and foolishness’, as ‘a nightmare for AMP’ (Knight 1999, Hanna 
  
 
89
2000, Mitchell 2000).  The weakened AMP was itself subsequently seen as a 
possible target for take-over by a major bank.18   
 
Such is life in the corporate jungle, into which the once-proud and well-
respected GIO was catapulted by the act of privatisation.  Of course it has to be 
recognised that part of its seeming success at point-of-sale---its fairly dramatic 
rise as a reinsurer---was built on the riskiest part of the insurance business.  
Clearly the risks were not handled well under private ownership, and we can 
only speculate about whether they might have been better handled if public 
ownership had continued---so that the crisis that surfaced in that part of its work 
at the end of the 1990s might have been averted or at least have been less acute.  
The fact is that privatisation had taken place, and because of it the NSW state 
was relieved of much of the financial responsibility for meeting the crisis, 
having shifted the burden to the new private owners, many of whom were the 
‘mums and dads’ who had so few resources with which to cope. 
 
Summarising, the main stages in GIO’s organisational evolution have been as 
follows: 
 
1891: Government insurance activity begins within NSW Treasury. 
1927: Government Insurance Office of NSW established under a statutory 
general manager. 
1978-85: Progressively commercialised and arguably corporatised as 
conventional statutory corporation. 
January 1992: Converted to state-owned company. 
June 1992: Sold by public float. 
1998-99: Subjected to hostile take-over bid, became AMP subsidiary, and 
eventually went out of existence---although its general insurance operations 
continued under the AMP banner. 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
1.  Only specific citations are referenced in the text.  Material on the early history is drawn mostly from OYB 
1931, Kelly 1971, Hansen 1988, ERC 1989 and speeches on various statutes relating to GIO in NSW 
Parliamentary Debates.  Unless otherwise indicated, comment on the sale itself is drawn mostly from 
Gottliebsen 1992, Walker & Howard 1992, Casey & Dollery 1996, the sale Prospectus and GIO reports;  and 
from interviews with or correspondence from the GIO’s Jocelyn, Roach and Green, and former Greiner advisers 
Lambert and Sturgess. 
 
2.  By the turn of the last century contracting out was so prevalent in Australia that government was persuaded 
of the need to extend its own insurance facility to its contractors, thus demonstrating that it is by no means a 
new process!   See McIntosh et al  1997. 
 
3.  Here the Greiner government followed the New Zealand reform example and so set NSW on a rather 
different course than most of the rest of Australia.  New Zealand had made very little use of the device of the 
statutory corporation and so for it ‘corporatisation’ meant turning public enterprises that had mostly been 
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departments or parts of departments into government-owned companies.  In following this model, the Greiner 
government was rejecting the long Australian statutory corporation tradition, even though the statutory 
corporations had usually embraced some elements of corporatisation.  For further discussion, see eg Wettenhall 
1995;  2000, pp 30-1. 
 
4.  At the time of this revision---October 2000---the value of the Australian dollar (A$) has sunk to about US 53 
cents, but for most of the 1990s it has been around US 66-70 cents. 
 
5.  This belief was abundantly confirmed when the magnitude of the crisis in the reinsurance business  became 
apparent in 1999 (on this business, see next paragraph, next note and final section of this paper).  Some of this 
lobbying history is recorded in Maiden & Ferguson 1999. No doubt those who were lobbying Greiner are now 
indulging feelings of the ‘I told you so’ variety! 
 
6.  A reinsurer is an insurance business which is prepared to insure other insurers against the possible adverse 
consequences to them of the first-instance risks they have insured.  The essential international character of this 
business comes from the need to spread risks widely, beyond national boundaries. 
 
7.  In their critical review of Australian privatisations published in June 2000, Bob and Betty Con Walker 
(2000, p. 247) inferred that the government’s demand for extra dividends directly influenced the build-up of 
high-risk reinsurance activity.  In also suggesting (pp 247-8) that no one had questioned publicly what a state 
enterprise was doing ‘punting taxpayers’ funds on the outcome of [eg] Indian satellite launches’, the Walkers 
were obviously unaware of Sturgess’s 1994  comment to be noted shortly. 
 
8.  Hurricane Andrew figures heavily in disaster insurance folklore. It resulted in an insurance industry loss of 
US$15.5 billion and, together with the Northridge earthquake of 1994 (US$12.5 billion loss), led to the failure 
of nine insurance companies. The next largest insurance industry loss associated with a natural disaster was then 
US$2 billion, for Hurricane Hugo in 1989: Lewis & Murdock 1996, p. 570. However it is likely that the 
combined costs of hurricanes in the Caribbean, tornadoes in the United States and other disasters in the later 
1990s have exacted an even greater toll on reinsurers. 
 
9.  In order to retain the public goodwill associated with the old statutory corporation and to assist in securing 
continuity in contracts and the like, the initials GIO were built into the name of the new company;  but as it was 
destined soon to leave the public sector it was no longer permitted to use the fuller version of the old name 
(Governmemnt Insurance Office). 
 
10.  The first sale of shares in an Australian public enterprise by the public float method occurred a year earlier, 
when one-third of the shares in the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (which had just been converted from a 
statutory corporation to a company, thus creating a divisible shareholding) were sold.  But this was done to 
provide the Bank  itself with additional capital so that it could acquire the State Bank of Victoria, and so was 
not an outright privatisation.  Its significance for privatisation was rather that it showed governments that there 
was a lot of money in the community to be attracted by such sales, so encouraging them to think of more sales 
which might attract funds in this way.  A semantic oddity is created by the juxtaposition of two senses of 
‘public’ in the context of these public-float privatisations:  the public-sector sense of the collective ownership of 
enterprises by the state (ie the general body of citizen-taxpayers); and the private-sector sense of ownership by a 
fairly large group of investing members of the public.  For one comment, see Wettenhall 1998b, pp 111-2, 119-
22. 
 
11.  Since World War II, all income taxes in Australia have gone to the Commonwealth government.  Public 
enterprises owned by state governments were exempted from this tax, but mostly---as with GIO---they made 
tax-equivalent substitution payments to their owning governments.  A significant issue for state governments 
contemplating privatisation of their enterprises has therefore been that they will lose these tax substitution 
revenues while the Commonwealth will gain the company taxes to be paid by the new private owners. 
 
12.  This was Wettenhall’s experience back in 1992.  As a student of Australian public enterprise, he had 
wanted to share this new development fully.  At first he simply assumed that he had been low on the priority list 
for sending out prospectuses because he was not a resident of NSW.  But it soon became clear that the system 
established to process requests for the prospectuses was unable to cope with the huge demand. 
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13.  Jocelyn has since explained (2000) that his ‘vitrol’ was directed primarily at the Ernst & Young report. 
 
14.  Walker was subsequently to assert that these ‘high transaction costs’---rather than a low selling 
price---made this one of Australia’s worst privatisations:  Walker & Walker 2000, p. 247. 
 
15.  Initially Barclays de Zoete Wedd, BZW was the Australian branch of the investment banking division of 
Britain’s Barclays Bank PLC (see BZW 1997).  In late 1997 it was taken over by the Dutch bank ABN AMBO 
NV.  Privatisation studies elsewhere show officials like Lambert and even government ministers who have 
presided over public enterprise divestments not infrequently moving to join such privatisation advocating and 
facilitating firms. 
 
16.  The companion case study of the privatisation of Canberra’s Belconnen Mall deals with an enterprise 
which, after the sale, joined the Lowy empire. 
 
17.  Another view of the causes of ‘this most spiteful of takeover battles’ suggests that the GIO board had 
‘sealed their fate’ when they effectively removed control of the reinsurance business from Jocelyn in 1995 and 
then appointed another American, Nick Steffey, who had worked with Trumbull in the early 1990s, as their new 
chief executive in 1998 (AFR 1999). 
 
18.  For some general reviews of these recent developments, see Bartholomeusz 1999;  Hughes 1999;  Maiden 
& Ferguson 1999;  Mellish & Knight 1999a, 1999b, 2000;  O’Riordan 1999. 
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Chapter 7 
 
COMMONWEALTH SERUM LABORATORIES/CSL LTD 
 
There are several particular points of interest in this case. The actual sale, 
coming soon after that of GIO, borrowed a good deal from that example. The 
enterprise being sold was not only widely regarded as being successful in 
public ownership but was also unusual in its combination of research and 
competitive commercial functions and its heavy involvement in public health 
policy issues. The sale was therefore particularly controversial, and it raised 
prominently the question of a government’s preparedness to indemnify the 
new owners against major risks.1 
 
Evolution in public ownership 
 
From branch of a department to statutory corporation 
 
CSL was established within the Quarantine Branch of the Australian 
Commonwealth’s Department of Trade and Customs in 1916;  it became a branch 
of the new Department of Health formed in 1921.  The creation reflected First 
World War concerns about Australia’s ability to obtain overseas supplies of 
antitoxins to meet domestic requirements.  Based in the city of Melbourne, CSL 
quickly established an excellent reputation on the basis of successes such as the 
production of three million doses of influenza virus vaccine for the pandemic 
which swept Australia in 1918-19;  soon it was internationally recognised, being 
selected in 1923 as one of four world establishments entrusted with large-scale 
preparation of insulin;  and it played a prominent part in the development and 
production of penicillin in the 1940s and Salk poliomyelitis vaccine in the 1950s.  
Also in the 1940s and 1950s, it became associated with the Red Cross blood 
transfusion service, established serum fractionation facilities, and began 
producing blood products. Other achievements were in the development of 
vaccines for veterinary use, the supply of immunising material for use in mass 
campaigns against diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus, and eventually, after 
protracted developmental work, in the production of antivenoms for use in the 
treatment of snake-bite and spider-bite. 
 
To do all this, CSL had a ‘two-fold purpose’ (Cameron 1961, pp 1779-80).  On 
the one hand, it had to produce and sell (involving, of course, commercial 
transactions) sera, vaccines and other bacteriological products.  On the other, it 
had to conduct research related to such products.  This conjunction had two 
major consequences.  First, in 1961 the owning government, under Liberal 
Prime Minister RG Menzies, determined that this public enterprise should be 
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turned into a statutory corporation to operate more clearly on commercial lines.  
And second, its director at that time, Dr PL Bazeley, contested that decision in a 
very public way, creating what became a cause celebre in  
Australian public administration history:  his actions attracted much attention to 
the  
issue of the right of a public servant to speak out in opposition to the 
government he was serving (eg Armstrong 1961;  Gilbert 1961;   Parker 1961a, 
1961b, 1964;  Brogan 1990: ch.13;  Beauchamp 1994: 63). 
 
A year before, a large American drug company had sought to buy CSL from the 
Commonwealth government.2  But the government was swayed by evidence 
that CSL was ‘dear to the hearts of the Australian people’ and that ‘the public 
would have viewed [its sale] with the most vehement disapproval’ (CT 1961).  
So the Menzies government decided to commercialise rather than privatise, and 
prepared legislation to transfer CSL from the Department of Health to a new 
‘statutory commission’ to be headed by a board comprising ‘two medical men 
of very wide experience’ and ‘three men of wide and appropriate experience in 
business and financial fields’ (Cameron 1961, p. 1781, and eventually 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories Act 38/1961). 
 
Bazeley was famous for his work in the development of penicillin and anti-
poliomyelitis vaccine, and wanted to protect the research side of CSL’s work.  He 
feared that the government’s proposal would have the effect of subjugating all 
research to commercial considerations.  Having failed to persuade the 
government through internal public service channels, he ‘went public’, writing 
for the newspapers and talking to radio reporters and opposition members of 
parliament.  Under Westminster traditions that was, of course, unacceptable 
behaviour for a public servant, and Bazeley was charged with breaching 
provisions of the Public Service Act and Regulations.  He was demoted to the 
rank of a senior medical officer in CSL, with a corresponding pay cut.  He took 
leave of absence, went to the United States to resume work with Salk (inventor of 
the polio vaccine), and later became attached to the University Hospital in San 
Diego. 
 
His opposition did not thwart the government’s plan, and so CSL became a 
statutory corporation.  But the issue raised by Bazeley’s protest was not stilled.  
Near the end of the 1960s, the Commonwealth parliament’s Joint Committee of 
Public Accounts described it as a ‘dilemma’, and reported that it would remain 
so: 
 
until it is made clear that the Commission is to be regarded either primarily as a part of the public health service 
of the community with a section devoted to commercial activities or is primarily a commercial activity with 
limited government responsibility (JCPA 1969, p. 63). 
 
  
 
98
The dilemma continued to produce casualties.  Thus, in 1980, one of the 
organisation’s prize-winning scientists who had recently developed the first 
anti-venom against the deadly funnel-web spider, but who was also pushing 
hard the research line, was suspended (Smith & Hanford 1980). 
 
Nearly a decade after the Public Accounts Committee report, an Independent 
Inquiry established to review the corporation’s purposes, functions, 
organisational structure, financial viability, research program, commercial 
operations and capital works program, devoted a chapter of its report to what it 
too described as ‘the C.S.L. dilemma---national interest or commercial profit?’.  
The national interest component of CSL’s functions was now stressed:  the 
report concluded that ‘there has been national uncertainty about whether C.S.L. 
should be primarily a profit-making commercial enterprise or part of the 
nation’s public health service’. It wanted CSL to cover its costs on a user-pays 
basis wherever possible, but its general thrust was towards identification with 
the national interest.  Thus the Commonwealth should fund all  costs of directed 
national interest services, since requiring CSL to partly offset those costs from 
its trading profits was seen to disadvantage it in what had become a highly 
competitive market, and all restructuring that did not recognise the value of 
CSL’s contribution to national security should be resisted.  This contribution 
included ‘the reserve value of the trained and dedicated staff’ and the ‘proud 
record’ of the organisation;  a ‘great expansion in regulatory agencies’ would be 
required if it were in any way diminished (Nossal & Reid 1978, chs 3, 10).3 
 
Amending legislation followed in 1980, seeming to accept most of the Nossal-
Reid recommendations:  CSL’s commercial activities were distinguished more 
clearly from its national interest activities, and it was enabled to produce non-
biological as well as biological pharmaceutical products---biological products 
represent the least profitable segment of the pharmaceutical industry 
(Commonwealth Serum Laboratories Amendment Act 7/1980). 
 
Through the 1980s the national interest activity remained significant.  Notably 
Commonwealth funding was made available to CSL for research into the new 
problem of identifying and treating AIDS/HIV.  By now, however, over 80% of 
its sales were coming from products which faced strong competition.  It won 
awards for exports to some 80 countries, and signed licensing and distribution 
agreements with pharmaceutical manufacturers in Britain, the US, Italy, France 
and Denmark.  But CSL was facing difficulties in competing and in achieving 
good financial performance, and increasingly it protested to the owning 
government about these difficulties.  On the one hand, government decisions 
sometimes favoured overseas vaccine suppliers (CSL asserted that only it could 
ensure the supply of vaccines composed of strains matching the disease strains 
circulating in Australia);  on the other, it was constrained by the tying of its 
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superannuation arrangements to the public service system, by a profitability 
limit on products sold, and by restrictions on its ability to enter joint equity 
ventures or to acquire property for business growth purposes (see eg Forbes 
1981, pp 5-7;  Robbins 1986a, 1986b).   
 
In 1985 the Hawke Labor government made some changes to the enabling act, 
inter alia  clarifying and expanding the powers of the commission to form 
subsidiaries and enter commercial relationships, allowing greater flexibility in 
the use of plant and equipment in responding to changes in technology and 
market opportunity, and removing the requirement for Public Service Board 
approval for terms and conditions of staff employment.  A year later, when the 
long-term problems of blood testing were being more clearly appreciated and 
Australia was beginning to think of itself as part of the Asia region, the decision 
was taken to establish under CSL management ‘the best blood plasma 
processing plant in the world and [to] make it big enough for the demands of 
not only Australia, but the whole region’ (Gottliebsen 1993, p.26;  also Robbins 
1986b). These changes removed some of the ambiguities and constraints which 
had hindered CSL’s commercial and technological development.  But they were 
a mere preliminary to a bigger change in 1990. 
 
Conversion to the company form 
 
From the late 1980s, the Commonwealth was coming to favour the organisational 
form of the government-owned company over that of the statutory corporation 
for managing public enterprises, especially where there were few if any 
community service obligations (CSOs).4   The change reflected the hardening 
view that public enterprises must operate unambiguously according to, and be 
judged by, commercial standards;  in accordance with this view, CSL was 
scheduled for conversion along with other public enterprises such as a domestic 
airline, the national shipping line, the engineering-consulting corporation which 
grew out of the Snowy Mountains hydro-electricity and irrigation scheme, the 
Commonwealth Bank and the public service superannuation investment trust.  
The Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (Conversion into Public Company) Act 
77/1990 authorised this change, though there was a rub:  CSL did have 
substantial CSOs, represented by its complement of ‘national interest’ 
responsibilities. 
 
The act provided for the reconstruction of the organisation as a fully 
government-owned company, Commonwealth Serum Laboratories Ltd 
(formally shortened a year later to CSL Ltd), with its memorandum and articles 
of association registered under standard company registration procedures.  The 
Minister for Community Services and Health would be the sole shareholder 
with power to appoint and dismiss the board of directors and to issue guidelines 
  
 
100
to the board, which would be required to provide a three-year corporate plan 
defining the company’s goals, financial targets, and strategies to achieve those 
goals.  CSL’s assets would be consolidated by transfer to it of remaining land 
and buildings vested in the Commonwealth.  However a division of shares into 
classes allowed the Commonwealth to have special rights in relation to the 
existing serum fractionation operation (a ‘national interest’ function) and the 
sale of CSL land, and the community service (or national interest) functions 
would be further regularised under a formal contractual arrangement with the 
Commonwealth. 
 
A new chief executive, Dr Brian McNamee, was recruited from a private 
Adelaide-based pharmaceuticals firm, and the board was renewed over the next 
two years with the chairman and other members coming from established 
private companies including accounting and consulting firm Price Waterhouse.  
The financial press  reported exchanges between new chief executive McNamee 
and Minister for Health Brian Howe about the future of the organisation.  
Apparently Howe sought the management’s view about its own future, and the 
management took that as an implied threat to privatise, explaining that people in 
government businesses were now asking ‘My God, how can we survive?’, 
observing that the ‘survival mentality is a very destructive force in any 
company’ and adding: 
 
we have been able to demonstrate to Howe and the rest of the Government that [CSL] has a very good asset 
base, a good company with good growth prospects.  It was not so long ago that the Government was not 
confident that it had an asset here.  It has come almost as a shock to them (reported Stevens 1992, p. 28). 
 
By now others were declaring that CSL was the ‘best government enterprise’, a 
distinction gained in the 1991 ‘Top 500’ businesses survey conducted by 
Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu.5   Reporting this, Australian Business Monthly 
commented that the conversion to company status had meant the end of ‘soft’ 
government money and that in consequence a new business program had been 
established.  McNamee told reporter John Arbouw that the Labor government 
had ‘pointed out to us quite correctly that we were an endangered species and 
that we didn’t have a God-given right to exist’. That, he said, had ‘really 
shocked the organisation’ (Arbouw 1991). 
 
A few months later merchant bank Hambros Australia’s executive director 
David Williams described CSL as the ‘jewel in the crown’ of privatisation 
candidates because it was profitable, had significant potential to expand, and 
had done most of the ‘cost trimming needed to bring the company to market’ 
(reported in Smithers 1992).  The strange implication was that, because it had 
these characteristics, it did not belong in the public sector!  But it had already 
been listed in the federal Opposition’s list of privatisation targets.  Now 
McNamee matched Williams’s observations by suggesting that location in the 
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public sector had significant disadvantages for CSL, particularly the constraints 
on raising new capital (also Smithers 1992).  Much later, in their general 
criticism of Australian privatisations, the Walkers would point out both that the 
Commonwealth did outlay much new capital at this time on CSL-related 
facilities and the privatisation advocates were not expressing much concern for 
the interests of the community (Walker & Walker 2000, pp 235-6). 
 
As we have seen, CSL was not only a profitable operation in both its later 
statutory corporation years and its first three government company years, but 
also enjoyed a high scientific reputation based on much excellent work over 
more than 70 years in developing, producing and distributing new vaccines and 
serums to secure the good health of Australia’s human and domestic and farm 
animal populations. 
 
‘Sleepers’ in CSL’s history 
 
But there were some dramatic ‘sleepers’ in its history which were to cause 
considerable embarrassment just as firm proposals emerged for its privatisation.  
One related to its developing blood fractionation technology;  another flowed 
from its production of hormones and other forms of treatment in a number of 
very sensitive and, to a degree, experimental areas of health management. 
 
Both were the subject of studies published in 1994.  The first, by the Australian 
Blood Regulators Study Group, reported that the Red Cross discovered in 1985 
that CSL had been bringing foreign blood products into Australia since the 
1960s and mixing them with the local plasma supplied by it.  This practice, it 
believed, not only posed grave health risks but also placed Red Cross itself in 
breach of its legal duty of care to the users of its blood;  and the report urged 
much closer regulation by the Commonwealth government (Beauchamp 1994).  
 
The second concerned the relationship between the use of hormones derived 
from the pituitary glands of dead people extracted during autopsies (and 
sometimes imported into Australia) and Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease or CJD.  CSL 
had begun producing these hormones in the 1960s and distributing them to 
medical practitioners for use in the treatment of infertility in women and of 
stunted growth in children.  It was not until much later that a direct connection 
was established between the onset of this always-fatal disease and the 
administration of the pituitary gland hormones;  the CSL program was 
discontinued in 1985, when the risks were clearly identified.  A considerable 
number of Australians had already received this treatment, but the virus was 
slow-acting and the first CJD death of a recipient of the CSL-produced 
hormones did not occur until 1988.  Others followed, and damages claims had 
begun to be lodged against the Commonwealth by relatives of the afflicted 
people (Allars 1994;  see also Coulter 1995 and Cooke 1998a, 1998b). 
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Both inquiries were under way and gathering notice as plans were being 
developed for the sale of CSL.  They drew special attention to the related matter 
of indemnities already provided by the Commonwealth to CSL.  In September 
1987, for example, indemnities had been provided for claims arising from 
certain CSL products including AIDS-related claims from its blood plasma 
products.  Between 1989-90 and 1994-95 the Commonwealth in fact outlaid 
$28.6m in settlement of HIV-AIDS claims ‘for reasons of public policy’, 
covering all CSL’s and 40% of the Red Cross’s proportion of settlement 
amounts (ANAO 1995, pp 28-33).  By this time the working out of the sale 
arrangements was well under way, and not surprisingly this question of 
indemnities assumed critical importance as they were being developed. 
 
The sale process 
 
The decision to sell 
 
The Finance Ministry announced the decision to sell CSL, along with the Snowy 
Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC),  in the 1992-93 budget papers 
(Dawkins & Willis 1992, p. 3.279).  It has been shown elsewhere that, from early 
in the period of the Hawke government, the small-government ‘rhetoric and ideas 
of the Department of Finance’ had been influencing Labor ministers towards the 
privatisation of many Commonwealth enterprises (Simms 1986, p. 32). 
 
Sources tapped by the Australian Blood Regulators Study Group inquiry 
indicated that the sale of CSL was first proposed to the Estimates Review 
Committee of cabinet and then to cabinet itself by the Health Department and 
that the proposal was ‘strongly backed’ by the CSL management, but that 
thereafter the issue was largely taken over by the Department of Finance.  
Consultation with stakeholders was very restricted because CSL ‘had 
agreements with forty-six companies including internationals’, and ‘its 
commercial interests had to come ahead of accounting to the Australian 
people’.  The author of the Blood Regulators report asked why it had to be sold, 
and got an answer in several parts (Beauchamp 1994, pp 316-21): 
 
* The general political climate favoured privatisation, and government was learning that it could recoup some 
budget losses and fill some budget holes that way. 
 
* Though ‘no one in Government ... thought that CSL was inefficient’, there was concern about the ‘incongruity 
in Government being CSL’s owner, customer and regulator’. 
 
* CSL itself ‘wanted to be sold’:  one of its officials told the investigator that it had ‘had a gut full [sic] of 
Government interference, of restraints on raising money, and being told what to do in the R&D area, and thinks 
it can compete’ in the private sector. 
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As we have seen, CSL had a new chief executive and several new board 
members imported from that sector.  ‘On the face of it’, this investigator 
reported, ‘CSL stood to gain far more from the sell-off than did Government 
and some of its gains were at Government’s considerable expense’.  
Nonetheless she was uncertain whether the government was selling to investors 
‘a pup, a pig, a bargain or the crown jewels’. 
 
One serious economic analysis (Hamilton & Quiggin 1995a, pp 3, 8-10) offered 
a heavy qualification to the argument that CSL was able to operate 
commercially and competitively under market conditions.  It asserted that ‘it 
would be difficult to imagine a market in which there was less scope for the 
play of market forces’.  On CSL’s production of blood products: 
 
there is no commercial market ... in Australia; the sale of blood is prohibited by law ... the supply of freely 
donated blood, in which even the costs of collection are met by taxpayers, represents a massive cost saving for 
CSL [and has been] the primary factor in allowing [it] to supply blood products at around 30% of world prices 
... CSL’s sole customer for blood products is the Australian hospital system supplied by the Commonwealth 
through its contract with CSL. 
 
The connection between CSL and the government was intricate and many-
sided, and it ‘remains for most practical purposes a regulated monopoly, with 
the rate of return being determined by the Commonwealth Government’. The 
clear implication was that continuing public ownership was much more 
appropriate for this enterprise. 
 
Given that the government was determined to sell, it was inevitable that some 
special conditions should be included in the sale arrangements.  The drafting of 
these conditions turned out to be one of the major challenges of this particular 
sale process.  Indeed, some major steps were taken before the sale to ensure that 
the conditions would be satisfied and at the same time to ‘sweeten’ the deal for 
prospective purchasers. 
 
Legislating and ‘sweetening’ 
 
The Department of Finance had already established a Task Force on Asset Sales 
to handle sales of government assets.  Now Task Force on Asset Sales B was 
set up to manage the new tranche of sales.  Financial consultants were quickly 
engaged to undertake a two-stage ‘scoping study’ of CSL.  The first-stage 
report, acknowledging a government-imposed restriction on foreign ownership 
and the likelihood that there were few possible Australian trade bidders, 
recommended that sale should be by public float.  This was quickly decided and 
announced by the relevant ministers on 9 November 1992:  it would be the first 
100% offering of shares by the Commonwealth by this method (ANAO 1995, 
pp 8-9).   
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Going the float route meant that this sale would be part of the movement 
towards achieving ‘a peoples’ capitalism’ which emerged as an important part 
of Thatcher’s privatising ideology in Britain.  Australia joined this movement 
with the mass appeal to potential buyers among all the ‘mums and dads’ 
featured in the Commonwealth Bank tranche sales and in that of the New South 
Wales Government Insurance Office (GIO) in the early 1990s. 
 
A quite detailed account of the procedures followed in the preparation and 
conduct of this sale is available in the Performance Audit report prepared by. 
Commonwealth Audit officers Victoria Walker and Colin Cronin (ANAO 
1995), and there is space for only a brief summary here. 
 
The second stage of the scoping study involved a detailed analysis of CSL’s 
‘financial, managerial and operational performance, ... including an indicative 
flotation valuation, recommendations for sale timing options, and an 
implementation plan’. The initial advice was that the government could expect 
to receive between $347m and $422m, but that estimate subsequently had to be 
downgraded. The advice was also that cessation of existing indemnities would 
have an adverse effect on the flotation value (ANAO 1995, pp 8, 21, 29). 
 
The Task Force then established three working committees (steering, due 
diligence/prospectus, and marketing/logistics), for each of which CSL and the 
Task Force provided joint chairs.  And a small army of consultant business 
advisers and legal advisers was engaged.  While CSL had its own legal advice, 
it did not employ separate business advisers;  the Performance Audit team 
reported that this ‘absence of duplication appears to have contributed to an 
effective working relationship between CSL and the Commonwealth agencies 
involved in the sale process’ (ANAO 1995, pp 2, 4, 8-9).6 
 
Major issues for the preparatory committees were the drafting of legislation 
prescribing the conditions of the sale and the entering into of agreements relating 
to the continuation of CSL’s national interest functions and to the issue of those 
Commonwealth indemnities.  Reporting the identification in parliament of 
matters the indemnities were intended to cover, one journalist drew attention to a 
‘stream of writs’ which had been lodged during 1993 ‘for damages arising from 
CSL products’, commenting:  ‘if they are successful, it is the taxpayer who will 
pay most’ (Cooke 1993).  The Performance Audit report would eventually 
criticise the various indemnity provisions on two grounds:  they were not brought 
specifically to the attention of cabinet, and there was no actuarial study to 
quantify the Commonwealth’s potential liability (ANAO 1995, pp 30-2). 
 
The Sale Bill was presented to parliament on 29 September 1993 (Johns 1993, 
pp 1344-6).  It contained a series of detailed provisions designed to ensure the 
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continuation of CSL as an independent company under Australian control, the 
continuation of blood product supply to the Australian community in the 
national interest, and the protection of staff entitlements.  Accordingly there 
were injunctions about what should be included in the company’s articles of 
association after the sale:  these included requirements that the head office and 
the blood fractionation facilities must ‘always be located in Australia’, that CSL 
must remain incorporated in Australia and that two-thirds of its directors 
including the presiding director must be Australian citizens.  There were other 
requirements eg that CSL must maintain a register of foreign-held voting shares 
(there was to be an aggregate beginning limit of 20% on foreign shareholdings), 
that it may not dispose of its blood fractionation facility without the consent of 
the minister, and that there would be a formal contract between CSL and the 
Commonwealth relating to the production and supply of blood products derived 
from plasma collected from Australians (CSL Sale Act 88/1993).  An 
immediate conclusion must be that there can be few public enterprises being 
prepared for divestment anywhere in the world subjected to so many ongoing 
constraints by the selling government.7 
 
Passage of the legislation was seriously contested only by the Australian 
Democrats, although the impression is strong that many members felt they were 
simply being swept along by the climate of the day.  Thus one Labor MHR who 
had initially opposed the sale could see no point in extending that opposition to 
a vote against the sale bill:  ‘when I look round I do not seem to see too many 
fellow travellers, so I have to accept that the inevitable will happen’ (Jenkins 
1993, p. 2638). 
 
In December 1993 the Commonwealth took several actions which had the effect 
of ‘sweetening’ the deal for private investors by ensuring a substantially 
improved revenue flow to CSL.  Thus it entered into two contracts with the 
enterprise for the supply of blood plasma products for the Australian health 
system.  Indemnities for product liability claims were included in both 
agreements, which were extendable by further contract.  Then there was an 
Indemnity Agreement formalising and to a degree extending the earlier 
indemnities granted for some other CSL products, notably covering any potential 
claims arising from the pertussis vaccine used in whooping cough treatment, 
from the pituitary gland growth hormone which could transmit the fatal CJD, 
from AIDS and hepatitis contracted from blood products, and from asbestos-
related disease.  And the Commonwealth transferred to CSL the blood 
fractionation plant which it had built in exchange for more than 50 million 
ordinary CSL shares (intended to recoup it for construction costs), in order, in the 
words of the Department of Finance, ‘to enhance the saleability of CSL because 
it would reduce CSL’s gearing substantially and make it more attractive to 
investors’.  The Performance Audit report indicates that another $51m ‘in 
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transition funding’ related to the new fractionation facility was provided by the 
Commonwealth.  Yet another late-1993 agreement assured CSL of continued 
Commonwealth funding of $300,000 per annum (indexed) for ongoing national 
interest work in ensuring the availability of appropriate and effective influenza 
vaccines (ANAO 1995, pp 17-8, 30-2, 36, 39-40, 42, with Dept of Finance advice 
quoted at p.40; also Beauchamp 1994, pp 322-3). 
 
In the event delays in completing and commissioning the fractionation plant 
delayed the sale itself;  when it eventually took place, the share market was 
falling, although the government had one month to spare in realising its aim of 
completing the sale in the 1993-94 financial year (ANAO 1995, p. 17). 
 
Selling 
 
The decision to sell had been announced in the 1992-93 budget papers;  in 
March 1994 the Minister for Finance was ready to approve details of the 
flotation strategy.  There would be 130 million shares, the total divided into 
three parts:  the largest reserved for retail (general public) and broker clients, 
with a minimum of 1,000 shares per client;  a minimum allocation of 35% of 
the issue reserved for institutions and brokers;  and 2% of the issue reserved for 
CSL employees, in respect of whom the CSL board had already designed a 
General Employee Share Ownership Scheme.  No single buyer could get more 
than 5% of the total stock, and there was a maximum foreign allocation of 20%.   
 
A cap price ($2.40 per share) was set for the first part;  for the second part there 
would be a ‘bookbuild’ process under which bids would be made before prices 
were determined, within a ‘constrained offer’ price system within a predetermined 
range ($2---$2.40), ‘the market’ thus affecting the eventual price, with a minimum 
of 50,000 shares per bid.  The Asset Sales Task Force had given close 
consideration to the merits of underwriting the float, a process which provides 
insurance against the risk that not all shares will be sold.  However it eventually 
advised against this because the additional cost to government would have been 
between $2.25m and $3m and because the 20% price range provided some 
flexibility to absorb market movements while the offer was open;  in announcing 
the sale strategy, the minister indicated that he had accepted this advice (ANAO 
1995, pp 7, 17, 19-21). 
 
The drafting of the prospectus had proceeded while this strategy was being 
worked out, and the draft prospectus went to the Australian Securities 
Commission (ASC) for ‘pre-vetting’ early in April 1994.  The final version was 
signed by the CSL board and the Minister for Finance on 15 April (ANAO 
1995, pp 11, 25; Prospectus 1994).  There were public/retail, 
broker/institutional and overseas marketing campaigns. 
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The sale plan was criticised on several grounds.  The Australian Financial 
Review reported that ‘every major broking house’ had recommended that the 
issue be underwritten and that, given the plunge in share prices, the Task Force 
could not have chosen a worse time not to appoint an underwriter (Ries 1994).  
And Blood Regulators Study reporter Beauchamp (1994, pp 333-6) expressed 
serious criticism on two grounds:  first, that the matter of the risk involved in 
the production of biologicals was not mentioned until page 91 of the 
Prospectus, and that it ‘slides around’ the issue of the availability and use of 
foreign plasma;  and second, that in the run up to the sale CSL employed an 
external public relations firm ‘which held media at arm’s length from CSL 
[itself]’, and that mostly the media followed ‘the Government line at the time’ 
in presenting CSL as ‘a good sale prospect’ or [following Williams, as noted 
earlier] as ‘the “jewel in the crown” of privatisation candidates’. 
 
Business Review Weekly‘s Gottliebsen (who had earlier expressed serious 
reservations about the GIO float) was surprisingly positive.  Because of its 
purely voluntary blood collection system, the quality and controls of Australia’s 
system are much superior to those of the US and Europe, and CSL has been 
very careful, he wrote;  if it can now make a success of the new blood product 
facility, ‘shareholders will do well’ (Gottliebsen 1993, pp 26-7).  Beauchamp 
(1994, pp 335-6) assumed he was unaware of the indemnities relating to the 
CJD hormone, blood products and plasma-mixing. 
 
Beauchamp’s report makes it very clear that officials of the government and of 
CSL regarded her as a serious nuisance as she persisted in asking her questions 
as they were preparing the float;  Senator Coulter subsequently referred to ‘the 
whispering campaign of lies about the author of that report that had been seeded 
in Parliament House and in the financial sector’ (1995, p. 221---see more 
below).  But her questions were serious ones, well worth asking.  Her analysis 
convinced her that the float was a bad deal for the Commonwealth and its 
taxpayers (Beauchamp 1994, pp 316-9). 
 
The float ran according to plan from 2 May to 27 May.  The public offer was 
marginally oversubscribed;  the institutional offer did better, being 
‘significantly oversubscribed with strong demand from broker-sponsored bids, 
medium-sized domestic institutions and foreign institutions’ (ANAO 1995, p. 
16).  A few days after the close, the government announced that it had decided 
to issue all shares at $2.30, compared with the set cap of $2.40, thus forgoing 
$13m of possible revenue.  An early press report said that this was done in 
order to ensure a positive privatisation experience and to give the forthcoming 
$2 billion Qantas issue the best chance of gaining retail support---’a $13 billion 
investment in the climate for the Qantas float’ (Bartholomeusz 1994).  Reasons 
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advanced officially to the Performance Audit team were that the discounting 
would ‘provide a premium to investors;  establish an orderly secondary market;  
create an ownership base of long-term shareholders;  and send positive signals 
to the community for forthcoming asset sales’ (ANAO 1995, p. 22). 
 
Some 37,000 retail investors took 62% of the shares, 124 Australian and 
overseas institutions took 37%, and 1,050 CSL employees took 1%;  foreign 
institutions had taken the maximum 20% they were allowed.  Applicants who 
subscribed for up to 3,000 shares got their allocation in full, with ‘scale-back’ 
of higher bids.  Gross proceeds from the sale to the Commonwealth were 
$299m, against which the Performance Audit team identified costs of $9.2m (or 
3% of total proceeds), which included Task Force salaries and administrative 
costs of $1.1m, Commonwealth legal fees of $1.8m, business adviser fees of 
$1.4m and selling and float management costs of $2.7m (Bartholomeusz 1994; 
ANAO 1995, pp 5-6, 21, 23).  The Task Force on Asset Sales B reported that 
the ‘[g]ross sale proceeds of $299 million were subsequently credited to 
Consolidated Revenue’ and that ‘[t]ransaction costs involved approximately 
two percent of total proceeds’ (DOF 1994, p. 119). 
 
After the sale 
 
Expansion and increase in value 
 
The privatised company has seized several opportunities to expand into new 
areas.  Within months of the float, it had acquired the assets and business of a 
US cell culture manufacturer and marketer,  a majority interest in a Swedish 
company with global rights relating to a vaccine response enhancer, and a new 
veterinary viral vaccine plant in Wellington, New Zealand.  Also it became the 
exclusive Australian distributor for the products of a US ortho diagnostic 
systems manufacturer;  entered a 10-year agreement with Australian Red Cross 
for the supply of plasma to CSL and for the distribution of fractionated 
products; and launched several new pharmaceutical products of its own (CSL 
Ltd 1994, p. 2).  Two years on from the sale, an Australian Industry 
Commission report on the pharmaceutical industry described CSL as ‘one of the 
largest and most highly integrated pharmaceutical companies in Australia, 
employing around 1350 people’ (IC 1996, p. 26).  
 
But the expansion continued.  Over the next two years it entered into other 
collaboration, licensing and distribution agreements with companies in France, 
Italy, Poland, Canada, the US and elsewhere (CSL 1995, 1996, 1997).  Then in 
1999 came a highly publicised deal with American Red Cross to develop a 
rapid blood-clotting bandage (Gosch 1999)---followed in 2000 by the 
acquisition of the plasma products division of the Swiss Red Cross, a deal 
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claimed to have ‘burst open the door to the plasma products market in the US’ 
(Wood 2000).  
 
There has been a fairly steady rise in profitability since the float, exceeding the 
profit forecasts in the sale Prospectus and in part reflecting the expansionary 
activity since that time.  However, since the enterprise also returned profits and 
was generally regarded as efficient in the earlier period, this demonstrates a 
healthy continuity over the public and private ownership phases and not in any 
sense a dramatic break with the past, or a reversal of fortune.  It is likely, of 
course, that the opportunities for expansion have been enhanced by its freeing 
up from government ownership and from the restrictions associated with that 
ownership. 
 
Since the sale, however, media attention has focused more on the dramatic 
increase in CSL’s share value than on its expansionist activity.  A 1977 report 
by leading brokers JB Were and Son indicated that the average share price gain 
over 16 ‘major floats’ since 1993 was 77%, but that CSL did far better with a 
gain of 263% over those three years (Were 1997, pp 1-2).  The impact on share 
values of the American and Swiss Red Cross deals was too recent to have been 
built into that analysis.  A day after the first of these arrangements was 
announced, however, the share values ‘surged’ by a further 26%, adding $440m 
to CSL’s market value and representing a seven-fold increase for the original 
investors who participated in the privatisation five years before.  A leading asset 
management firm official then declared:  ‘it’s been the best of the (Australian) 
privatisations by a stretch’ (reported in Hughes 1999).   
 
Best for whom is, of course, an important question.  In their general critique of 
Australian privatisations completed after the US but before the Swiss Red Cross 
CSL deals (when the shares were trading at around $23), the Walkers calculated 
that the value of this enterprise at 31 December 1999 was $2.9bn, representing a 
$2.6bn profit to the private sector on the near-$0.3bn paid in mid-1994.  In the 
sense of loss of value to the public sector, it was probably ‘the winner’ among 
all the Australian privatisations;  on those late 1999 prices, the Walkers also 
calculated that share options given to CSL Managing Director McNamee, that 
‘most vocal advocate’ of privatisation, would have delivered an entitlement 
worth $13.8m---a ‘handy bonus’.  For the Walkers, all this made the CSL 
divestment one of the worst privatisations---compounded by the fact that the 
Commonwealth retained exposure to claims for product liability under the 
indemnities granted (Walker & Walker 2000, pp 24, 224-5, 234-40). 
 
At the end of year 2000, the value of a single CSL share stood at $39.06 (Were 
2001, p.4)---compared with $2.30 at point of sale! 
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Movement since the sale within the total initial package of 130 million shares is 
as indicated in Box 1.  Consistently with patterns observed in other public floats 
of this  
 
 
BOX 1:  SHAREHOLDER MOVEMENT 
[Source:  CSL Ltd 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.] 
 
Date of 
compil-ation 
Total no of 
share-
holders 
No of 
share-
holders 
with 
5,000 
shares or 
less 
No of share-
holders with 
over 10,000 
shares 
Per cent of 
share-
holders with 
over 10,000 
shares 
Per cent of 
shares held 
by share-
holders with 
over 10,000 
shares 
Top 20 
share-
holders: per 
cent of 
shares 
Top 20 
share-
holders: 
total no of 
shares held 
by them 
30.8.94 35,873 33,910 592 1.650 45.72 33.08 42.96m 
25.9.95 31,189 29,396 553 1.773 53.00 37.87 51.52m 
30.8.96 29,035 27,297 548 1.887 56.46 36.15 51.24m 
29.8.97 27,528 25,909 532 1.933 60.61 40.56 53.24m 
31.7.98 27,237 25,695 520 1.908 62.53 42.37 57.64m 
30.6.99 27,921 26,418 504 1.805 63.18 40.56 51.40m 
Note:  The total no. of shares at time of float was 130,000,000;  this had grown to 131,652,084 at 30.6.99. 
 
kind, share ownership has consolidated in the hands of the larger investing 
institutions.  The number of individual shareholders decreased by over 20% in 
five years’ trading:  while that number remained reasonably large at almost 
28,000, just 1.8% of those shareholders held over 63% of the shares;  the largest 
investors were almost all bank, insurance, and superannuation funds.   
 
A feature of the float was that the foreign ownership restriction did not apply to 
secondary trading after close of the primary share offer, though the company 
was required to monitor foreign trading.  Annual reports of the privatised CSL 
certify that there are no significant foreign shareholdings (eg CSL 1996: 56). 
 
Controversies 
 
Research involvement 
 
CSL functions in an industry where ongoing research is of vital importance, as 
recognised long ago in the forceful contribution of the somewhat quixotic 
former Director Val Bazeley.  However the commercialising and corporatising 
of the organisation during its public ownership period seemed to some to 
involve rejecting this proposition.  Thus, immediately after privatisation, 
Professor Straun Sutherland, suspended from CSL 14 years before and now 
described as ‘Australia’s foremost anti-venom scientist’, protested that 
privatisation was ‘threatening vital anti-venom research’ (quoted in Norman 
1994).  A year and a half later, the Alfred Hospital’s Dr John Weiner 
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complained about the lack of funding for the development of a venom extract to 
protect: 
 
Fifty thousand people living in rural southern Australia ... at risk of death from extreme allergic reaction to ant 
stings ... A few years ago, the task of making a desensitising agent would have been given to the 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, but that had now been privatised ... The pharmaceutical companies aren’t 
interested in producing [such an] agent (quoted Cribb 1996). 
 
Senator Coulter complained (see below) that CSL’s anti-venom production was 
‘cast off shortly following the sale’ (Coulter 1995, p. 221).  
 
The conclusion many drew was that a profit-seeking company would invest in 
research only where very large at-risk populations were involved.  Thus a 
university biochemical scientist reports: 
 
I don’t know a lot about CSL privatisation except that it’s now impossible to get collaboration with them.  
They used to have their finger in many biotechnology projects within the university sector but their new 
corporate culture demands that they focus on only three or four projects [which] are substantially conducted 
in house (Collyer 1998). 
 
The privatised CSL nevertheless presents itself as a big researcher.  It has 
maintained one division focusing on ‘research and development’ (R&D), with 
this effort now supported from the government’s R&D assistance budget.  A 
year after the sale, CSL reported that it had been named the leading company in 
terms of total R&D expenditure in the Australian pharmaceuticals industry and 
14th highest of all Australian companies in respect of total R&D expenditure 
(CSL 1995).  An industry bulletin confirmed that it was the pharmaceutical 
company ‘spending the most on research’ in 1994-95 (PBN 1995b, p. 17).  In 
1995-96, CSL reported that it spent more than $30m on R&D, retaining its 
position as the largest R&D investor in the Australian pharmaceutical industry 
and rising to 10th position among all Australian companies (CSL 1997). 
 
A management under siege 
 
Clearly, CSL’s management got most of what it wanted from the sale.  But it 
was also very much a management under siege.  While the sale was in progress, 
and during the settling-in period that followed, five serious inquiries or critiques 
focused on the organisation itself and/or the sale conditions.  Only one---the 
audit performance evaluation---could be regarded as ‘par for the course’ for a 
Commonwealth privatisation.  Two focused mainly on health issues and two on 
economic or accounting issues, while the fifth was a wide-ranging digest of all 
the problems. 
 
The Blood Regulators Study was well under way before the float was decided, so 
that its commentary on the divestment itself was a late addition to the study’s 
main purpose and came very soon after the sale was completed.  The strong 
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official opposition to this inquiry and the principal investigator’s conclusion that 
the sale was a bad deal for taxpayers have already been noted.  To give a net 
result, she deducted from the proceeds ($299m): 
 
six million for the cost of selling the authority, ... one hundred and seventy to one hundred and eighty million 
put into the new blood processing plant, ... twenty million a year in forsaken lease payments and ... annual 
dividends from CSL’s business.  [Then mildly:] Government also had to declare some indemnities... 
(Beauchamp 1994, pp 318-9). 
 
Though it was not an official document, Senator John Coulter, a member of the 
small Australian Democrats party, tabled this report in parliament in October 
1994, and during estimates hearings in November two other senators asked 
upwards of 40 questions mostly derived from it.  These questions exercised 
both CSL and the Department of Human Services and Health over the summer 
months, and their answers were provided on 9 February (SCALC 1995).  There 
were also direct statements from CSL and the department (CSL 1995; DHSH 
1995).  Though mixing of blood plasma from many sources (as claimed by the 
author of the report) was admitted, the answers asserted that only mixing for the 
production of clotting factors carried risk, and that this practice was stopped in 
1984 as soon as the risk was understood; other mixing was subsequently 
discontinued.  Most would no doubt have been satisfied by these reassurances.  
But Coulter, himself a medical professional, was soon to make it clear that he 
was far from satisfied. 
 
The second health-related inquiry, commissioned by the government and 
conducted by Margaret Allars, described as ‘an administrative law expert from the 
University of Sydney’, focused on the issue of pituitary-derived hormones and 
CJD.  As journalist Cooke digested it, the resulting report demonstrated that ‘laws 
had been bent, ethics ignored, corners cut, red tape avoided and dead bodies ... 
unlawfully raided for pituitary glands’ (Allars 1994; Cooke 1998b, pp 229, 248), 
and CSL got its fair share of these criticisms.  By the time of the sale there had 
been several deaths, and hundreds of others who had received this hormone 
treatment had organised to seek redress;  several writs had already been taken out, 
joining the Commonwealth and CSL as defendants (Coulter 1995, p. 247). 
 
The third inquiry, and main economic critique, was that of Clive Hamilton and 
John Quiggin from The Australia Institute think-tank. Their conclusion was that 
this privatisation was ‘a fiscal scandal’.  In their view, ‘one of the best-
performing Commonwealth business enterprises’ was sold in a way that ‘raises 
some larger questions about public accountability and the extent to which the 
Commonwealth Public Service can be relied upon to protect the interests of the 
public’.  Their summary extracts many of the main features of the account here 
presented, but pushes on to a longer-term evaluation that leads them to their 
highly critical conclusion: 
  
 
113
 
To support the sale the Commonwealth entered into a new 10-year contract to buy blood products for an 
annual fee more than twice as high as in previous years.  In addition, the new owners have been indemnified 
against AIDS-related and other claims arising from the use of blood products manufactured by CSL in the 
past. 
 
Apart from a brand new tax-funded fractionation plant valued at two-thirds of the sale price, the main fiscal 
impacts of the sale are twofold.  The public sector will forego a minimum of $20 million per year in profits, 
and taxpayers will have to find an extra $50 million per year in additional payments for blood products. 
 
Allowing for depreciation, the Institute’s analysis shows that the sale of CSL will result in an additional annual 
expenditure by the Commonwealth of $45 million.  After a little over six years, the $299 million proceeds of the 
sale will thus have disappeared and each year thereafter taxpayers will be $45 million worse off as a result of 
the sale (Hamilton & Quiggin 1995b, drawing on fuller analysis in 1995a). 
 
The fourth inquiry, the performance audit conducted by the Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO), has already been noted for its useful description of 
aspects of the sale process.  It identified the costs of sale to government as 
higher than Beauchamp’s estimate ($9.2m, in its view not excessive for a float 
of this kind);  it also identified other costs associated with the new blood 
processing plant, lifting the total Commonwealth outlay to $201m;  and it too 
was critical of the way in which the issue of indemnities had been handled.  In 
particular, it questioned two Commonwealth decisions:  to transfer ownership 
of the fractionation plant to CSL rather than to lease it to the enterprise with a 
resulting regular income stream;  and not to include a ‘clawback’ option to give 
the Commonwealth some later return should CSL make significant gains from 
future dealings in property redevelopment, as had occurred with a number of 
British privatisations.  Here the Department of Finance disagreed, arguing that 
transfer of the fractionation plant had enhanced the saleability of CSL and that, 
in respect of clawback, it was better to ‘capture’ all such potential gains at point 
of sale and so avoid future complicating transactions (ANAO 1995, pp 40-1).  
 
Another ANAO report under preparation used the CSL sale as a lead example in 
its concern about the government’s risk management practices.8  And Sydney 
Morning Herald journalist Jennifer Cooke now described the ‘scope of the 
indemnity’ to CSL as ‘unprecedented in the asset sales of former government-
run institutions’  (Cooke 1998b, p. 258).  A subsequent report by the 
parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts indicated that CSL had been 
trying for many years to obtain commercial insurance cover to mitigate the risk 
to the Commonwealth through all these indemnities.  It had obtained limited 
cover for hepatitis claims but failed to get cover for past employees exposed to 
asbestos fibres.   As this report was being finalised, the insurers agreed to 
provide cover of $49m for HIV/AIDS contracted from blood products, subject to 
the insuree paying the first $1m of any claim. From the taxpayers’ point-of-
view, however, there was still a sting:  the Commonwealth is contractually 
obliged to pay the premiums for these CSL insurances (JCPA 1997, pp 20-1). 
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Senator Coulter now provided the fifth major critique.  He conducted his own 
review of the issues and presented his findings in a speech spread over six 
Senate adjournment debates between May and August 1995.  In essence, he 
directed his remarks to both the blood plasma mixing and the pituitary gland 
hormone issues, and suggested that processing errors and lack of quality 
controls in CSL amounted to negligence---much more than acting with good 
intent but in ignorance of side-effects.  The sale process had therefore been 
flawed because buyers did not know what they were getting into, past judicial 
proceedings had been starved of adequate information, and it was grossly unfair 
that the present CJD litigants should be saddled with the legal costs of sorting 
out the mess.   Claiming he had himself been subject to intense lobbying by 
CSL and the department---which convinced him they had much to hide---he 
sought a full parliamentary inquiry.  He was further incensed when then-
opposition (Liberal-National Party) members refused to support him;  they had 
explained, he said, that such an inquiry would adversely affect CSL share 
prices, and so in his view totally confirmed the primacy of commercial over 
public-interest considerations (Coulter 1995). 
 
At the end of this speech in several parts, Coulter asked Senator Peter Cook, 
Minister for Industry, Science and Technology, whether he accepted the 
Hamilton-Quiggin analysis.  The minister replied by reading out a statement 
prepared by the Department of Finance, arguing that the analysis was 
‘seriously flawed’ because it failed to take into account either the risks that 
would exist even if CSL had remained in Commonwealth ownership or the 
multiple objectives a government is required to meet in any major asset sale 
(Cook 1995, pp 1905-6). 
 
Over the period of the sale CSL found itself, along with the Commonwealth, 
instructing lawyers to defend it against the writs issued by the pituitary gland 
hormone recipients, and much negotiation ensued between the contending 
parties.  It had become clear that the indemnities would not apply if liability were 
found to arise from deliberate or reckless action endangering the health and 
safety of human life (SCALC 1997, p. 27),  and this would be one of the issues in 
any litigation.  Eventually arguments such as those presented by Coulter and by 
journalist Cooke, who was completing a book on the CJD affair and had much 
sympathy for the victims  (Cooke 1998a, 1998b), prevailed.  Already the 
Commonwealth had made available a $10m package to meet some of the 
recommendations of the Allars report, and a settlement was reached with the 
families of some hormone recipients who had died of CJD.  But between 1993 
and 1997 more than 100 new court actions were begun, alleging that knowing the 
possibility of contracting CJD at some future time had caused nervous shock.  
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Again the Commonwealth and CSL were being sued for compensation (SCALC 
1997, pp 31-2). 
 
In April 1997 the Commonwealth offered another settlement:  it would pay 
compensation if a nervous shock plaintiff actually contracted CJD, and it and 
CSL would pay the legal costs already incurred by these plaintiffs, ie 
regardless of whether they contracted the disease.  These benefits would 
supplement those already available under the $10m package.  The offer was 
accepted by over 90 of these litigants, but not all.  At particular issue were the 
Commonwealth’s refusal to grant them legal aid to pursue their cases in the 
courts and whether this constituted undue pressure to accept the settlement 
offer;  whether documents relevant to the Allars inquiry had been withheld 
from hormone recipients;  and whether all such recipients had been traced.  
The Senate now sought advice on the fairness and adequacy of both the 
government’s response to the Allars report and the settlement offer from its 
Community Affairs References Committee, and after careful inquiry the 
committee made 18 recommendations for more follow-up official action, not 
closing off the possibility of further litigation (SCALC 1997, pp xi-xiv, 77-85, 
105).  In mid-1998 the government had acted on several recommendations, but 
was still considering its response on others:  another $3m would be added to 
the trust account established under the original $10m settlement, allowing one-
off payments to hormone recipients who could demonstrate that ‘a recognised 
psychiatric injury’ had resulted from their being told that they were at risk of 
contracting CJD (SCALC 1998). 
 
The tensions created by the blood plasma fractionation process also refused to 
go away.  Another ANAO performance audit report published in December 
1999 (ANAO 1999, pp 11-18;  also Hamilton 2000) revealed that the 
Commonwealth had paid out over $400m between January 1994 and April 
1999 for therapeutic products derived from domestic plasma without any 
procedure for checking that the products had been received by the designated 
recipients or that the invoices submitted by CSL were reasonable.  Nor did the 
Commonwealth have in its records copies of insurance policies obtained by 
CSL covering risks for which it is indemnified by the Commonwealth and in 
respect of which the Commonwealth meets much of the premium cost.  CSL 
had also breached certain contract provisions:  in a supplementary agreement 
entered into in 1996, it had contracted with the Commonwealth to supply the 
Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), the relevant section of the 
Department of Health, with full advance information about any plasma to be 
imported from overseas sources.  Two years later, TGA detected that CSL had 
breached this agreement in importing and processing plasma from a US source 
without advising it;  this was followed by an ‘unannounced audit’ (described as 
a ‘raid’ by The Australia Institute’s Clive Hamilton:  2000, p. 8) by 
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Commonwealth officers of the CSL plant, which confirmed the breach of the 
agreement.  Amazingly CSL continued to process foreign plasma---from four 
countries---for several more months without following the agreed procedures.  
Eventually the Health Minister commissioned an independent inquiry, which 
confirmed CSL’s lapse but declared that it had had no material adverse impact 
on the plasma products system.  The relevant regulations were tightened, but 
the Audit report considered that there was still significant scope for 
improvement in the Department’s contract management procedures relating to 
CSL, including a proper vetting of those insurance contracts entered into by 
CSL relating to risks for which the Commonwealth has accepted liability.   
 
The impression is strong that, despite the privatisation, government health 
officials have continued to treat CSL as though it were a public agency 
requiring only a very restrained and gentlemanly sort of supervision.  As we 
have seen, the Commonwealth has already outlaid considerable sums related to 
the indemnity provisions in the CSL sale compact.  Though CSL has obviously 
borne some costs, it has mostly been protected by these provisions.  The 
remarkable consequence is that, though these vicissitudes related so clearly to 
CSL’s own earlier operations, and though some of the problems have continued 
past the point of sale, its management has been able to focus on maintaining and 
improving commercial performance, its share prices have not suffered, and 
leading stockbrokers continue to recommend it as an excellent investment (eg 
Were 2000). 
 
Summarising, the main stages in CSL’s organisational evolution have been as 
follows: 
 
1916: established as branch of a Commonwealth department (Trade and 
Customs and, from 1921, Health); 
1961: converted to statutory corporation; 
1990: converted to government-owned company; 
1994: sold by public float, and thereafter operated as private company 
sheltered by several government indemnities 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
1.  We are grateful to the management of the privatised CSL for providing us with Annual Reports, the sale 
Prospectus, and other published company documents.  However the company declined to comment on an early 
draft of this case study when it realised that we were taking seriously a number of critical commentaries on 
various CSL activities. 
 
2. Around that time the Menzies government disposed of several of its commercial holdings and tried 
unsuccessfully to dispose of others, in a process then described as ‘denationalisation’---the word ‘privatisation’ 
was not then in use (Wettenhall 1987, pp  3-4 and ch.9). 
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3. The Nossal/Reid inquiry drew attention to a burden that public enterprises suffered that was not matched by 
their private enterprise competitors: subjection to numerous investigations by ‘external reviews and inquiries’ 
imposing loads on management ‘which must have a negative impact on productivity’. It listed 18 such 
inquiries (including three by the Public Accounts Committee) that had impacted on CSL between 1974 and 
1977: Nossal & Reid 1978, pp 48-50. 
 
4.  This general movement is discussed in Wettenhall 1998. 
 
5.  Hamilton and Quiggin, who were to be leading critics of the sale, offered another accolade.  They saw CSL 
as ‘one of the best-performing Commonwealth business enterprises’ (1995a, p. 3).   
 
6.  This contrasts with the position noted in our companion case study of the sale of GIO Australia. 
 
7.  Given the high degree of ‘publicness’ in the ongoing work of CSL, it might be asked why the government 
did not retain a ‘golden share’ in the company, a privatisation strategy in considerable use elsewhere. It is 
recorded that this course of action ‘had once been envisaged’ but that the government ‘acted on advice’ not to 
do so, ‘instead ensuring that CSL would continue in its vital role of supplying plasma fractionation services for 
the government by binding it to a 10-year contract’ (PBN 1995, p. 26). 
 
8.  This report estimated that, over all portfolios, the Commonwealth was liable for at least $222 billion in the 
form of specified guarantees, some of which had neither financial nor time limits;  there were also a ‘large 
number of indemnities and some letters of comfort which [had] no specified financial commitment’.  The 
criticism was directed particularly to portfolio departments which issued guarantee instruments regularly 
without time and financial limits or termination clauses. The report asserted that there was a need for an 
increased level of awareness ‘of the commercial risk that attached to Commonwealth off-balance sheet 
exposures and options for treating that risk’.  In the case of the CSL sale, ANAO believed the Commonwealth 
had remained significantly exposed.  ‘An asset sale’, it argued, ‘may provide an opportunity to curtail if not 
transfer contingent liabilities to another party’.  In contrast to the CSL sale, the Commonwealth had divested 
itself of all significant obligations in the sale of the Moomba-to-Sydney gas pipeline, and in the sale of the 
final tranche of Commonwealth Bank shares it ensured a release from substantial exposure through sunset 
clauses beginning to have effect three years after sale (ANAO 1996: xiv, xvii-iii, 53-4, 75; Taylor 1996).  
This Audit report was subsequently considered by two parliamentary committees which made their own 
recommendations, all leading to the promulgation of Finance Circular 1997/06 announcing revised guidelines 
on the provision of guarantees, indemnities and letters of comfort (see generally ANAO 1998;  also JCPA 
1997). 
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Chapter 8 
 
VICTORIA’S TOTALIZATOR AGENCY BOARD/TABCORP* 
 
In this case study we observe one of the first divestments conducted by the Kennett 
government elected to office in Victoria in 1992.  The Victorian Totalizator Board 
(TAB) was also the first of its kind in Australia, demonstrating the use of public 
enterprise for the purpose of social and economic cleansing.  It operated 
successfully in its appointed field until it was compromised, being forced by public 
policy change into a new role for which it was unsuited.  The new government then 
used it as an exemplar for the mass privatisation program it wished to pursue, 
though there was an unusual beginning arrangement to recognise the interest of a 
third party.  The new owners were significantly sheltered as the state assumed  
many residual costs, although it has proved difficult to get information about the 
full extent of this shelter. 
 
Pre-sale organisational evolution 
 
Establishing a public enterprise with a cleansing mission 
 
Horse racing and gambling have been closely associated in Australia since 
virtually the beginning of European settlement.  Gradually the several state 
governments developed schemes for the licensing of racecourses and regulation of 
their operations, for the registration of bookmakers and bookmakers’ clerks, and 
for the payment of registration fees and a stamp duty on each betting ticket issued.  
Initially the only legal form of betting was by means of registered bookmakers on 
licensed racecourses.  But associated developments in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries introduced both new entrepreneurial opportunity and new regulatory 
challenge. 
 
The first was the invention of the totalizator,1  originally hand-driven but later 
electrically powered, a machine which was capable of indicating odds, counting 
bets, deducting tax and calculating and displaying the value of different classes 
of  
dividend.  Its racecourse potential was quickly apparent, and it seriously 
challenged the bookmakers’ role; governments became involved also in its 
regulation.  Second, social pressure developed for a legalised means of off-course 
betting:  Tasmania and South Australia responded with regulated ‘betting shops’, 
but they were not replicated in the larger Australian states, the racing clubs 
protesting that they would lead to a decline in racecourse attendances and therefore 
a decline in their own revenues (Martin 1959;  VYB 1965, p.341; Brawley 1995, 
p.20;  Dickerson 1996, pp 1461-2;  TAE 1996, p.2939). 
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Running against the interests of governments and racing clubs alike, a black 
market developed to satisfy the insatiable demand for the provision of off-course 
betting facilities.  The hole was filled by a multitude of starting price (SP) 
bookmakers.2  But the racing clubs lamented that they earned nothing from this 
‘multi-million pound economy’ (Brawley 1995, p. 20).  And state governments 
wanted desperately to compel the off-course bookmakers to pay taxes.  The 
illegality of these operations had other insidious effects.  Since the SP bookmakers 
and all the people who did business were offending against the law, it had become 
a major police responsibility to detect, punish and suppress them.  But it was 
‘victimless crime’, and such crime constitutes a major invitation to petty 
corruption:  it leads easily to the offering of bribes and in this and other ways 
brings the force of ‘the law’ into disrepute. 
 
Many in the community regarded gambling as a social evil and wanted to stiffen 
penalties against off-course betting and expand police capacity to deal with it.  But 
the sheer pressure of numbers of those who were determined to bet irrespective of 
the law and the desire of governments to earn revenue from their betting activity 
led to the establishment of a series of royal commissions by Australian state 
governments, all charged with the mission of discovering a generally acceptable 
public policy compromise.  By the time Victoria commissioned Mr Justice Martin 
to conduct such an inquiry in 1958, New Zealand had already taken action to 
resolve its own public policy problem over gambling, and that action was to 
provide a useful model for Victoria to adapt to its own circumstances.  The New 
Zealand solution was to establish a form of ‘nationalised off-course betting’, the 
means being the creation of a Totalizator Agency Board employing the ‘tote’ 
technology, to handle all such betting, extending its coverage to greyhound-racing 
as well as all forms of horse-racing.  This TAB system would return profits to the 
general community rather than the SP bookmakers, ensure that punters got better 
returns from their successful investments than they had previously received, and 
allocate a percentage of the profits to the racing clubs (Brawley 1995, pp 20-1). 
 
Encouraged by Sir Chester Manifold, a highly respected figure in the Victorian 
racing industry and a close observer of the New Zealand debates, and supported by 
Premier Sir Henry Bolte, a keen racegoer himself, and by the Martin royal 
commission, the Victorian parliament legislated in 1960 to establish a new public 
sector corporation called the Totalizator Agency Board to provide off-course 
facilities for betting on horse races (Racing (Totalizators Extension) Act 
6619/1960).  Created by the addition of a new part to the basic Racing Act, it 
comprised of eight members appointed by Governor-in-Council on the nomination 
of the main racincg clubs.  Subject to ministerial approval, the board could regulate 
its own procedures; and it was empowered to appoint a manager, secretary and 
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other officers and employees outside the provisions of the Public Service Act (ie in 
a formal sense they were not public servants). 
 
Until the Victorian TAB (hereafter Victab) was financially self-supporting, all the 
expenses involved in the setting up of its offices and agencies were to be borne by 
clubs holding licences for the use of totalizators or sharing in commissions for their 
use.  They were described as ‘participating clubs’, and so had a clear stake in the 
efficiency of the operation.  Once self-sufficiency was reached, they would then 
share in the distribution of the commission earned by Victab on all bets it handled.  
These clubs were to submit to the minister administering the Racing Act a financial 
scheme dealing with the manner of payment and distribution of the moneys due to 
them from the operations of Victab. 
 
The main intended role of this system was to provide facilities for people away 
from racecourses to place lawful bets on totalizators operating on racecourses;  in 
doing so Victab would act as agent for the club using the totalizator relating to the 
event on which the bet was made, and pay all monies received into that totalizator.  
These moneys would thus form part of the combined (on-course and off-course) 
pool on a race.  However, where no suitable racecourse totalizator was available, 
Victab could conduct its own pools (Racing (Totalizators Extension) Act No. 6619 
of 1960;  also TAE  1996, p. 2939). 
 
Victab in operation 
 
Manifold became foundation chairman, and in setting up the organisation he and 
his colleagues drew heavily on the experience of the New Zealand TAB, a number 
of whose senior staff ‘have become the nucleus of our organisation’.  The original 
Victab agencies opened for business on Saturday 11 March 1961, in Manifold’s 
words introducing ‘a period of historic development in the racing and trotting 
industry and the most satisfactory means of meeting a social demand’ (Manifold 
1961, p. 5).  
 
Almost immediately satisfaction was being expressed that a great many Victorians 
had shown that they  welcomed ‘the opportunity of betting legally’, that the 
provision of legal off-course betting facilities had not seriously affected on-course 
attendances, and that the setting-up costs were lower than expected (so that the 
racing clubs had been required to outlay less underwriting capital than anticipated).  
After one year of operations there were 83 Victab agencies attracting off-course 
betting ‘investments’ of almost £14 million, a result regarded as demonstrating ‘a 
remarkable increase in public acceptance of the scheme’ (Victab 1961, pp 8-10; 
1962, p. 8; 1963, p. 8). 
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Though the outcome of a dramatic piece of public policy development and 
operating as a public-sector body under a clear legislative charter, the board 
operated at a very long arm’s length from government:  untypically for a statutory 
body, it used a private auditor and had its annual report printed privately, and the 
chairman addressed that report not to ‘the minister’ but to the board collectively.  
The impression is strong that, although the state government had found it necessary 
to intervene in this important part of the gambling ‘industry’, in both the public 
interest and that of the racing clubs with which leading government figures had a 
close association, there was seen to be a sort of ‘sleaze factor’ about the whole 
operation which led government not to want to be closely identified with it.  
 
Under Manifold’s strong leadership (he retired in 1968), the betting turnover 
increased dramatically in the early years, and the organisation served as a model 
for the establishment of public-sector TAB systems in the other Australian states 
and territories (see obituary in Victab 1979, p. 1).  Australian public administration 
students were quick to recognise this development as constituting ‘a new province 
for the public [statutory] corporation’ (Brimfield 1967;  also eg Bell et al 1972).  
Victab gained notice for another reason too: since it employed its own staff outside 
the framework of the Public Service Act, it had considerable freedom to innovate 
in personnel matters and, along with the other early Australian TABs, it attracted 
much interest for its pioneering of permanent part-time work. 
 
In a Corporate Profile published towards the close of 1987, Victab recorded that, 
since it had begun, ‘the community’ (ie hospitals and charities) had benefited by 
more than $673m from its distributions.  It operated through ‘420-odd State-wide 
outlets’, and employed ‘about 4000 of the racing industry’s “population” of 27,000 
in Victoria’.  Also more than 150,000 Victorians maintained telephone accounts 
with it and, in the TAB Telephone Betting Group with ‘more than 350 telephone 
lines’, a ‘team of up to 1000 telephone betting clerks handle the transactions 
between 10am and 11pm each race day, accounting for about 30 per cent of TAB 
turnover’.  It claimed that it was now rated among the top 500 businesses in 
Australia (Victab 1987a, pp 1, 11). 
 
The portfolio of betting services gradually expanded to embrace also greyhound 
racing and football competitions, and new forms of betting on horse races such as 
the quadrella.  In the later 1980s, ‘new betting products’ were introduced such as 
pools on Grand Prix motor racing, the America’s Cup yacht races and one-day 
cricket, and movement towardsthe notion of a ‘tabaret’ in which patrons could eat, 
drink and bet simultaneously.  Fresh legislation authorised the introduction of 
PubTabs, while the installation of Sky Channel facilities in 320 Victab outlets 
became ‘a major factor in retail sales growth’.  Other developments included the 
absorption of the metropolitan on-course totes (take-over of the country on-course 
totes came a few years later) and computer expansion to enable the state-wide 
  
 
125
integration of on-course and off-course wagering services.  By 1990 Victab was 
describing itself as ‘an investment powerhouse’ and as ‘one of the few sources of 
revenue growth for the State’s health and social policy infrastructure’ (Victab 
1987-90). 
 
Under Aspro business head and Victorian Racing Club committeeman Hilton 
Nicholas, who had replaced Manifold as chairman, the headquarters building was 
expanded to become the ‘Racing Industry Centre’, with many racing clubs 
relocating there (Nicholas 1978, p. 1).  The assumption of responsibility for the 
provision of on-course as well as off-course totalizator facilities was made possible 
and perhaps inevitable by the movement to computer technology and by the 
continuous refinement and improvement of Victab’s computer facilities thereafter-
--although, in the longer term, this technology was to prove very troublesome for 
the organisation. 
 
But it was not able to maintain its managerial distance from the government, the 
changing relationship demonstrated by a variety of interventions from around 1973 
onwards.  Further legislation in 1983 reconstituted the board to include 
representatives of racing interests other than thoroughbred horseracing, stipulated 
that the minister would nominate as chairman a person not closely associated with 
any of the racing communities, and as deputy chairman (after consultation with the 
Treasurer) a person with special expertise in financial management, and required 
that the chief executive would henceforth be appointed subject to ministerial 
approval---Victab had previously acted autonomously in this matter.  In the 
reconstruction that followed, only two members of the old board remained, and 
there were thereafter many signs of a managerialist ‘revolution’, highlighted by a 
new ‘Corporate Statement’, ‘Corporate Objectives’ and a ‘Declaration of Interest’ 
by board members (Trezise 1983, pp 1573-4;  Racing (Further Amendment) Act 
10014/1983;  Victab Annual Reports, various).  
 
Celebrating its 30th birthday in 1991, Victab recorded that its contribution to the 
‘Hospitals and Charities Fund since inception exceeds $1 billion’.  But that year 
also saw the Victorian parliament pass the Electronic Gaming Act heralding the 
expansion of electronic gaming, and the government announce its intention to 
award a licence for the introduction of a casino.  The management saw these 
developments as ‘dramatically changing the gambling policy environment’ and 
introducing a new need to ‘protect the traditional wagering business’.  It had also 
come to believe that the traditional statutory authority structure which had applied 
to it since its inception in 1961 was no longer appropriate for the tasks it now 
faced.  So, in the lead-up to the launching of the new gaming machine network, it 
reported that it ‘must look to new corporate models if it is to meet its challenging 
mandate’, and that it was ‘seeking to commercialise both its wagering and [its] 
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gaming systems in partnership with Victorian industry’ (Victab 1991, inside front 
cover and pp 2-4). 
 
A year later, the board reported that, to this end, it had 
 
put a comprehensive proposal to its stakeholders, the Government and the Racing Industry, for legislative reform of 
the TAB’s powers and structures under the Racing Act and reform of associated Government administrative 
arrangements impacting TAB operations ... these proposals have been the subject of extensive consultation and 
analysis within Government and the Racing Industry.  The Board looks forward to the resolution of these matters at 
an early date so that the TAB can deliver its business plan in the coming year for the benefit of its stakeholders 
(Victab 1992, p. 5). 
 
So the board clearly recognised its own limitations in the changing gambling 
environment, and had suggested a solution to its major stakeholders.  But events 
moved too rapidly for it. 
 
Into a new gambling environment 
 
These changes in the gambling environment were closely related to the dramatic 
downturn in the condition of Victoria’s state finances, associated with the decline 
of the state’s secondary industries, the collapse of the State Bank and several other 
economic enterprises both public and private, and the need to arrest the growth of 
public debt and find new sources of both revenue and employment.  Hitherto 
Victoria had been markedly conservative among the Australian states in matters 
related to gambling.  Now, however, the Labor government under Joan Kirner 
came to promote casinos and electronic gambling as part of a strategy to expand 
the tourism and entertainment industries and thereby attract new business to the 
state and new revenue for its government.  But in doing so it was determined to put 
a distinctively Victorian stamp on the new system, marked by avoidance ot the 
term ‘gambling industry’ and a determination to regulate closely the distribution of 
operating licences.  
 
The Kirner government therefore enacted legislation in 1991 to create a 
supervisory Victorian Gaming Commission and to vest control of the gaming 
machines in large, well-recognised Victorian institutions to which the government 
could relate closely:  the existing publicly owned Victab and the Tattersall lottery 
organisation, operated by a private trust, were the only possible candidates and 
duly received operating licenses.  For Victab it was accepted that the gaming 
machines should be located in and regulated in conjunction with its many betting 
facilities throughout the state, and much innovatory effort ensued to develop both 
more attractive venues such as ‘tabarets’ where both sides of Victab’s business 
could be conducted in pleasant surroundings and a Victorian capacity to 
manufacture gaming machines.  Operation of the gaming machines was linked to 
the existing Victab computer system, creating severe pressure on the technology.  
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At the same time Victab was absorbing the last of the on-course totalizators 
hitherto run by the racing clubs, negotiating agreements with counterpart TABs in 
smaller Australian jurisdictions (Tasmania, South Australia, Northern Territory) 
whereby their investments were fed into the larger Victorian pool for the 
determination of dividends, and having to cope with the threat to its business 
created by some Australian dealings with the privately owned and Vanuatu-based 
VITAB betting organisation.  
 
Still more pressure on Victab came from the impending introduction of a casino in 
Melbourne.  Concerned about its likely impact on its business, Victab sought to 
involve itself in the consortium being formed to apply for the casino licence.  But it 
needed fresh capital to do this, and its owner, the impoverished state government, 
could not oblige.  So it proposed a restructuring which would see the rapidly 
expanding gaming machine operation moved to a separate subdidiary company 
which could raise capital by offering shares to financial institutions.  By now, 
however, there was much speculation about the likely effects of a change of 
government widely expected after the general election due in late 1992, and there 
was beginning talk of possible full privatisation. 
 
The disposal process 
 
Enter the Kennett government 
 
As expected, the Kennett Liberal-National Coalition won government in the 
October 1992 general election, and an unkind fate quickly intervened to bring the 
Victab house of cards tumbling down.  Against very long odds, there were three 
late scratchings, importantly including the favourite ‘Let’s Elope’, from the 
Melbourne Cup early in November, and Victab staff faced a huge challenge in 
refunding bets and adjusting dividend rates.  Its computer system simply could not 
cope, producing a ‘great financial disaster’ for the Victorian Racing Club and a 
general impression of organisational breakdown.  Within a couple of weeks, there 
was further calamity:  a straight-six jackpot was left open for betting for eleven 
minutes after the first race had been run.  The new Minister for Sport, Recreation 
and Racing, TC Reynolds, immediately announced an independent inquiry , 
reported to be ‘on the entire TAB operation’;  and his announcement was 
welcomed by Victab chairman Redlich who said that the  inquiry was opportune 
because---repeating views already very clearly expressed---Victab’s resources had 
been stretched and because its structure was inadequate for its mission (The Age 
1992:  4, 17, 18 November). 
 
The question now was: what sort of change would follow? It was no secret that 
selling off state enterprises was high on the agenda of the Coalition parties.  A 
series of inquiries followed quickly3 and, on release of the first private consultant’s 
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report, chairman Redlich resigned, giving as his reason the fact that Victab’s 
responsibilities had outgrown its capacity to operate without significant structural 
change (quoted in Reynolds 1993a).  
 
A holding  reconstruction 
 
As a kind of holding measure, the government introduced legislation in April 1993 
to amend the Racing Act, providing among other things that the Victab board 
would henceforth consist of seven members (including a chairman and vice-
chairman) all appointed directly by the government.  Gone was the appointment of 
members to represent various racing interests:  the minister explained that it was 
‘in the interest of the whole community that the TAB should have available to it 
the best possible people for its board’;  the membership ‘should be skills based 
rather than subject to sectional interests’.  This legislation also reduced totalisator 
betting commissions to a rate similar to that applying in New South Wales to 
maintain Victab’s competitiveness (Reynolds 1993b, pp 1360-1;  Racing 
(Amendment) Act 49/1993).  The new board took office in 1 June 1993, but an 
oversight had quickly to be repaired.  The board members who had presided over 
the growth of Victab since its inception in 1961 until now had been entitled only to 
‘such travelling and other allowances in respect of their attendance at board 
meetings as are from time to time prescribed’.  The government now believed that 
‘the highly skilled people’ needed to serve on the board ‘should receive an 
appropriate remuneration for their services’, and so the Racing Act was again 
amended to provide for remuneration at rates determined by the Governor-in-
Council (Reynolds 1993d, p. 505;  Racing (Further Amendment) Act 77/1993). 
 
Victab’s Chief Executive, Neil Walker, resigned after another private consultant’s 
report was submitted.  The role of the former government in driving the move into 
gaming machines was now mostly forgotten; it was easy to make scapegoats of 
those more closely identified with Victab itself.  Age columnist Kenneth Davidson 
wrote that ‘the TAB books have been sandbagged in order to make the previous 
management look bad and give the new management a flying start’ (Davidson 
1993).  
 
For the government, a major problem was the involvement of the racing clubs.  As 
talk of privatisation increased, they argued from the back history that they actually 
owned Victab, and offered to run it themselves, paying a new super-tax and other 
taxes to government.  Resolving this problem took up considerable time, and 
eventually another private consultant played an important part in negotiating an 
agreement.  Also the government needed to balance its plans for the establishment 
of a Victorian casino with its determination to restructure Victab.  Inevitably the 
awarding of the casino licence, announced on 6 September 1993, was a dramatic 
development for the corporation.  Against estimates that its racing turnover would 
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decrease by from 14 to 16 per cent when the casino became operational, it was 
revealed that the board had withdrawn from the successful bid consortium because 
it did not have the necessary liquid funds at its disposal;  and there was no 
likelihood that the government would make funds available to a publicly owned 
Victab for that purpose (Reynolds 1993c, p. 270;  Walker 1997).  
 
In the wake of another of the consultant’s reports, the Victab board agreed to write 
off $96m from its accounts, and recommended a drastic reduction in the surplus 
available for distribution to the racing clubs.  But the government preferred to 
withdraw the sum from the Victab capital reserve and make a normal distribution, 
and the Auditor-General disputed some of the board’s writing-off action.  Then the 
new chairman, Peter Scanlan, found himself implicated, with John Elliott and other 
Elders executives, in proceedings before the Melbourne Magistrate’s Court relating 
to allegedly fictitious foreign exchange transactions investigated by the National 
Crimes Authority, and was forced to stand aside from the chairmanship 
(Melbourne Sun Herald, 26 December). 
 
Preparation for sale 
 
The determination of Premier Kennett and Treasurer Alan Stockdale to sell was 
very clear.  It was well known that they were favourably disposed to selling off 
public enterprises.  Given the difficulties they were experiencing with Victab, and 
aided by the fact that others were at least half-convinced that privatisation was 
necessary for it, they decided to make it a show-case for their planned divestment 
program. 
 
There was early agreement that Victab would not be broken up into separate 
wagering and gaming organisations, and an early assurance by the Premier that he 
wanted to retain a viable racing industry in Victoria.  Press reports said variously 
that options were for a 49% float, with the industry getting ‘up to a 35%’ of 
ownership plus taxation benefits; or for a 75% float with the other 25% retained by 
the industry (reported Bourke 1993a).  The latter firmed up as the main plan, 
announced by the Premier on 21 December 1993: he said that the industry ‘would 
be guaranteed a fat annual fee and a 25% shareholding’, with the other 25% 
‘publicly floated, with a limit of five per cent per individual’;  the government 
valued Victab at more than $1b, and ‘the sell-off would provide $600m to pay off 
state debt and allow the Government to escape the increasingly competitive and 
risky industry’.  It would be the biggest ever public float of a Victorian company, 
and become one of Australia’s 75 biggest companies.  The prospectus would be 
issued before 30 June 1994: some details remained to be negotiated with the racing 
industry, but there could be ‘no significant compromise’ (reported Magazanik 
1993). 
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At this time the Victab organisation employed 443 permanent staff and 1,822 
casuals spread over three divisions:  Wagering: conducting its own off-course 
totalisator system, as well as on-course totes on 83 race-courses and tracks where it 
serves as agent of the relevant club;  Gaming: operating almost 7,000 gaming 
machines in licensed clubs and hotels; and  Corporate: providing financial and 
administrative, human resources and corporate development services to the other 
two divisions (Prospectus  1994, p. 9). 
 
Agreements reached 
 
Further difficulties with the racing industry were resolved by March, when a 
memorandum-of-understanding was signed joining the government and the 
industry in what was described as ‘an unincorporated joint-venture company’, to 
be owned 25 per cent by the industry and 75 per cent by Victab, which would then 
be floated and be free to pursue other opportunities.  Each party would have three 
representatives on the joint-venture board, whose decisions had to be unanimous.  
The industry would get a guaranteed $130m in annual fees from the wagering 
business plus dividends from the joint venture, racing club members would get 
preferential treatment in the float, and there would be a relaxing of government 
regulation of the industry.  The government also accepted advice that the float 
would use the open pricing (or book-building) method in which investors bid for 
stock in a previously set price range, rather than a set-price underwritten float;  and 
in the absence of an underwriter the government would appoint a ‘lead manager’, 
probably supported by co-managers to deal with the local and off-shore portions of 
the issue (Bourke 1994b;  Gluyas 1994). 
 
Within days Treasurer Stockdale was ready to announce both that the new 
organisation would start with ‘an absolutely clean balance sheet’ (ie the 
government would ensure that none of its old debts or other commitments carried 
over), and ‘the appointment of stockbroking, legal, accounting and advertising 
advisers for the start of the due diligence process on the issue’.  It was, as the 
reporting journalist pointed out, ‘a largely home-grown [Melbourne] team’ to steer 
‘the first of several privatisation offerings [the government] plans to bring to 
market’ (McIlwraith 1994b). 
 
Meanwhile a classic spill of management positions took place.  Within a month of 
Kennett’s December 1993 announcement, there was a call for applications to fill 
all the senior management positions.  Several existing managers had resigned and 
others would have to reapply for positions under review.  On very doubtful 
grounds (it was not the case with other public-float privatisations considered in our 
project), Acting Victab Chairman Tony Hodgson said this was ‘normal commercial 
practice when an organisation was moving from public to private sector 
ownership’, and that it was a necessary step because of the different way in which 
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the organisation would be able to operate when ‘removed from the considerable 
constraints of public sector ownership’.  Two firms of consultants were engaged 
‘to review the senior positions and assist the board in the selection process’ (quotes 
from Bourke 1994a, McIlraith 1994a).4 
 
In June the appointment of Ross Wilson, former chief executive of Southcorp 
Holdings Ltd (previously South Australian Brewing), to head the about-to-be-
privatised Victab was announced.  The appointment was controversial :  it was 
widely reported that Wilson was not on the short list of names put forward to the 
board by the consultants chosen for that purpose, and that he had been offered a 
very high salary package, described as approaching $2 million a year.  Reports 
suggested that the government had been told by the float advisers that it should 
accept Wilson’s appointment or delay the float for at least two years;  it would 
appear that the advice the government received was that it needed a high-profile 
executive to attract foreign investors, and that Wilson insisted on receiving the 
same sort of package he had enjoyed at Southcorp if he were to take the job 
(Magazanik 1994;  Greene 1994).  
 
The other major component of the pre-sale reconstruction fell into place with the 
passage through the state parliament in April and May 1994 of the Gaming and 
Betting Act 37/1994.  It was a very complex piece of legislation, with 235 sections 
spread over 170 pages and involving the amendment of ten other acts.  There was 
obviously great pressure on the Victorian parliamentary drafting service to ensure 
its speedy preparation in collaboration with all those engaged in working towards 
the sale.  The main effects of the act were to: 
 
* authorise the conversion of Victab into a public company ‘freed from past constraints on its capital funding 
capacity’, able to make commercial business decisions, and ‘in a very strong position to expand interstate and 
overseas’, and its subsequent sale expected to attract at least $600m to be applied to the reduction of state debt; 
 
* reduce state taxes on wagering turnover but ensure continuing dedication of revenue from these taxes to the 
Hospitals and Charities Fund; 
 
* establish a single regulatory authority, the Victorian Casino and Gaming Authority to replace the earlier separate 
gaming and casino refulators, to be funded from consolidated revenue and from an approved supervision charge to 
be paid by holders of wagering and gaming licenses;  
 
* provide for the privatised Victab to be issued the first such licences for 18 years, and to establish subsidiary 
companies as operators of either or both of those licences; 
 
* provide for licensed racing clubs to conduct on-course totalisators and regulate shareholdings in any licence to 
ensure a diverse ownership structure with no single dominant shareholder; and 
 
* establish the mechanisms for the transfer of Victab staff to the new company, and for transfer of its property, 
rights and obligations to the company or its subsidiaries or the state (Stockdale 1994, pp 1313-7). 
 
In his second-reading speech on 28 April 1994, the Treasurer indicated also that 
the state was pursuing its case for ‘structural assistance’ from the Commonwealth 
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to reflect the significant windfall tax gain that would come to it after the sale.  
Although not spelt out in the speech, Melbourne commentators understood that the 
intention was to continue both the wagering monopoly Victab had enjoyed for so 
long and the gaming duopoly it had shared with Tattersalls (eg Davidson 1994). 
 
The sale in process 
 
In fact the government had anticipated the approval of parliament (it had a 
majority in both houses!) and incorporated the new company, TABCORP 
Holdings Ltd, on 13 April (with the state holding the six issued ordinary shares).  
Now both the statutory corporation (Victab) and the new company, at this point 
still government-owned (Tabcorp), were in legal existence.  On 25 May Tabcorp 
entered into long-term contract arrangements with companies established by the 
racing industry under the Joint Venture Agreement, and on 28 June it was issued 
the wagering and gaming licences needed to enable it to take over Victab’s 
business, for which it would eventually pay the state around $600m or $700m 
depending on the final share price:  it received the sole licence to conduct off-
course totalizators in Victoria, this licence authorising it also to conduct on-course 
totes in its own right instead of as agent for the relevant club as before; and it 
received one of only two licences issued for the conduct of gaming machines in 
clubs and hotels.  But formal transfer of the business awaited the ‘appointed day’ 
under the act (Prospectus 1994, pp 2, 8, 10). 
 
The prospectus was now prepared, and was available from about 5 July.  There 
was wide publicity in Australian newspapers through early July, with the public 
offer for the 300 million shares scheduled to open on 18 July and close on 5 
August, and the institutional offer to run from 8 to 12 August.  More than one 
million copies were distributed as inserts in Melbourne newspapres and through 
Tabcorp’s 750 retail outlets---’to give all Victorians the opportunity to participate 
in Victoria’s biggest-ever float’ (Henry 1994).  
 
The public offer was open to members of the Australian public, at the ‘application 
price’ of $2.70 per share and with a minimum of 500 shares per application.  All 
Victab employees, agents and associates and members of Victorian racing clubs 
would receive personalised offers to subscribe for 1,000 shares within this public 
offer, with loans available to employees.  The institutional offer was open to 
Australian and international institutions, with a minimum shareholding of 50,000 
shares and bids to be made within a price range of $2.25 to $2.70 per share. 
Australian residents were limited to a 5% shareholding; no non-resident could have 
more than 2.5%, and non-residents in aggregate were limited to 40%.  The ‘final 
price’ would be set after close of the institutional offer; if less than $2.70, 
successful applicants in the public offer would receive refunds of the difference, 
and then Victab employees and agents and racing club members would receive 
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rebates of 2.5% of the price finally paid, funded by the state government.  In place 
of the usual provision for underwriting, there was a commitment that, in the event 
that applications were not received for all the shares on offer, the prospectus would 
be withdrawn and application monies returned.  As a form of indemnification of 
the new company, the prospectus indicated that any outstanding litigation at the 
time of the float would remain with Victab (Prospectus 1994, pp 13, 17, 60).  
Coopers and Lybrand were appointed as share registrars. 
 
The response to the public offer was sluggish, one analyst describing it as 
‘underwhelmed’ in contrast with other floats of this kind.  But overseas interest 
was said to be ‘enormous’, and the hope was that any shortfall in the 65% allocated 
to the public would be taken up by institutional and overseas investors.  At the 
close it was known that all shares on offer had been taken up, but that the number 
of ‘mum and dad’ investors (ie the general public) was only a little over half of 
what had been expected.  Announcing the result, Treasurer Stockdale said this 
shortfall had allowed the institutional investors to set the price at the bottom of the 
set bookbuilding range---$2.25 per share, reducing the return to the taxpayer by 
$135m.  The general public took up 34% of the issue, 26% went to foreign 
investors, and Australian institutions took the remaining 40%---even though some 
of Australia’s big institutional investors had ‘snubbed’ the float.  They had all got 
‘a bargain’, the Treasurer said:  those ‘who had expressed their confidence in 
Tabcorp would find that they had made a very sound investment’ (reported Adams, 
Walker & Kaye 1994;  Canberra Times 1994: 2 , 5, 14 August). 
 
A serious criticism came from The Age columnist Kenneth Davidson, who 
believed the government was ‘throwing money away’ and asked the classic 
privatisation questions:  ‘what purpose or whose benefit is served by asking 
Victorians to buy a part of something they already own?’, and ‘why is it in the 
interests of the existing shareholders that the Kennett Government sells their TAB 
on their behalf?’  He pointed out that Victab was already a profitable business, 
calculating that the profits would reach $110 million within a year, so that ‘the 
State Government is foregoing revenue of $110 million a year to save $77 million 
a year [on saved public debt interest], and that ‘this gap will continue to widen’.  
Indeed, he based his calculations on a likely sale price of $2.50 per share, but as we 
have seen they sold for less.  He reasoned, therefore, that the Victorian taxpayers 
were not beneficiaries; the government had chosen ‘to give a bonanza to the new 
owners’.  Also, given that the enterprise would henceforth pay corporate income 
tax at 33 per cent but that it now seemed unlikely that the Commonwealth would 
pay any compensation to the state (indeed, it refused to do so, saying that benefit 
was a once-only payment which Victoria had already received in respect of the sale 
of its State Bank), the state government had chosen to make another ‘gift of about 
$38 million a year of state revenues in perpetuity to the Federal Government for no 
return whatsoever’, based on the ‘conservative assumption’ that Tabcorp profits 
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will not increase beyond $110 million per year (Davidson 1994).  Sydney Morning 
Herald’s  Melbourne reporter Malcolm Maiden did not traverse this territory, 
though he thought the Victorian government had given Tabcorp ‘a dream 
franchise’ (Maiden 1994b). 
 
The Labor opposition in the Victorian parliament was also bitterly opposed.  Its 
new leader John Brumby highlighted the adverse impact Melbourne’s just-
established Crown Casino appeared to be having on Victab’s wagering revenue;  
the ALP announced a new policy it intended to implement when returned to 
government which would end the gaming and wagering monopolies and/or 
duopoly enjoyed by Victab, Tattersalls and the casino (Pinkey 1994;  Maiden 
1994b).  
 
Inevitably there was a search for scapegoats, and the Treasurer was caustic about 
Labor’s ‘economic terrorism’.5   Brokers and financial analysts agreed Brumby’s 
statements had had some influence, but that ‘more likely’ explanations for the 
relatively poor public response were investor concerns about Victorian licensing 
laws and uncertainty about the impact of the casino on the business, the absence of 
an underwriter for the float, problems associated with the Victab computer system 
(indicated at p.39 of the prospectus) and dissatisfaction with the ‘estimated $8 
million five-year salary package’ of Tabcorp chief executive Ross Wilson.  There 
were ‘also problems with the timing of the issue.  The market isn’t in great shape at 
the moment’ (Thomas & Kearns 1994;  Canberra Times  14, 15 August).  Another 
explanation offered, however, was that the government was prepared to ‘take a 
haircut on the sale price’ to improve the chances of a strong ‘after-market’ for 
Tabcorp shares and so ‘lubricate’ the subsequent unloading of ‘chunks of 
Victoria’s power utilities and other assets’ (Maiden 1994a). 
 
Post-sale settlements 
 
The settlements proceeded according to the prescriptions of the authorising 
Gaming and Betting Act 37/1994 as elaborated to a degree in the prospectus.  Thus 
Victab’s operating staff became employees of Tabcorp with continuity of 
employment including superannuation rights preserved, although they transferred 
to a new Tabcorp superannuation fund and alteration of other terms of employment 
was permitted. 
 
Continued in existence for the time being to process all the necessary transactions, 
Victab itself was given three months (or such longer period as the Treasurer might 
approve) to provide the Treasurer with a statement of its property, rights and 
liabilities (except for those the Treasurer directed it in writing not to include in the 
statement), indicating whether they were to go to Tabcorp or a wholly owned 
subsidiary, or to the state;  and with the Treasurer’s approval the properties that 
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were to go to Tabcorp were to be vested in the new owner without payment of 
stamp duty or other transfer tax.  And, within 21 days of the vesting day, Victab 
had (i) to repay to the government all outstanding financial accommodation 
extended to it and interest thereon;  (ii) to pay $20m to VicRacing, the company 
established by the racing industry as its principal commercial vehicle;  and (iii) to 
pay the Treasurer the amount received from Tabcorp for all the transferred 
property etc less the amounts outlaid under (i) and (ii).  
 
The value of the property etc transferred to Tabcorp had been assessed at $77.9m 
(the written-down book value).  The proceeds of the float ($675m), collected by 
Tabcorp, went on this settlement with Victab and on payment of the balance to the 
state for the wagering and gaming licences; according to Tabcorp itself, the 
payments were $77.8m for Victab’s business and $592.2 for the licences 
(Prospectus 1994, pp 8, 30;  Tabcorp 1995, p. 2). The state then used this licence 
revenue to retire debt;  but the government had also agreed to meet all the 
transaction costs involved in preparing for and conducting the float, which had to 
be covered from other parts of the public account.  So the new private company 
and those who invested in it were sheltered in several ways in the deal that had 
emerged, and it became a major research problem to discover what items, if any, 
the Treasurer had directed Victab to exclude from the written statement of its 
property, rights and liabilities it was required to furnish him as the settlement 
details were being arranged. 
 
Describing itself as ‘one of Australia’s leading leisure and entertainment 
companies’, Tabcorp immediately entered upon the management of its wagering 
and gaming businesses under its ‘long-term joint venture agreement with the 
Victorian Racing Industry’.  In essence, it manages the total business of the joint 
venture, effectively as its agent, and takes 75 per cent of the turnover.  It 
explained that it ‘provides the licences and fixed assets, employees and 
management for the conduct of the businesses, for which it receives a fee’.  
Effectively this fee constitutes its working capital. Its reporting responsibility, it 
further explained, extends ‘only [to] its 75% share of the joint venture’s turnover, 
revenue and expenses’ (Tabcorp 1995, p. 2). 
 
It was soon found necessary to make a number of ‘enabling and technical 
amendments’ to the Gaming and Betting Act to facilitate the ongoing operation of 
the machinery it had established.  These amendments tightened provisions for 
regulation of the probity aspects of the industry by the Victorian Casino and 
Gaming Authority;  supported, guaranteed and indemnified Victab as it worked on 
to finalise a number of outstanding commercial matters awaiting settlement, with 
all costs charged against the public account; and authorised Tabcorp to establish a 
wholly owned subsidiary to own and operate the gaming machines and restricted 
competitions, giving it ‘maximum flexibility to possess or dispose of gaming 
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machines within its group structure’ (Reynolds 1994;  Gaming and Betting 
(Amendment) Act 98/1994). 
 
Several matters relating to the preparation of Victab for sale and to its decision to 
withdraw from the consortium seeking the casino licence were raised in 
proceedings before the Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), but the 
findings were fairly inconclusive.  A legal wrangle in New York courts between 
Victab and a North American computer company over the supply of software 
components was settled in December 1944, but details were to remain confidential;  
it will be recalled that the government had indemnified Tabcorp for any liabilities 
it might incur through legal actions involving Victab, so these costs became 
another charge against the Victorian taxpayer (Macdonald 1994).  The Victorian 
Auditor-General, Ches Baragwanath, was also involved in ‘wrapping up’ 
operations, and his inquiries drew from him a report that, ‘from a taxpayer’s 
perspective, gaming machine assets [of Victab] ... appear to have been disposed of 
[to Tabcorp]  well below their true value’, and that Victab’s 1993-94 ‘liabilities 
were overstated by $11.25 million and net profit understated by the same amount’ 
(AGV 1995, pp 41-8, and report in Green 1995).  It appears, for example, that the 
value of the gaming machines transferred to Tabcorp was heavily written down 
because of their age, but that Tabcorp went on using them for several years 
afterwards.  In this and other ways, the ‘public’s watchdog’ implied that Tabcorp 
had been let off lightly in the privatisation settlement;  it is not so surprising that 
the Auditor-General earned the enmity of Premier Kennett (see Snow 1997 for one 
comment on this row). 
 
As will be apparent from the above account, the settling of some elements of this 
transition dragged on for some time, and during this period Victab remained in 
formal existence to process relevant matters.  In 1999 Victoria still lacked a final 
accounting endorsed by the Auditor-General, who was reporting to parliament 
annually that he was awaiting a ‘signed set of financial statements for TAB, 
1.8.94-2.6.95’;  it may of course be that, given the age of the transactions, the 
Audit Office was no longer giving their clearance high priority (AGV 1987, p.269;  
1998, p. 314;  1999, p.353). 
 
Within a couple of days of their listing on the stock exchange, the price of the 
shares had dropped to $2.20;  nearly seven million had been traded on the first day, 
with two million changing hands in the first ten minutes.  But Tabcorp chief 
executive Wilson then urged patience until ‘sentiment’ surrounding the stock was 
removed from the marketplace (Canberra Times, 16 August). 
 
Before long those who had invested were doing very well, for after this beginning 
hiccup share prices have risen spectacularly---in late 1997 it was assessed as 
having brought the highest accumulated return to shareholders in a group of ten 
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large floats (eight public enterprises and two propriety private companies) since 
November 1991 (Eastway 1997).  Profitability has been good, and the business has 
continued to grow, with Chief Executive Wilson exploring a number of 
possibilities for new investments in the ‘leisure and entertainment’ industries. In 
April 1999 he launched a major takeover bid for Sydney’s Star City Casino;  by 
October 1999 Tabcorp controlled nearly 94% of Star City’s voting shares and had 
received the NSW Casino Control Authority’s approval for the merger;  and a year 
later it posted a higher than expected annual profit ‘on the back of (this) 
acquisition’ (Lecky 1999;  CT 1999;  CT 2000).   
 
After an 18.2% profit increase was declared in the 1999 Annual Report, Wilson 
and the other directors sought a $750,000 rise in the maximum total remunueration 
payable to the board;  many shareholders, supported by the Australian 
Shareholders Association, baulked at this increase, though the chairman explained 
at the annual general meeting that the acquisition of Star Casino would bring 
another three directors to the board (Tabcorp 1999, p. 3;  Neil 1999).  Australian 
Financial Review columnist Steven Mayne now reported that the board itself was 
‘haggling’ with Wilson about a new contract at a time when he already owned 1% 
of the company.  Wilson was said to be ‘almost $30 million in front on his share 
package’, with Premier Kennett, who had engineered his original appointment, 
reported as having described that package as ‘obscene’ when it had reached only 
$17 million---now it was likely to get even bigger.  Mayne remarked that the ‘Vics 
are competing with John Fahey and his great State Bank giveaway on this one’ 
(Mayne 1999).  At the end of 1999, the Walkers, who had given Fahey’s NSW 
State Bank sale one of two ‘Wooden Spoon Award(s) for Australia’s Worst 
Privatisation(s)’, calculated that the Victab divestment had resulted in a ‘profit to 
private sector’ of $3.2 billion (Walker & Walker 2000, pp 24, 274).   
 
Summarising, the main stages in the organisational evolution of the enterprise 
have been: 
 
1961: Victab established as a statutory corporation, operating at a long arm’s 
length from government, initially to provide off-course totalizator betting facilities; 
 
1970-90: gradually brought under much closer government supervision, and in 
late ‘80s acquired on-course tote business also; 
 
from 1991: became one of two licensed Victorian operators of gaming 
machines, and much affected by development of plans for a Victorian casino; 
 
1994: the operating business sold by public float to a new private company 
fuctioning within a contractual joint-venture arrangement with the racing industry, 
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with the old statutory corporation retained pro tem while the complicated 
settlement details were being finalised. 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
1.  Notwithstanding that words like organisation and privatisation are usually rendered with an ‘s’ in Australia, the 
word ‘totalizator’ is normally (although not always) spelt with a ‘z’:  that practice is maintained here. 
 
2.  The starting price (SP) is ‘the final quote returned on a runner by on-course bookmakers, and illegal bookmakers 
pay out on this price’ (TABV 1987, p. 2). 
 
3.  Commissioned variously by the government, the reconstructed Victab board and the racing  industry, Deloitte 
Ross Tohmatsu, Macquarie Corporate Finance, Arthur Andersens, KPMG Peat Marwick, DMR Group Australia 
Pty Ltd and Centaur Corporate Finance (formerly Lloyds Corporate Advisory Services) were all involved in this 
consulting process. 
 
4.  At this point former chief executive Neil Walker went public to attack the fairly widely held view that the 
troubles in Victab were largely due to poor management.  ‘Every major business decision’, he said, had been 
‘subject to ministerial approval as a statutory requirement’, and ‘the substitution of business decision-making based 
on business acumen free of political expediency is the greatest efficiency likely to flow from privatisation’.  He 
congratulated the Victab management and staff on generating the benefits now considered likely to flow from 
privatisation (Walker 1994). 
 
5.  The Labor Party returned to government in Victoria towards the end of 1999, but there was in the event little 
evidence of any desire to turn this particular clock back.  In his election campaign launch in September 1999, 
the State ALP Leader and now Premier Steve Bracks made a number of anti-privatisation statements (Bracks 
1999);  however it is generally accepted that his position is that, while a Bracks government will undertake no 
further privatisations, it will not seek to undo those carried through previously by the Kennett government. 
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Chapter 9 
 
SNOWY MOUNTAINS ENGINEERING CORPORATION* 
 
The sale of the Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) was the 
first Australian privatisation by management buy-out.  There were particular 
circumstances which governed the choice of this form of sale:  the account 
will show how the choice was influenced the fact that the headquarters of this 
public enterprise was located not in an Australian capital city but in the small 
country town of Cooma, situated in a marginal electorate that usually swings 
to the new government with each change of government.  The managers of the 
enterprise were able to exploit this circumstance to procure a sale contract 
beneficial both to themselves and to the community with which they were so 
closely connected. 
 
The case study examines particularly the influence of key stakeholders in the 
privatisation decision-making process;  the role of political lobbyists, legal 
representatives, and accounting firms;  the influence of officers in the Task 
Force on Asset Sales in the price negotiation process;  and the problem of 
valuing assets and the goodwill of SMEC in the absence of market 
competition.  
 
Foundation of SMEC and performance before privatisation 
 
Establishment and early operations 
 
SMEC was established as a Commonwealth statutory corporation in 1970 
when a decision was made to save the substantial engineering expertise 
built up within an earlier statutory corporation, the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Authority (SMHEA).  
 
There had long been interest in the possibility of turning the waters of the 
short and swift-flowing Snowy River back through the mountains of the Great 
Dividing Range to irrigate the dry lands to the west and generate hydro-
electricity in the process.  After protracted negotiations between the 
Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victorian governments, SMHEA was 
established as a Commonwealth authority (under the Commonwealth’s 
defence power) in 1949 to design and construct the scheme.  The 
organisational form of SMHEA drew both from Australian home-grown 
experience with statutory corporations and from the widely-copied example of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA (Wettenhall 1987, p. 75).  
SMHEA established its headquarters in Cooma, a town of about 8,000 people 
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about 120 kilometers south of Canberra and gateway to the Snowy Mountains 
where the major works would go on.  SMHEA’s operations over a lengthy 
period would provide a great boost to the economy of that area. 
 
It embarked on a major project of river diversions, dam constructions, 
tunnelling under mountains and construction of electricity-generating plants, 
and it earned much praise for its engineering and managerial initiatives and its 
general competence.  Much of the actual construction work was contracted out 
to large private firms---giving the lie to a popular modern perception that the 
contracting out of public business is a product of the recent reform period---
but SMHEA also built up its own expert groups of investigation, design, 
scientific and contract supervision staffs (McIntosh et al 1997, pp 22-6).  By 
the end of the 1960s the construction phase was drawing towards its 
conclusion, and there was considerable debate about what to do with this 
expert staff group.  SMHEA continued on after construction was completed to 
maintain and operate the power generation facilities, but it was a much 
slimmed-down organisation.1  In the later 1960s it was already bidding for and 
winning tenders to aid major engineering projects elsewhere in Australia and 
overseas, and the Coalition (Liberal-Country Party) government then in office 
decided to retain the relevant specialist staffs and pursue this business in a 
new publicly owned engineering-consulting corporation.  This was the genesis 
of SMEC. 
 
It was established in the form of a corporation sole by legislation passed in 
1970.  The corporation was constituted by a director, who was to be supported 
in top management by two assistant directors---this was an unusual form of 
authority governance, but it was modelled on that of SMHEA itself (a 
commissioner as corporation sole, with two assistant commissioners) and the 
matching facilitated a high level of cooperation and staff-sharing between the 
two corporations, both based in Cooma.  The Minister for National 
Development, introducing the legislation, explained that the new corporation 
would ‘operate as a commercial organisation, pay Commonwealth income tax 
and be expected to make a reasonable return on capital’.  However the 
minister retained the right to approve the projects it could work on, advised by 
a statutory consultative committee;  this provision was apparently an 
acknowledgement of the sensitivities of state governments and private 
organisations who might see SMEC as a potential competitor within Australia.  
‘As far ahead as we can see’, said the minister, ‘it will be centred in Cooma to 
enable full use to be made of existing specialist facilities’ (Swartz 1970, pp 
81-4; Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation Act 39/1970) . 
 
For more than a decade SMEC operated profitably, and it quickly established 
a good reputation in the highly competitive international consulting-
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engineering industry.  Most of its work was in developing countries, where it 
undertook assignments through UN agencies, the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, and its consultancies included the design and construction 
of hydro-electric systems, roads, bridges and water supply/irrigation/flood 
control facilities, urban development projects, geological and river basin 
studies, and survey photogrammetry.  Some of the projects were very large, 
such as the $30m Trengganu power project in Malaysia (Hodgkinson 1978). 
 
By the mid-1980s, a minister in the Hawke Labor government could report to 
parliament thus: 
 
Until 1983-84 the Corporation had an unbroken record of profitability, returning to government $3.3m and 
corporate tax of $10m. The Corporation developed an international reputation for the Australian engineering 
industry for the successful completion of some 1,100 projects in 35 countries, involving total consulting fees 
for the corporation of over $200m. Its staff members grew from 192 in 1971 to a peak of more than 600 in 
1983. In 1984, Engineering News Record, a major American publication, ranked the Corporation number 60 
in the world’s top 200 international design firms. Only two other Australian firms have ever appeared in these 
listings. The Corporation’s outstanding commercial export record over the 1970s and 1980s was marked by 
its receipt in 1984 of the Governor-General’s Award for Export Excellence (West 1985, p. 1013). 
 
SMEC adjusts to decline in workload 
 
In 1983-84, however, SMEC recorded its first-ever operating loss.  The world-
wide economic depression reduced aid flows to developing countries and so 
led to reductions in many development programs;  these reductions were 
compounded by the rise of the ‘green’ movement, which seriously challenged 
the hydro-engineering approach to development;  and competition from 
international engineering firms became much more intense as they faced 
dramatic downturns in their traditional markets.  In July 1983 SMEC Director 
Doug Price reported that the corporation would have to consider retrenching 
staff to reduce costs.  He predicted that the amount of work was unlikely to 
return in the short term to the high levels experienced in 1981-82.  SMEC 
could sustain a moderate loss by using its reserves, but there had to be staff 
reductions to preserve long-term viability (reported CT 1983). 
 
In this climate SMEC sought a review of its operations by management 
consultants, and introduced improved accounting, costing and management 
information systems.  For its part the government announced its support for a 
continued SMEC operation based in Cooma, and approved a ‘cash injection of 
up to $6m largely to fund a voluntary retrenchment program ... pending 
decisions on a longer term restructuring’.  Staff numbers were expected to 
decline to 360 by June 1985 (West 1985, p. 1013). 
 
SMEC underwent its first major reorganisation during 1985, when the 
corporation sole style of management was replaced by a much more 
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conventional five-member corporate board drawn from the engineering, 
marketing, finance and trade union sectors and including a full-time managing 
director.  The new legislation also removed restrictions on the range of 
engineering activities open to SMEC, allowed it to form subsidiary companies 
and enter into joint ventures, required it to act in accordance with sound 
commercial principles and otherwise aligned it with developing government 
policy relating to statutory authorities (West 1985, pp 1012-3;  Snowy 
Mountains Engineering Corporation Act 101/1985).2 
 
First calls for privatisation 
 
During the debates on this legislation, the Coalition parties issued their first 
call for the privatising of SMEC.  A joint meeting of the parliamentary Liberal 
and National Parties in Canberra in April 1985 agreed that, ‘in Government 
[they] would sell it off to private enterprise’.  Their spokesman, Shadow 
Minister for Housing and Construction Michael Hodgman, was reported as 
saying that ‘the continued existence of the corporation and its expanded 
activities were inconsistent with the philosophy and fundamental principles of 
Liberalism’, that the ‘corporation was a burden on the taxpayers’, and that it 
‘competed unfairly against private enterprise professional engineers’ (CT 
1985).3 
 
The call was repeated in 1987, when the Opposition Spokesman on 
Industry, Technology and Commerce, Senator Austin Lewis, said after 
the tabling of SMEC’s annual report in the Senate that the organisation 
should be privatised (CT 1987).  This report recorded the capital injection 
of $6m to assist SMEC to continue operating.  In 1986 it had suffered a 
reduction in turnover of 25% on the previous year (to $ 26.9m) and 
incurred an operating loss of $ 3.6m (SMEC 1987, p. 4).  Ironically this 
privatisation call came on the same day that Labor’s parliamentary 
caucus carried a strong anti-privatisation motion, specifically including 
SMEC in its list of enterprises to remain in full public ownership 
(Malone 1987). 
 
Conversion from statutory corporation to company 
 
To the delight of its supporters, SMEC returned to profitability in 1987-88, 
recording an operating profit before tax of $270,000, against a predicted loss 
of $1.5m (Jones 1989, p. 976; also CT 1988b).  However it now faced another 
major restructuring, the second in its fairly short life as a public enterprise. 
 
As Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce, Senator John Button 
announced on 17 August 1988 that SMEC would become a company as a 
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further step in implementing the Hawke government’s program to improve the 
performance of government business enterprises (CT 1988a).  This conversion 
was effected by legislation passed in 1989, which in Minister Jones’s words 
had ‘the twofold effect’ of ‘making SMEC subject to the Companies Act ... 
and enabling the removal of many of the statutory controls that have applied 
in the past and which are inappropriate for a public company’.  The 
Commonwealth would be its sole shareholder, and ‘mechanisms [would] be 
established for strategic oversight of [its] activities by the Government and to 
ensure that the company operates within wages and industrial relations 
policies of the Government’.  The legislation provided for continuity of 
corporate identity across the conversion ‘from the Corporation to the new 
public company’, so that all existing contracts and agreements could continue 
to operate.  There was also a provision for establishment of a special share 
premium account, which the minister explained might be used in the future to 
allow for the introduction of a staff equity participation scheme (Jones 1989, 
pp 975-8;  Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (Conversion into 
Public Company) Act 66/1989).4 
 
The changes became effective on 1 July 1989, when the enterprise was 
formally retitled Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation Limited.  It was 
now a public-sector company;  but it was not destined to remain long in the 
public sector, and its staff, or more precisely a leadership group among them, 
were to play a prominent part in shaping the events which would eventually 
move them to the private sector. 
 
The privatisation process begins 
 
Two main impulses 
 
There were two main impulses for the privatisation of SMEC, one coming 
from the government as potential seller and the other from this staff group as 
potential buyer. Once it was decided to sell the enterprise, however, the staff 
group had to fight hard to prevent a trade sale which would, in their 
estimation, have seriously damaged their stake in the enterprise.5 
 
Early buy-out schemes 
 
Once members of the Coalition parties began calling for privatisation, senior 
SMEC staff began developing plans for a buy-out---this was reflected in the 
provision for a possible staff equity scheme in the legislation which converted 
SMEC from a statutory corporation to a government-owned company.  When 
that legislation came into effect, Minister Jones again hinted that, at some time 
in the future, employees might be offered some equity in the organisation; 
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Canberra Times’s government roundsman Mike Taylor was probably correct 
in suggesting that this was ‘an unprecedented suggestion by a member of the 
Federal Cabinet’, though he erred in stating that SMEC employees were 
already ‘private-sector employees’ (Taylor 1989).  Now a ‘staff buy-out 
committee’ was formed, and the the SMEC board chairman, Jeff Cook, 
quickly prepared a number of proposals for the distribution of shares to 
employees, with entitlement to buy shares generally to be based on a formula 
including salary level and number of years of service.  
 
Two options apper to have been considerd:  that staff might be offered some 
limited equity, as was happening in some public enterprises elsewhere for 
largely motivational reasons, Singapore Airlines being a notable 
contemporary example (Thynne & Ariff 1987, pp 117-9);  or that the whole 
enterprise might be disposed of by government through a total 
staff/management buy-out, as in the case of Britain’s National Freight 
Corporation (Bradley & Nejad 1989; Chambers 1991, pp 289-95).  But, either 
way, the proposal was blocked by opposition from the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU), and in the SMEC view all privatising options were 
closed off. 
 
The consulting firm Arthur Andersens had been commissioned in late 1990 to 
provide advice on restructuring options for SMEC, and it ‘had identified either 
outright sale or merger with another engineering consulting firm as the 
preferred future option’.  However the government indicated in mid-1991 that 
it preferred ‘to retain ownership ... through restructuring aimed at improving 
efficiency and accountability’ (Downie 1991). 
 
In the knowledge that a federal election was due early in 1993 and that 
both the governing Labor and the opposing Coalition parties regarded 
Eden-Monaro as a critical seat, the group pushing for staff shareholding 
maintained its pressure.  The mayor of Cooma Shire advised it to employ 
Peter Phillips, a Canberra lobbyist who had previously done good work 
for the shire council, and he became associated with the group in late 
1992. 
 
A budget announcement 
 
By this time Labor’s Finance Minister Ralph Willis had incorporated the sale 
of SMEC into his planning for the 1992-93 budget.  This decision was 
announced when the budget papers were presented to parliament, along with 
the proposed sale of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (CSL) and some 
smaller divestments (Dawkins & Willis 1992, p. 3.279).  However it was a 
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commitment to sell the enterprise, not a statement about how that would be 
done. 
 
For SMEC people, this announcement ‘came like a bolt out of the blue on 
budget night’ (Boniface 1996).  SMEC’s board and management had not been 
given prior notice;  nor had the minister and officials they related to in the 
supervising Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce (DITAC).6  
But it was not unwelcome news, and the SMEC management quickly 
reactivated its formal staff buy-out committee and established a ‘fighting 
fund’ to oppose possible sale to an existing private company.  Cooma Shire 
Council contributed $5,000 and slightly over $5,000 was contributed by 
SMEC staff.  At least on this side, it was now abundantly clear that a total 
buy-out was envisaged. 
 
Impact of oncoming election  
 
In consultation with Phillips, the group determined to work on the sensitivities 
of the political parties.  An early move was to convince the opposition 
spokesman on privatisation, Liberal MP Julian Beale, that it was in the 
Coalition’s best interests to have him visit Cooma and ‘make an absolutely 
unequivocal statement’ to confirm that a Coalition government would sell 
SMEC, that it ‘would at all times be mindful in the sale of the longer-term 
interests of Cooma, and the Cooma community, and the Snowy Mountains 
region’, and that ‘it would support the legitimate aspirations of the 
management/staff buy-out team to be the purchasers of SMEC’.  Beale 
agreed, visited Cooma, and made a statement to this effect.  It then took about 
‘three nanoseconds’ to bring this to the attention of  Finance Minister Willis 
and say:  ‘Geez these fellows are making a fair sort of commitment;  what’s 
the government going to do to match it?’ (Phillips 1997). 
 
Activity in Cooma: establishing a buy-out company  
 
The buy-out committee decided that a commercial vehicle was needed to 
ensure a consolidated approach in the pursuit of their objective:  ‘a loose 
group of people’ could not approach the government.  A Cooma solicitor 
therefore advised SMEC’s General Manager International, Jack Boniface, 
who had assumed the leadership of the buy-out group (and later became 
SMEC executive chairman), that they should buy a shelf company, and 
Tinbury Pty Ltd was acquired for this purpose.  Six SMEC managers were the 
initial shareholders, each buying a dollar share in the company;  and several 
different classes of shares were offered to other staff members.  To overcome 
some suspicion in the group that just a few would have voting shares and that 
the others would put their money in for nothing, Tinbury was converted from 
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a private to an unlisted public company early in 1993 (Boniface 1996).  The 
intention of this management/staff group was to finance the purchase of 
SMEC themselves, but of course they wanted to keep the sale price as low as 
possible and they maintained lobbying pressure to ensure a non-competitive 
sale. 
 
The Tinbury group was now approached by several major engineering-
consulting firms interested in buying the business.  It believed (Boniface 
1996) that these firms were mainly interested in acquiring the SMEC name, 
international reputation and goodwill, and that a successful buyer would strip 
the enterprise, sell most of the physical assets in Cooma, move about 20 core 
staff who had the detailed knowledge and experience of the international 
consulting market to a capital city to join its own head office, and dispense 
with the rest.  The implications of the alternative trade-sale route to 
privatisation were thus made very clear, so the SMEC management was 
reinforced in its view that a staff buy-out was necessary. 
 
Lobbyist Phillips calculated that it was in the government’s interest to ensure 
that the reputation SMEC had built up was ‘not besmirched or debauched by 
somebody taking it over and going through a wholesale change---and causing 
irreparable damage to the reputation of Australia’s external engineering 
services industry’;  and so he ‘played upon’ that consideration too (Phillips 
1997).  And Cooma Shire Council never needed persuading.  It was convinced 
that, if SMEC was sold on the open market by a competitive tender process, 
the purchaser would move the headquarters from Cooma resulting in the loss 
of a major local employer.  It was obvious also that the sale of a large number 
of residential properties on the small market would lead to a plummeting of 
local property values.  So the Council agreed that a trade sale would do much 
damage to both the staff and the Cooma interest, and a shared desire emerged 
to retain SMEC as a separate entity and ensure that its headquarters remained 
in Cooma.  In one reported threat, Council President Bill Rushton (who was a 
former SMEC manager) said that, if a decision were made ‘against the 
interests of the town’, then the Cooma ‘community would march on 
Parliament’ (McPhedran 1992). 
 
The question of the value of the enterprise now arose, and was complicated by 
concerns about the accounting treatment of the accumulated sick leave credits 
of SMEC staff.  Successive accountants had adopted different practices in 
recording this item in enterprise budgets, causing large fluctuations between 
book profits and book losses.  The Tinbury group wanted a valuation of 
SMEC that overrode this issue, and contracted with Coopers and Lybrand 
accordingly.  From this, the group estimated that SMEC was worth minus $6 
million.  Though people who were associated with the government’s handling 
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of this matter deny that Tinbury was ever informed, it claimed to know that 
Andersens had advised the government that SMEC was worth $7 million, and 
so understood that there was a $13 million gap between buyer’s and seller’s 
prices (Boniface 1996). 
 
Enter the Asset Sales Task Force 
 
Back in Canberra, the 1992-93 budget decision to sell two public 
enterprises (SMEC and CSL) and a number of other assets was followed 
by the establishment of a second Task Force on Asset Sales  (to be 
known as Task Force on Asset Sales B) within the Department of 
Finance. The original task force (now Task Force A) was heavily 
engaged in processing the several stages of the Commonwealth Bank and 
Qantas sales. 
 
Within Task Force on Asset Sales B, an advisory committee to progress 
the SMEC sale was immediately set up, its membership comprising 
senior officials from the Finance Department (Ted Mathews, who chaired 
the task force) and DITAC (Malcolm Farrow), and new SMEC chairman 
Neil Galwey (TFAS 1994).  Tim Garrard, a Canadian Industry 
Department officer on two-year exchange duty in DITAC in Canberra, 
became associated with this work around that time, and it occupied him 
during his last nine months in Australia (details from Garrard 1997;  
Farrow 1997):  Garrard now becomes central to our account.  He had a 
Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree from Queen’s University 
in Kingston, Ontario, and had been in charge of Canadian government 
relations with the aerospace industry at a time when two aircraft 
manufacturers (Canadair and Canadian de Havilland) had been 
privatised.  He had not been closely involved in that privatisation 
process, but had had some knowledge of it.  
 
DITAC staff had been monitoring developments concerning SMEC.  
They had been aware of Finance Minister Willis’s desire not to let 
Opposition leader John Hewson ‘get too far ahead’ in the lead-up to the 
election, and knew of Willis’s inclination to push privatisation---he had 
been asking around the departments ‘what are the next cabs on the rank?’  
As DITAC First Assistant Secretary, Farrow had heard that Finance was 
interested in putting SMEC on the list.  So Farrow had ‘sent signals’ to 
Finance warning both that there was a major problem arising in relation 
to defects in the Dartmouth Dam project SMEC had undertaken in 
association with Victorian state authorities, and that SMEC would be 
difficult to sell because ‘its assets were the people, not much more’.  On 
budget night in 1992, therefore, the DITAC officers had been surprised to 
  
 
150
discover that Finance hadn’t heeded their advice.  Thereafter Farrow kept 
reminding Finance of the problems, adding his awareness of the ‘political 
problem’, ie the Cooma interest.  Eventually Finance responded: ‘We 
hear you. What do you suggest?’ (Farrow 1997;  Garrard 1997). 
 
Garrard became closely involved with the Finance team considering the 
matter.  The first step, taken through Task Force B in the light of knowledge 
of British privatisation practice, was to call for tenders to undertake a ‘scoping 
study’.  The call went to eight large consulting firms, of which four made 
bids.  The contract went to Arthur Andersens who, in that earlier report, had 
recommended a trade sale or merger for SMEC.  Now, assisted by another 
consulting firm, they produced a thick report in January 1993 which dealt in 
turn with the viability of the company under a possible new ownership;  
realising the full potential of SMEC;  the interest of the stakeholders (which 
Garrard described as ‘code for Cooma’);  and fair value to the taxpayer.  All 
this, as Garrard put it in interview (1997), ‘with Dartmouth Dam hanging over 
all’. 
 
This dam had been built for the State Electricity Commission of Victoria 
(SECV) on plans prepared by SMEC.  But there had been a serious accident 
with the sluice gates, and at this time there were six writs in existence:  SECV 
v SMEC, SMEC v SECV, and various insurers against both.  Secret 
discussions were also going on with the insurers as they tried to broker an 
agreement.  SMEC stood to lose $90 million, ten times the value of its assets, 
and would be ‘vaporised’ if the decision went against it.  The Commonwealth 
had firm legal advice that it was not liable, but people in the task force were 
very anxious because they believed the Commonwealth never had and never 
would pull the plug on one of its own agencies---this because of the likelihood 
that the Commonwealth would find it much more expensive to borrow if it 
was understood that bankruptcy of an agency was possible (Garrard 1997;  
Bills 2000).7 
 
Another step now taken by the task force team was to issue a call for 
expressions of interest in purchasing SMEC.  There were ‘about 25 or 26 
respondents, one of which was the staff/management buy-out group ... task 
force officers made judgments about which offerers were worth talking to 
further, and they conducted on-going negotiations ... it remained very much a 
competitive process all the way through';  and some joint venturing 
possibilities were considered (Phillips 1997). 
 
Awareness of the Dartmouth Dam issue encouraged Finance officers to look 
towards a quick sale, which they thought might lessen Commonwealth 
liability.  But it was a very serious issue which necessitated much consultation 
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with legal advisers.  Lobbyist Phillips believes that it worked to the advantage 
of the Tinbury group, whose engineer members had a close knowledge of the 
problem and insisted throughout that their design work had not been 
defective;  thus they had confidence that SMEC would not be found liable.  
No other potential buyers had this sort of inside information, and they ‘would 
have had to put a lot of work in to investigate the issue’ (Phillips 1997). 
 
The task force team now put together a ten-page memo for Finance 
Minister Willis, arguing that SMEC was ‘unsellable’ unless the issue was 
settled.  The memo noted four possible approaches:  granting the buyer 
full indemnity (which might lead to a monster settlement award);  taking 
SMEC off the market (politically embarrassing in view of the budget 
announcement);  doing nothing ‘in a busy-looking way’;  or settling for 
limited liability (money-back payment to the buyer if a heavy damages 
bill were to eventuate).  It seems that the Finance people favoured the 
first option---unlimited liability---and this was the eventual 
recommendation.  Garrard recalls his amazement that the minister 
approved it (this and next two paragraphs from Garrard 1997).  
 
But Garrard got support within the Finance Department, and was invited 
‘to say what you think’ in a meeting of concerned officers.  He said he 
believed what had been approved was ‘a terrible option’, one which, 
moreover, might set a precedent for future privatisations.  The matter was 
again brought to the minister’s attention, and Willis was converted to the 
view that limited liability was the best option.  Garrard prepared a fresh 
memo, which was now approved. 
 
Andersen’s scoping study report now came in, recommending a trade 
sale because the enterprise was too small for flotation.  But they also said 
that a satisfactory Dartmouth Dam outcome had to be found;  until that 
was done, it would be impossible to put a reasonable value on SMEC.  It 
seemed that the proposed staff buy-out was off the agenda.  The Asset 
Sales Task Force was always prepared to consider a bid from Tinbury in 
competition with other bids, though its best hope was that key SMEC 
staff would ally themselves with one of the trade bidders.  
 
Tinbury  again 
 
Then came the March 1993 general election, which returned the Keating 
Labor government.  Within DITAC, Farrow had predicted that the staff buy-
out group ‘would get to the politicians’.  The Cooma issue was raised first by 
Coalition candidates, and then taken up by Willis.  Working through Phillips, 
the buy-out group had secured the strong support of key Labor 
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parliamentarians including the sitting member for the electorate covering 
Cooma (Eden-Monaro), Jim Snow, who happened to be chairman of the ALP 
Caucus;  and Willis had been persuaded.  Cabinet determined accordingly, 
and so staff buy-out was now the preferred option (Willis 1993a;  Farrow 
1997).  Garrard had to spend his last few months in Australia dealing with it.  
 
There are deeply contrasting views about developments over these few 
months. The SMEC buy-out group thought it very strange that the government 
had ‘a foreign public servant negotiating the sale of an Australian asset’ 
(Boniface 1996), and saw him as an unfriendly and unhelpful ‘haggler’.  For 
them it was a very emotional issue, over and above the commercial 
considerations.  Tinbury had ‘half a dozen key staff shareholders---Jack 
Boniface being the primary one---they risked a lot of their money---I mean 
these guys put their houses up---so they took a huge risk” (Bills 1997).  They 
reported that no progress was made, and negotiations were stalled, until after 
Garrard had left the country; in fact they walked out of a meeting with him on 
20 June 1993 (Boniface 1996).  From their point of view, once Garrard had 
left and an Australian, Kym Bills, had replaced him, there was a greater 
readiness on the part of the government to negotiate a price acceptable to the 
buyers, and the main outlines of an agreement were settled within two weeks. 
 
Not surprisingly, Garrard, who is no foe of privatisation,8  sees it differently 
(from interview).  Of course he wanted to reach a conclusion before his 
exchange period ended on 30 June.  But he was also aware of ‘extreme 
tensions among the SMEC staff---with Tim Garrard in the middle’;  a 
December 1992 Canberra Times feature had highlighted, for all to see, the 
desperate concerns of non-managerial SMEC staff and their Staff Association, 
and their deep suspicion of the SMEC board and management at that time 
(McPhedran 1992).9  And all Garrard’s socialising into the profession of 
public administration had armed him with a deep conviction that it was his 
duty as a public official to protect the taxpayer interest;  while on attachment 
to the Australian public service, it was the Australian taxpayer who deserved 
his best service.  Lobbyist Phillips thought Garrard ‘was very conscious of the 
role that he filled in terms of his engagement as an exchangee ... he was 
absolutely meticulous in doing everything right ... and he drove some of those 
engineers to distraction with his bureaucratic rectitude’;  but ‘I found him a 
thoroughly reasonable person to deal with’ (Phillips 1997). 
 
Other engineering-consulting firms continued to press their case for a trade 
sale.  ‘They were lobbying the government to change its mind’, and this 
pressure did not come only from private firms---‘the Tasmanian Hydro-
Electric Commission were one of the key ones who were aggrieved;  they 
desperately wanted to buy it’.  There were letters to ministers, and ‘phone 
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calls and threats and everything else’ to officials (Bills 1997).  To counteract 
these moves, the Tinbury group, with the Cooma Shire Council behind it, 
hunted for adverse comments about the competitors, and Phillips’s job was to 
ensure they were publicised (Phillips 1997). 
 
Garrard was still prepared to recommend against a buy-out proposal if 
Boniface could not demonstrate that he had significant staff support, but some 
members of the SMEC board were continuing the fight against the trade-sale 
option.  The board was in a difficult position:  on the one hand, it blocked 
moves to prepare the company prospectus necessary for a trade sale, but on 
the other it had some concern that the Tinbury group was being too 
transparently self-serving in its activities.  There were some Tinbury 
suggestions that the board should be sacked to remove this obstacle, though 
they were not pursued.10  Garrard noted that the board was not consulted 
before the sale announcement was made nor given any role in the sale, and 
drew from this the lesson that all ‘privatisation planners’ need to think 
carefully ‘through what role the board should play’ (Garrard 1997, 1998;  also 
Bills 2000). 
 
Towards a final deal 
 
Proposals and negotiations 
 
Acting for Tinbury, Boniface was now asked to make a firm proposal.  This 
was that the management group should  buy the enterprise for one dollar;  the 
potential Dartmouth Dam liability was still much in mind, but also Tinbury 
made much of the ongoing liability for accumulated sick leave.  For Garrard, 
the government simply had to resist making any sick-leave pay-out at the time 
of the sale, and let any staff members’ rights pass to the new owners/managers 
to sort out.  Garrard advised Minister Willis not to accept this offer, and Willis 
agreed.  
 
So Tinbury was asked to make another bid, and one for $1 million arrived.  
Garrard was about to leave Australia, and there was a bargaining meeting.  
The government side offered to sell for $3 million, but they had agreed among 
themselves that they would take $2 million.   
 
Garrard was replaced as the task force’s principal negotiator by Kym Bills, a 
career Commonwealth public servant who had spent some time on leave as 
senior adviser to the South Australian opposition leader and in that role had 
uncovered many of the problems with the South Australian State Bank and the 
South Australian Insurance Commission before they became public 
knowledge.  Like Garrard, he believed in privatisation (Bills 1997, 2000).   
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Within a short time, both parties settled at an agreed price of about $2 million.  
Boniface and his colleagues saw Bills as more sympathetic to their cause than 
Garrard, and have said that the settlement would not have come without this 
change.  But, as Bills says (1997), ‘that’s an untestable proposition’;  and it is 
likely (but also untestable) that the hard line Garrard had followed resulted in 
a better settlement from the Commonwealth’s point of view. 
 
The agreement 
 
The drafting of legislation to cover the sale had commenced in March 1993 
and, with the settlement now in train, it was introduced to parliament in 
September and passed in October.  But it would take many months to draw up 
all the necessary contracts and there could still be hiccups, so the legislation 
adopted a conditional note.  In introducing it, Finance Minister Willis spoke 
warmly of SMEC’s achievements and wished the likely new owners well in 
the future.  He then explained the terms of the agreement with Tinbury, 
emphasising that the government had ensured that careful consideration was 
given to issues of importance to the enterprise’s staff.  A large part of the 
legislation was in fact devoted to these issues (standard in Commonwealth 
asset sale legislation), and it would come into operation when, in the opinion 
of the Minister for Finance, a majority of voting shares in SMEC had passed 
out of the Commonwealth’s hands (Willis 1993b, pp 960-2; Snowy Mountains 
Engineering Corporation Limited Sale Act 54/1993). 
 
In negotiating the final details, the task force officials had to achieve a 
balance between getting an adequate return for the Commonwealth and not 
leaving Tinbury so debt-ridden that it would collapse after the sale---with 
the Commonwealth then having to pay out staff entitlements.   A union 
representative was heavily involved in these final negotiations (Bills 2000).  
The draft Sale Agreement was approved by cabinet in October, and the sale 
details were announced by Willis on 9 November 1993: 
 
* SMEC was sold to Tinbury for an up-front payment of $1 million and 
two subsequent payments of $250,000, due on 1 July 1994 and 1 July 
1995 respectively. 
* The Commonwealth also received its normal $571,000 dividend in 
respect of 1992-93 profits. 
* Tinbury agreed to the extinguishment of tax losses which could realise a 
further benefit to the Commonwealth of over $1 million. 
* SMEC’s headquarters had to remain in Cooma for at least five 
years. 
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* Tinbury could not dispose of shares to non-SMEC employees for at 
least five years. 
* Tinbury had to make a further share offer to enable SMEC staff who 
were not already shareholders, or who only had a small shareholding, to 
apply for shares on terms at least as favourable as the original offer. 
* In respect of Dartmouth Dam, it was agreed that, if a decision went 
against SMEC, Tinbury had a ‘money back guarantee’ of its $1 million 
up-front payment; and the unions had a guarantee that the Commonwealth 
would pay out any outstanding annual leave and long-service leave if the 
company were forced into liquidation as a result of an adverse judgment 
(Willis 1993c;  TFAS 1994). 
 
 SMEC Ltd became a wholly owned subsidiary of Tinbury, and the staff were 
formally employed by SMEC Services Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
SMEC Ltd (Boniface 1996). 
 
The general manager of SMEC’s Australian business, Peter Busbridge, was 
soon extolling the settlement which, he said, marked ‘the first federal 
government business enterprise to be sold through a management buy-out’, 
and suggesting that ‘it should be used as a model for further privatisations’.  
He noted that some would have preferred a trade sale, but considered ‘it was a 
far better option to enable the staff of SMEC to have the opportunity to decide 
their own futures’:  50% of SMEC’s staff were involved in the staff company 
Tinbury, and a further offer would now be made to those who have no shares 
or only small shareholdings.  Solicitor Chris Chenoweth, who was an adviser 
to Tinbury on the sale, was also quoted soon after the settlement.  He said it 
‘was a hard-fought deal’, but provided a good model for privatisation:  ‘It 
restores to the people who put the value into the organisation, the incentive to 
make it even more valuable’ (both reported in Macdonald 1994).  
 
Tinbury had not needed to take out a loan to finance its purchase:  six key 
SMEC staff had put in about 50% of the capital, and each of them had a 
shareholding of between 10% and 20% .  While the objective had been to get 
as broad a cover as possible from among the employee group, Chenoweth had 
advised against very small parcels.  On 1996 figures there were 140 
shareholders in all, as against about 500 people on the Australian payroll, so 
the coverage had declined in two years.  However, while many employees 
owned between 1,000 shares and 5,000 shares as a demonstration of loyalty to 
the organisation’, the holding of shares provided no guarantee of continuing 
employment (Boniface 1996). 
 
A summary by Bills for TFAS (1994) makes this claim: 
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The sale was a significant achievement given that it was negotiated in the shadow of a potential contingent 
liability totalling $89 million due to an incident at Dartmouth Dam, involving SMEC as one respondent ... A 
major factor in the success of the sale was the ability of the sale team to focus on particular high risk issues 
that may have threatened the sale.  The development of a risk management strategy assisted in ensuring that 
issues which were outside the direct control of the sale team were managed and monitored to minimise 
perceived threats to a successful sale outcome.  In particular, the Dartmouth Dam litigation issue;  the 
negotiation with Tinbury to meet the required conditions of sale;  the management of the delicate relationship 
between the staff buyout members and the Board and management of SMEC;  and the negotiations with the 
unions were risk areas which required close attention. 
 
After privatisation 
 
The strucure of the SMEC organisation did not change markedly after 
privatisation. However a large business development unit previously 
responsible for marketing activities was abolished, with marketing 
responsibility decentralised to all staff in the field.  Boniface moved to 
become both chairman and chief executive officer whereas, before 
privatisation, the two offices were separated.  As he explained it, the emphasis 
at board level was now on strategy and policy rather than compliance issues, 
board members had to be ‘really interested in the future of the company’, and 
the staff had greater incentive to chase new work.  For many staff the change 
overcame the stress caused by years of uncertainty about the future;  but there 
was also a strong post-privatisation trend towards contract appointments, with 
the non-monetary benefits in public-sector style employment converted into 
higher cash incomes as in the private engineering-consulting industry 
(Boniface 1996). 
 
After the sale and on a SMEC initiative, a ‘mediation’ chaired by former 
NSW Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street, facilitated by a prominent 
Brisbane law firm, and involving all parties to the previously issued writs 
relating to Dartmouth Dam, arrived at a settlement of that affair which 
left SMEC free to carry on under the terms and conditions of the original 
sale agreement.   
 
The core skill of SMEC is and always has been project management, especially 
in hydro-electricity projects.  However the green lobby has been active in 
South-East Asia and its effect has been a major cut-back in dam construction 
and hydro-electricity works.  So SMEC has had to diversify its operations:  
there is an increased consciousness within the company of the market for 
services related to environment protection, and it has also moved significantly 
into the education and health sectors of developing countries, building facilities 
but also with involvement in eg curriculum development and training.    
 
It has also become more active in the Australian domestic market.  The 
original SMEC Act prevented the enterprise from undertaking engineering 
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works in Australia except under very stringent provisions;  the original 
purpose of SMEC was to sell expertise overseas.  But the privatised SMEC is 
not so constrained and is able to undertake work freely in Australia.  Its new 
objective was to do 50% of its work in Australia, and 50% overseas---without 
any reduction in the international work.  In the first few years after 
privatisation, it achieved a business growth rate of around 20% per annum. 
 
Another objective has been to become an equity holder in a major project, a 
move that would provide a regular income that would reduce the present fairly 
precarious dependence on contract fees.  But, as at mid-2000, this objective 
has not been achieved, and SMEC operates under an acute awareness that its 
own growth and future prospects are more-than-usually dependent on the 
health of the global economy.  In its private form it remains an unlisted 
company and demonstrates a strong determination to protect its privacy, so 
that information on its internal operations, shareholding structure and 
profitability is hard to come by;  it is arguable that this stance actually reduces 
opportunities for further development.   
 
In mid-2000---seven years after the sale, exceeding the five-year guarantee 
under the sale agreement---the headquarters remains in Cooma, indicating that 
that rural community and its residents have done well out of this privatisation.  
It is probable that this outcome would not have been achieved under any other 
form of privatisation, to a degree justifying the tortuous process through 
which the sale took place.  Of course, as before, most of its operational work 
is conducted away from Cooma, and recent advances in communications 
technology have provided easy links between that headquarters and field 
operators elsewhere in Australia and overseas.  However, in the view of a 
close observer, this very continuity has made it more difficult for SMEC to 
break away from the ‘public sector culture’ that infused its earlier operations:  
Peter Phillips, who contributed so significantly to the cause of the Tinbury 
group, explains picturesquely that it has not proved possible to ‘take Cooma 
out of SMEC’, and that the enterprise’s ‘roots are buried deep in the basalt of 
the Snowy Mountains’ (Phillips 2000).   
 
Given the stirring battle between the Tinbury group and the government 
officials wanting to secure a fair price before selling the enterprise to them, it 
is important to acknowledge that there was never any suggestion that the 
members of that group were other than highly meticulous in attending to their 
duties as officers of the SMEC corporation/company in public ownership.  
While they wanted to buy cheaply, they were fully aware of the great 
importance of maintaining a high reputation for professionalism and 
dedication in winning contracts for ongoing work, whether in the public or the 
private sector. 
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This relatively small-scale privatisation had no major impact on the 
community at large.  However, an unrestricted sale of SMEC to the highest 
bidder in the private sector would probably have realised an extra $4m to $5m 
to government (provided the bidder was not saddled with responsibility for 
any adverse Dartmouth Dam settlement), and the general taxpayer interest 
would have benefited to that extent. 
 
More generally, it is relevant that SMEC established a high reputation in 
its field, and made reasonable profits except for the recessionary years of 
the early 1980s, as a public enterprise;  and that it appears to be giving a 
similar degree of satisfaction as a private enterprise.  The other favoured 
party has been the members of the Tinbury group---they were prepared to 
accept considerable personal risk in battling for this particular solution 
and so would, in the view of many, be entitled to receive a good reward.  
They acquired a profitable company with a highly valued international 
reputation and stood to make future capital gains.  As noted, however, the 
sale did not remove the element of risk:  they needed to keep on winning 
sufficient contract work to ensure the continuing viability of their 
enterprise.  It is likely that their degree of risk exposure is higher than 
that of most operators in the private corporate world. 
 
Summarising,  the main stages in SMEC’s organisational evolution have 
been as follows: 
 
1970:  Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation established as a 
Commonwealth statutory corporation to function as an engineering 
consultancy service and so save the substantial expertise built up by the 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority during the construction of 
the Snowy Mountains scheme;  initially operated under a single 
commissioner, but given a more conventional corporate board in 1985. 
 
1989:   converted to a government-owned company, initially Snowy 
Mountains Engineering Corporation Ltd but subsequently just SMEC 
Ltd. 
 
1994:  sold to Tinbury Pty Ltd, a buy-out company established by a 
senior SMEC staff group, with SMEC Ltd becoming a wholly owned 
Tinbury subsidiary. 
 
 
NOTES: 
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1.  In this work SMHEA has operated as the agent for another public body, the intergovernmental 
Snowy Mountains Council established under the Snowy Mountains Agreement which accompanied the 
passing of the SMHEA legislation in 1949.  SMHEA has itself, over the last few years, been the 
subject of intense discussion as the Commonwealth and the eastern states develop their interlocking 
electricity grids and move unevenly towards privatising the electricity industry.  The work of SMHEA 
attracted both romantic and scholarly writers, and there is a large literature about it:  see eg Scott 1975, 
chs 8-13. 
 
2.  For comment on how this policy was developing in the mid-1980s, see Wettenhall 1996, pp 248-50;  
for later developments, see Wettenhall 1998, pp 244-46. 
 
3.  This statement was somewhat ironical given that Hodgman was MHR for Denison in Tasmania. 
Denison (covering central Hobart) was the electorate in which the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric 
Commission had its headquarters, and that Commission---still a public enterprise---was soon to make a 
strong bid to take over SMEC.  See more below. 
 
4. The legislation also allowed the new company a choice of auditors, a feature of the contemporary 
GBE reform process.  But this part of the process attracted strong protest from the Auditor-General, the 
Public Accounts Committee and others, and was soon adjusted:  for discussion, see Wettenhall 1992, 
pp 228-9. 
 
5.  Our information about the privatising process in this case has been drawn mainly from a series of 
interviews with people who were closely involved:  Boniface 1996; Bills 1997, 2000; Farrow 1997; 
Garrard 1997; Phillips 1997, 2000.  There was much common ground between the views and 
recollections of these people, and they are further cited only where they are directly quoted or have 
provided distinctive information, or where their views differed markedly from those of the others. 
 
6. This department has frequently changed its name in recent years, though Industry and Technology 
are the important core words. It was the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce (DITAC) 
from December 1984 to March 1993. 
 
7. They were obviously not aware of the experience of the First Commonwealth Shipping Line in the 
later 1920s, on which see eg Wettenhall 1983, p. 16.  However a much more recent analysis by a South 
Australian Crown Solicitor has tended to support them:  Selway 1995. 
 
8.  He argues, indeed, that no sensible Western government would retain public enterprises.  He cites 
the risk factor, with the fates of the Victorian and South Australian Savings Banks as leading exhibits.  
He also believes it is impossible to get pure competition when government is an owner;  and 
community service obligations can, in his view, be handled through regulatory mechanisms.  In any 
case, he says, there was no remaining public interest function in SMEC, so it should have been 
privatised.  But he did not believe a staff buy-out was the best option, and thought many of the 
arguments put by the Tinbury group were ‘self-serving rationalisations’ (Garrard 1997). 
 
9.  The question has sometimes been asked whether this was a management buy-out or a staff buy-out.  
Garrard expressed the view that he was dealing with ‘a management buy-out group hiding behind a 
staff buy-out image’, and recalled that at one stage a counter staff buy-out scheme was launched---’but 
it was a damp squib’ (Garrard 1997). 
 
10.  This was in fact done in the case of the board of ANL Ltd, which was considered by the Keating 
government to have been blocking its attempts to sell the Australian National (Shipping) Line. 
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Chapter 10 
 
PORT MACQUARIE BASE HOSPITAL* 
 
This case study reports a privatisation which took a different route from that of our 
other cases.  It did not involve a trade sale, an industry takeover, a public float or a 
management/staff buy-out, but rather a BOO (build-operate-own) contract for 
extensive private enterprise involvement in what is essentially still regarded as a 
public institution.  Given this difference, our treatment of the case necessarily 
involves a course rather different from that adopted in the others.   
 
There remain huge variations in estimates about whether the state (and therefore 
the general body of taxpayers) has benefited or suffered financially as a result of 
this transaction.  We seek, in our treatment of the case, to consider the various 
arguments fairly, but we need to record that our conclusion has greatly offended 
the major private institution involved, Health Care of Australia (HCoA).  The 
criticism we offer is not of the way that institution is managed, either now or in the 
past, but rather of the financial compact within which that management operates.  
We express our sadness that the management of the controlling HCoA considered 
it necessary to disassociate itself formally from our study and accuse us of political 
bias (Catchlove 1998).  From our point of view, its failure to enter into reasoned 
argument with us is evidence of political bias of the same kind as that of which it 
accuses us. 
 
A brief outline of the context in which this privatisation developed is presented 
first.  The case will then be explained and analysed in more detail. 
 
The context:  increasing private sector involvement in the hospital industry 
 
In 1978 the New South Wales (NSW) Labor Government announced that a new 
public hospital would be constructed on the mid-north coast to replace the old 
Hastings District Hospital, which was increasingly unable to meet the demands of 
the rapidly developing region around Port Macquarie.  The plan was for the new 
public hospital to be completed by 1983.  The promise was repeated (with varying 
construction starting dates) at subsequent elections, with little tangible result.  
Funding was provided for consultation and planning, but construction remained 
stalled.  One of the problems related to Loan Council restrictions on public 
borrowing (SC 1993, p.119-20);  Degeling & Thomas 1995, p. 197). 
 
The election of a Liberal-National Coalition government in 1988, and the fall of 
the local seat to the National Party, brought some members of the community fresh 
hope, but introduced a new element into the planning process---the new 
government announced that the private sector was to build and operate a new 'for-
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profit' public hospital in Port Macquarie.  Despite community outrage over the 
decision, Health Minister Ron Phillips signed a contract with the private hospital 
management corporation, Health Care of Australia (HCoA), in December 1992, 
construction took place over the next couple of years, and the 161-bed Port 
Macquarie Base Hospital (PMBH) opened in November 1994.  As a base hospital, 
PMBH now provides many of the services expected of a public regional hospital, 
including social work, some outpatient services, and accident and emergency, 
mental health, oncology, intensive care and neonatal facilities.  HCoA owns and 
operates the hospital, accepting public patients under a 20-year contract 
arrangement with the state government. 
 
PMBH represented the first privatisation project of this kind in the Australian 
hospital sector.  The hospital ‘industry’ has always straddled the public and the 
private sectors, with private hospitals providing many services, and state and 
federal governments paying most costs.  In the past, however, the private hospitals, 
thought of as constituting a ‘cottage industry’, were usually small independent 
organisations owned by medical practitioners and their families, or church 
hospitals.  A complex financing system had developed, with government providing 
most of the revenue (drawn from the tax base) and transferring it to the private 
sector in the form of subsidies and the provision of infrastructure (such as the 
training and education of skilled workers, and an extensive research system).  The 
national financing system is known as Medicare,1  and it is composed of grants to 
the states and terrritories as well as a universal insurance system in which all 
essential medical costs are paid for by government (or at least substantially 
subsidised), regardless of whether one has additional private cover, and whether or 
not one is a public or private patient.  This combination of a public and private 
system has offered opportunities for private investors that are simply not available 
in nations with fully public or fully private health systems. 
 
In the mid-1980s, a Senate Select Committee considered how the then-existing 
private hospitals were regulated, and found that there were no effective controls 
either over their management or their impact on health spending (SSCPHNH 
1987).  A large section of that report dealt with dangers to the Australian health 
system expected to come from the growth of corporate chains of hospitals, an issue 
highlighted when the Liberal-National Coalition under Greiner won government in 
NSW in 1988, and new Health Minister Peter Collins promised or threatened 
(depending on the point of view) a ‘new era for private hospitals’ (reported Bacon 
1988;  see also Collins 1991). 
 
Over the last decade the ‘cottage industry’ pattern of ownership has mostly been 
supplanted by large corporations owning 'chains' of hospitals following a model 
initially established in the United States.  Recognising the investment 
opportunities, these new privately owned hospital chains are increasingly 
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associated with public hospitals, and they have become intimately linked with the 
privatisation programs of Australian governments.  There have been several 
strategies, including (using NSW examples) the development of new private 
hospitals in the grounds of public teaching hospitals (Prince of Wales/Prince Henry 
and St George in Sydney), public ownership but private management (under lease:  
Liverpool and Hawkesbury), and private ownership and management with public 
funding (St Vincent’s at Lismore).  Port Macquarie under its BOO contract 
represented a fourth strategy (Collyer & White 1997;  White & Collyer 1998;  also 
Degeling & Thomas 1995, esp. p. 198). 
 
This new hospital industry structure is the result of a widespread change in the 
policy of Australian governments directed towards the active pursuit of private 
sector participation for a wide range of infrastructure and service provision projects 
(Collyer 1998, and see eg Harris 1996, 2000;  Neutze 1997).  The signing of the 
contract with HCoA for the construction of PMBH followed public advocacy by 
the then NSW state government of a policy of allowing a larger role for the private 
sector in the delivery of hospital services (SC 1993, p. 62-3).   
 
The decision to move from public to private ownership 
 
Beginning official investigations 
 
Prior to the decision to privatise, the state government was faced with a number of 
demands for new public hospitals.  This was due, at least in part, to the aging of 
the hospital infrastructure in NSW, where by the late 1980s 60% of the hospitals 
were over 30 years old, and where expansion in the newer suburbs had resulted in 
an uneven distribution of hospitals and a concentration of services in the Sydney 
city centre (Wraight & Bessler 1992, p. 4).   
 
In 1990 discussions were held between the Premier's Department and the ANZ 
Bank about the possibility of alternative funding structures for public sector 
infrastructure projects.  Public servants in the NSW Health Department (hereafter 
NSW Health)2  were asked to come up with a range of alternatives for Port 
Macquarie, and to include an option of private sector participation.  For about 18 
months, public servants from NSW Health, the Premier's Department and State 
Treasury met with the Health Ministers3  to examine the various options.  
Departmental officers examined the possibility of private sector involvement in 
hospital services and prepared an assessment of the cost of building a new public 
hospital for Port Macquarie compared with the option of allowing the private 
sector to build and operate a 'public' hospital: 
 
The original proposal for looking at alternative funding models ... came out of a shortage that we had within in our 
forward capital program.  So we had a backlog of need, in terms of substandard infrastructure, and we had an 
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inadequate supply of capital to address those.  So we were looking around for alternative ways to structure funding 
for projects.  We pushed hard at asset sales and then the bottom fell out of the asset market ... but we still had the 
need for our projects  (NSW Health officer).4 
 
In 1991 the Health officials presented their findings to Health Ministers Hannaford 
and Phillips.  The position of the departmental officials was that the introduction of 
private sector participation into the PMBH project would not be the best option.  It 
would introduce competition, but would present too many problems to be viable.   
 
The ministerial response 
 
The response from the ministers was to instruct the officers to pursue the private 
option, regardless of the potential problems.  It was felt that the privatisation option 
would introduce competition into the NSW Health sector, forcing it to become 
more efficient:  ‘there was an inherent feeling at the time within the Liberal 
government that the private sector could do things more efficiently’ (NSW Health 
officer). 
 
The result of these discussions was that PMBH was nominated by Minister 
Hannaford in August 1991 as a potential private sector infrastructure project (NSW 
Health 1992, p. 2).  An invitation to tender for the construction and operation of 
the hospital was issued in September 1991.  Three tenders were received, and they 
were evaluated through November and December 1991 (NSWAG 1996, p. 397).  
As already noted, a contract with HCoA was entered into in December 1992. 
 
Parties involved 
 
The main parties involved in this privatisation process were the state government 
(particularly the Departments of Treasury and Health);  the financier (Hambros 
Australia), with development funds from NatWest Australia Bank Ltd;  the 
builders (Fletcher Constructions);  the Mayne Nickless corporation (and 
subsequently its hospital management company, Health Care of Australia); and 
various community groups and organisations including the local Council of Trade 
Unions, and the Hospital Action Group. 
 
The publicly visible partner with government in the privatisation is the hospital 
management company, Health Care of Australia (HCoA).  This company now runs 
the base hospital;  it was established as a subsidiary of Mayne Nickless in 1991, 
when the latter purchased the hitherto US-owned Hospital Corporation of 
Australia.  Mayne Nickless itself began as a transport company, diversifying into 
the hospital sector in the late 1980s and becoming Australia's largest provider of 
private health-care services by 1996.  HCoA has now extended its operations into 
Asia (White & Collyer 1998, p. 494). 
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When the privatisation agreement was eventually concluded, it involved the 
private sector building a new hospital which would be 'owned' by the special 
purpose company, PMBH Ltd.  This would be under mortgage to the banks, 
NatWest Australia Bank (51%) and Hambros Nominees Australia Pty Ltd (49%).  
Hospital services would be provided by HCoA (the operator) under a 20-year 
service agreement with the Macleay Hastings District Health Service (now part of 
the Mid-North Coast Health Service).  The new hospital would provide both 
private and public (Medicare) hospital services, and would be built on land owned 
by Hastings Council.   
 
At the end of the 20-year contract period, HCoA has an option to purchase the 
hospital from PMBH Ltd.  If t fails to take up this option, other purchasers (such as 
the government itself) may show an interest. 
 
Arguments for and against privatisation 
 
When the Greiner government publicly announced privatisation to be the best 
option for Port Macquarie, there were four specified reasons.  First, NSW Health 
and Treasury reasoned that the state faced a shortage in available capital for the 
provision of public infrastructure, and that the privatisation of PMBH would solve 
this fiscal problem in this case by injecting private sector capital into the public 
sector.  Second, the privatisation would provide more cost-efficient services than 
could the public sector.  Third, it would provide a more timely upgrading of 
facilities.  And fourth, it would eliminate the need for the state to be both the 
funder and provider of health services, introduce competition between providers, 
and thereby stimulate more cost-effective service delivery (NSW Health 1992, pp 
2-4;  SC 1993, pp 12, 89). 
 
The Treasury particularly was pushing this reasoning.  Underpinning it is a 
theoretical model of the functioning of the economy brought into favour during the 
1980s.  The primary assumption of the model is that increasing competition leads 
to greater efficiency---an idea propounded vigorously by the Hilmer committee in 
its report on a national competition policy (Hilmer 1993)---and that cost efficiency 
should be the aim of all state activities.  The model is used to justify privatisation 
as a strategy to support the private sector (which is assumed to be inherently more 
productive than the public sector), to reform the public sector, and to integrate the 
national economy into the global financial system.  Closely associated with this 
model is a philosophical and political view which opposes a large and viable public 
sector.   
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Opposition to the proposal began soon after the NSW government informed the 
Port Macquarie community that there was no public finance available for a new 
hospital.  It is likely that the strength of this opposition took the government by 
surprise.  It then made a rather crafty tactical move:  it would insist that the matter 
was to be decided by the community itself!  So the community was told that it 
could either continue with the outdated and inadequate Hastings District hospital 
or have a brand new private facility.   
 
Much the same choice was given to the Hastings District Hospital Board and 
executive staff: 
 
We could start a publicly funded public hospital with no commitment to the finishing date, it would be a slow trickle 
of funds that may see the hospital built before the end of the decade, emphasise may.  Or to explore another option, 
ie a privatisation option.  And every person, every person on the board, every member of the executive staff, said no 
way.  The private sector don't know a damn thing about health, about public health services, there's just no way.  But 
when the reality set in, we thought God, if we don't get a hospital for the community, we are not doing the right 
thing for the community either, so how do we go about negotiating the best possible deal for the community and the 
staff?  So we agreed to participate in the process, to explore a private option (PMBH employee).   
 
Community opposition was fuelled by this tactic, which had the effect of creating 
antagonism between community groups and between staff members, as well as 
disputes within the union movement and within families: 
 
it divided it, it has torn the community apart.  I described it in 1992, as ... the Battle of the Hastings ... not the 1066 
Battle of Hastings, but the battle of the Hastings of 1992 ... because you try and take away a lot of things from a 
community ... ordinary Jo and John Citizen.  You take away their anything ... and usually with some convincing they 
accept it, but you take away their right to free health ... and that was what was being pushed, and they fight it ... they 
fight it (PMBH employee).    
 
Being a small community, every person was affected to some degree. Those who 
accepted the inevitability of privatisation were viewed by many as ‘traitors’, while 
those who fought against the proposal knew they were risking their jobs and future 
security:  
 
because we didn't have a lot of choices in this town.  If you wanted to stay working and you wanted to stay in this 
town ... the best idea was to accept it and try and make it work (PMBH employee). 
 
But it was pretty clear where the majority of residents stood.  As late as 19 
September 1992, 615 voted against the government’s favoured option in a local 
referendum and only 39% supported it (Staunton 1992b). 
 
Concern over the private ownership and operation of the hospital focused on a 
number of issues.  One concern related to the monopolistic aspect of the deal, 
which revealed an inconsistency in the government’s own position:  the same 
company was allowed to purchase the only other hospital in the area, giving the 
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consumers little 'choice' and ensuring HCoA a 20-year monopoly on hospital 
services (Draper & Owen 1996, p. 199).   
 
A second issue of concern was the potential loss to hospital staff who would have 
to transfer to the private sector and might lose public sector entitlements and work 
conditions.  Nurses and other staff of the Hastings Hospital held public rallies and 
'stop-work' meetings during 1992, expressing their disapproval of the expansion of 
the private sector in the health sphere (Lamp 1992c, p. 10).  The situation became 
so heated that the general secretary of the NSW Nurses Association was, at one 
stage, banned from entering the hospital by the Hospital Board (Lamp 1992b, p. 4).    
 
Union pressure eventually resulted in an agreement between the NSW government 
and HCoA to ensure that staff who transferred from the old Hastings hospital could 
keep their public sector conditions and entitlements, including superannuation, 
maternity leave, long service and the higher rate of pay found in the public service.  
However, new staff of the hospital (including those who returned after first 
resigning in protest at the privatisation decision) are covered by a private sector 
award and have less favourable wages and conditions.5  
 
A third concern related to the need for a community rather than a hospital-centred 
approach to health care in the region.  It was argued that hospitals are only one 
form of health care service, and that there is an inherent conflict of interest if 
hospitals are given responsibility for preventative health strategies, health 
promotion activities, and community care.  Hospital companies need to maximise 
hospital admissions to ensure profitability, a requirement which is likely to 
undermine the hospital’s capacity to promote preventative health strategies 
effectively and so ensure that people stay away from it (Carter 1993, p. 19).  In the 
case of PMBH, this situation was remedied by removing community services from 
the HCoA contract, and by new contract conditions which stipulate the maximum 
number of in-patient admissions, and assign additional costs to the operator if the 
maximum number is breached.  However, the contract contains some flexibility in 
relation to future demand, a flexibility which effectively undermines the capacity 
of the government to control demand as it does in public sector hospitals (see 
NSWAG 1996, p. 430). 
 
A fourth concern of the community was about access to good-quality free hospital 
services under a private sector operator, and there were many who were 
philosophically and politically opposed to the further commodification and 
privatisation of health care.  Though some argued against privatisation in any 
form, others recognised that the Port Macquarie case represented something 
fundamentally different in the provision of health care services, and these groups 
questioned whether a private-for-profit company should be  delivering public 
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sector health services in Australia (eg Lamp, 1992-3, p. 4).  The Nursing Union 
expressed concern about the impact of privatisation on universal community 
access to health services, its cost to the community, the restrictions on consumer 
choice, its ability to undermine the viability of the public health care system, and 
its erosion of working conditions (Staunton 1992a, p. 9).  Community groups also 
argued that, while contracts could be made between the private sector and the state 
government for straightforward services such as the purchase or building of a 
hospital, contracts are an inadequate means for ensuring the provision of services 
and protecting the community's interest (Labor Council of NSW et al 1992, p.16). 
 
Opposition to the privatisation contract also occurred in parliament where there 
was action from Independent members to pursue legislation to ban contracts of this 
nature in NSW---even though there were, by this time, a number of similar 
contracts already operating with not-for-profit institutions.  The Labor opposition 
warned of the potential for the costs of the privatisation of PMBH to outweigh the 
conventional public sector option, and Shadow Health Minister Dr Andrew 
Refshauge argued that, while the private option was likely to save the government 
$41m over 20 years, it would require an additional $30 million from the 
community in increased private health insurance costs (reported in Ferrari 1992).6  
Before the contract was signed, the Coalition government had to factor in an extra 
$40 million to subsidise private patients who wanted to use the hospital.  The 
additional expense added substantially to the cost of the private hospital project, 
and fairly clearly made the private option more expensive than the public one (Carr 
1992, p. 13). 
 
One analysis of this privatisation process has been kind to the tactical course 
followed by the Coalition government.  It recognised that the ‘issues to be resolved 
in bringing this agreement into effect were numerous and politically explosive’.  
But it concluded that, ‘by following due process and not adopting a confrontational 
stance, the Liberals attained their goals’ (Degeling & Thomas 1995, p. 197).  
Essentially they had forced the community to decide between two options:  
continuing with the existing position, which nearly everyone involved regarded as 
unsatisfactory, or following the government’s preferred path to a ‘solution’. 
 
Our research suggests a different interpretation.  It seems to us that the privatising 
government was incredibly confrontationist.  Its tactics tore up a community, and 
alienated the doctors and trade unionists.  Also the planning was inadequate, the 
government then having to expend a considerable amount on meetings, inquiries 
and public education campaigns in an effort to calm people down.  And soon 
afterwards that government lost office! 
 
Select Committee inquiry and other evaluations 
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The final throw of the due-process dice was such as to ensure that, although the 
government’s tactics produced the action it wanted, the outcome would remain 
controversial.  In this final throw, the Labor opposition and three Independent MPs 
forced the government to agree to a parliamentary Select Committee inquiry (Lamp 
1992a).  The Select Committee7  was chaired by a government MP, but it included 
the Labor shadow minister and the outspoken Independent, John Hatton.  In the 
event, the first (June 1992) report of this broadly based committee failed to support 
the private hospital option clearly.  As a journalist reporting on it pointed out, if the 
private hospital now failed to proceed for policy reasons, the government was 
obliged to indemnify Mayne Nickless for expenses incurred up to $1m (SC 1992;  
Ferrari 1992).   
 
NSW Health’s submission to this inquiry (obviously cleared at ministerial level 
and so covering up divergent views of officials) had presented the government’s 
cost estimates.  In choosing the privatisation option, the government had expected 
to save $15m in construction costs and $46m in recurrent costs, through a 
contractual arrangement with the 'more efficient' private sector.  To justify the 
policy decision, the Greiner government had produced figures that suggested a 
publicly funded hospital would cost $64m in the construction phase and $417m 
over 20 years in recurrent expenditure.  By way of comparison, it had asserted that 
the private sector would be able to build the hospital for $49m and the recurrent 
costs would be only $371m (NSW Health 1992, pp 2-4, 8;  further analysed in 
Collyer 1997).   
 
The Select Committee had received and considered submissions from many of the 
concerned parties.  Its proceedings and reports demonstrated both major differences 
among its members and much complexity and many risks and debatable assumptions 
in the costing methods the government had used.  It concluded that the private 
option provided some financial advantage to government over the 20-year period 
and that the negotiations that had led towards the agreement between the 
government and HCoA had basically been conducted ‘in good faith’.  But it did not 
specifically endorse the agreement, and chose rather and more safely to present 
recommendations that were ‘designed to improve the contract if the project is to 
proceed using the private option’ (SC 1992, pp 2-3). 
 
As a result of this inquiry, concessionary clauses were included in the service 
contract.  Thus free public access to the hospital was 'guaranteed' (though subject 
to annual budget constraints).  And the hospital was obliged to work with other 
community health services;  comply with the Community Health Accreditation 
Standards Program (which benchmarked standards to six public base hospitals in 
NSW);  offer a number of prescribed services to the community such as 
domiciliary help for aged people (Thomas 1994, p. 76);  and share information 
with public not-for-profit hospitals (Carter 1993, p. 19).  As a further outcome (and 
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as already noted), NSW Health entered into an agreement with HCoA to ensure 
that existing staff could retain their salary levels and benefits such as 
superannuation and maternity leave.   
 
The Select Committee’s second report had a more general focus.  Among other 
things, it emphasised the capacity of private hospitals to treat more patients than 
they did, and the costliness to the state of resourcing this unused capacity.  For this 
and other reasons, it stressed the need for a ‘more holistic approach to the delivery 
of (health) services’ and for the participation of the wider community in setting 
health priorities (this against the government’s single-minded focus on efficiency 
enhancement:  SC 1993, executive summary). 
 
An Auditor-General’s inquiry, completed after the Liberal-National Coalition 
government had lost office in 1995 and been replaced by the Carr Labor 
government, was more openly critical of the PMBH project, questioning the 
capacity of government generally to negotiate acceptably balanced deals with the 
private sector, and disputing the Health Ministers' earlier view that the PMBH 
project reflected state interests.  Of course, ministerial and official views were now 
more compatible:  as a consequence of the government change, the Health 
Department was now headed by Dr Refshauge, a leading critic of the plan for the 
private hospital, so such conclusions would no longer  have been politically 
unwelcome.  They were based on the assessment that, contrary to appearances, the 
project’s costs were being met by the state, not by the investors.  In fact the cost of 
capital construction of the hospital was wholly funded by the state through the 
annual availability charge which it would pay to the private partners over the 20-
year period.  This arrangement also ensured that the state paid for the cost of the 
capital construction of the hospital a second time through the set fee-for-service 
payments;  although the Health Department had projected its construction costs for 
the private hospital at nil, it would in fact pay $143.6m through this servicing 
charge.  In criticising these accounting arrangements, this Audit-General’s report 
exposed significant differences that had existed within the Greiner government, 
with the Treasury overruling Health on some critical matters.  And it observed that, 
at the end of the 20-year period, the state would have no ownership rights and that 
its right to have the hospital used by it or its appointed agent would lapse 
(NSWAG 1996, pp 16, 18 and appendix 4).8 
 
The emergence of a Labor government in place of the pliant Coalition government 
obviously created discomfort for the private operator.  Under its new minister the 
Health Department quickly altered its public position:  by June 1995 it was 
distributing figures purporting to demonstrate that it was costing the state 30% 
more to run PMBH than its own hospitals in Dubbo, Lismore, Albury and Orange 
(Patty 1995).  Then it was widely reported that there was a ‘twelve-month 
stalemate’ in negotiations over the 1996-97 hospital budget between HCoA and the 
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minister---resolved when, after threats of litigation by HCoA, Refshauge ‘gave in 
to demands ... for more money to run the hospital when other hospitals in the area 
were starved of cash’ (Downey 1997;  also Queensland Nurse 1997, p. 6,  
digesting other reports).  Whereas patient bed numbers are fixed in other Medicare 
hospitals, the amount paid to the PMBH operators for services for public 
(Medicare) patients is not fixed but negotiable.  So PMBH could make demands on 
the state budget for an increase.  Accompanied by threats of litigation, all demands 
at this time were met, allowing costs to escalate.  The right to take legal action was 
enshrined in the dispute resolution clause of the basic contract, which also 
prevented public disclosure of financial information. 
 
The view that the state could have built a fully public hospital for about $50m and 
still have owned it at the end of the 20-year period, and the Health Department’s 
own estimate that it was costing 30% more to run the private hospital than 
comparable public hospitals, working out at about $6m extra per year in recurrent 
funding, was often repeated (eg Evatt 1996, pp 143-4;  and see Queensland Nurse  
1996).  At the same time, many other community and patient concerns about the 
private hospital in operation were raised:  publicly operated hospitals are certainly 
not free of such criticism, but private operation is thus shown not to be 
significantly different (Evatt 1996, pp 143-4). 
 
The costing figures were strongly disputed by the private hospital management, 
which asserted that, over the life of the 20-year contract, ‘we would save the 
government between $28 million and $40 million’ (reported Patty 1995).  Again, 
in its 1996-97 annual report, HCoA claimed that PMBH’s costs of operation for 
1995 were comparable with those of peer base hospitals.  In part, this disagreement 
can be seen to result from the differing perspectives of the two stakeholders.  
HCoA is comparing its own costs of running the hospital with those of other base 
hospitals, but its figures exclude the other costs to government of financing the 
private hospital.  Thus HCoA’s estimates do not include a wide range of extra costs 
that the state must incur with PMBH:  eg to guard against fraud in its service 
agreement the government maintains full-time audit staff within the hospital to 
monitor the number and type of services provided.  Similarly, because (due to 
potential conflict of interest) public and community health services cannot be run 
by the private hospital (as they can by the other seven NSW public base hospitals) 
the state has to provide for these as separate administrative units on an alternative 
campus. 
 
Details of the costs included in the additional 30% required to service the contract 
with HCoA are difficult to access, even though evaluations have been completed.9   
There is, however, sufficient evidence to permit a judgment to be made on whether 
this privatisation project met the four stated objectives of the Greiner government.  
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Though one stated intention was to introduce private sector finance into the 
supposedly 'ailing' public health care system, the impact has in fact been the 
reverse;  it has enabled the private sector to access public funds and shift funds into 
the private sector.  It has also enabled the private sector to access revenue raised 
through donations and fundraising, prosthesis fees, facility charges for staff 
specialist use for private patient treatment, and rental for shops and services space 
which partially offsets the cost of providing services in public hospitals (cf:  SC 
1993, pp 91, 107).   
 
Against the second objective---to provide more cost-efficient services than the 
public sector is able to do---the privatisation of PMBH has not been successful. It 
is now generally accepted that PMBH costs the government more than equivalent 
publicly operated hospitals.  This finding is not surprising, both because (as noted 
above) the PMBH management can demand increases in its service charges and 
because in this case the public sector is not only paying for the cost of hospital 
services but is also repaying the private sector for investing in the building of the 
hospital and operating it.   Thus the annual charges the state pays to the operators 
include an amount for interest on borrowings, the cost of invested capital, 
shareholder returns, and various other costs such as the Commonwealth taxes that 
the private operator must pay;  in other words, the amount paid to the operators 
must return their costs plus a component for profit, something that need not be 
included in payments to public hospitals.  But in addition to these payments to the 
operators, the state must meet other costs such as those for auditing and monitoring 
patient throughput in the hospital and extra administration and staffing for a 
separate community services program.    
 
Another of the primary reasons given for the privatisation of PMBH was to enable 
a base hospital to be built in a timely manner, given the ‘lack’ of public capital 
available.  The community was told they would not have a base hospital unless it 
could be privately owned and operated.  Nevertheless, within a very brief period on 
from the contracting with HCoA, the NSW government procured public funds for a 
new public hospital at Albury (SC 1992, p. 2).  Indeed, if ‘timeliness’ had been a 
real consideration, there were cost-effective alternatives to privatisation.  For 
instance the Hastings Hospital Action Group’s submission to the parliamentary 
inquiry contained a proposal to renovate the existing Hastings District Hospital 
rather than build a whole new hospital, at the much lower cost of $12m (HHAG 
1992).  The group argued that reports about the poor condition of the Hastings 
hospital were inaccurate, and supplied independent engineering assessments to the 
inquiry to show that the old hospital was still structurally sound.  The submission 
by independent MP John Hatton (MLA for the South Coast) supported this view, 
and showed that the churches were interested in providing care in the region 
(Hatton 1992, p. 35).  Neither submission was given serious consideration. 
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The fourth objective, to stimulate more cost-effective delivery of health services 
through competition and a split between the provision and funding of services, has 
been met in a limited way.  The need to deal with the PMBH contract has led to the 
introduction of more systematic measurement systems within NSW Health.  NSW 
Health now has an alternative model of public hospital services, and has begun to 
collect comparative data to review its own procedures and assumptions about the 
differences between the private and the public sector.  An important innovation, 
spurred on by the privatisation of PMBH, has been the development of product 
costing for hospital services.  As set out in the service contract, PMBH is measured 
against the other public base hospitals in NSW.  Indicators developed to ensure 
PMBH delivers services according to the terms of its contract provide the 
department with a range of financial and clinical benchmarks to assist with hospital 
management, policy development, fiscal accountability and infection control.   
 
Thus the privatisation of PMBH can be said to have led to better monitoring and 
measurement systems in the management of the NSW health care sector, but it 
would be difficult to show that it has led to better services (higher standards of 
care) for the same cost (ie cost effectiveness).  Along a number of indicators (such 
as infection rates) the standards of care at PMBH are in many ways comparable 
with those at other base hospitals, but they are achieved at a higher cost to 
government and, if waiting lists are taken as an indicator of standards, PMBH fares 
badly, having one of the longest waiting lists in the state, especially for elective 
surgery.  In addition, privatisation has not resulted in a fully cost-effective use of 
PMBH because, although facilities for a full range of health services were built, 
not all of these can be fully utilised.  PMBH was built to take more patients than 
the old Hastings District hospital but it has not been taking its full complement of 
patients, thus effectively costing more for the same services (Richards 1995;  
Doherty 1998).  A lack of cost-effectiveness is also evident in the case of mental 
health and coronial services, since current NSW legislation does not allow private 
hospitals to perform post mortem services nor treat scheduled mental health 
patients (involuntary patients).  Consequently these services have to be made 
available elsewhere, isolating patients from their families and imposing extra 
transportation costs on the state and families.  
 
The impact of the privatisation on staffing has been to vary rewards according to 
the occupational group involved. This result is not entirely unexpected.  Studies of 
hospital services overseas show that the quest for cost efficiencies is often directed 
toward the loss of lower paid jobs and the reduction in the working conditions of 
many staff (cf: Light 1995, p. 146). The outcome at PMBH is a typical corporate 
response to the introduction of competition. 
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The idea of promoting competition between providers in the hospital sector 
assumed that competition would lead to better and cheaper services.  There is no 
evidence that competition has achieved this in NSW, nor that it could achieve this 
in the health-care sector (see eg Nevile 1999, 2000).  Overseas evidence suggests 
that competition between hospitals leads to higher operating costs and is a 
particularly ineffective strategy in markets where the government is the dominant 
purchaser.  Furthermore the hospital sector is one area where long-term stable and 
collaborative relationships are required, not competitive ones (Light 1995).  
Competition has been forced on the relationship between PMBH and the public 
hospitals in the region and there is some evidence to suggest this has had a 
negative impact on the patient transfer network, and made it difficult for staff to 
share information (eg about employee back injury rates) and take up professional 
development opportunities (Lyons 1997, p. 211;  and generally White & Collyer 
1997).   
 
Epilogue 
 
The funding of the public hospital system remains an intractable issue for 
Australian governments at the turn of the century.  But it does not seem likely that 
resort to the new breed of corporately owned hospital chains is making matters so 
much easier.  At the end of the 1990s, the Mayne Nickliss/HCoA group which now 
owns PMBH comprised 47 hospitals, but the corporate owner’s managing director, 
Bob Dalziel, conceded that 20 of them were ‘underperforming as a result of 
“negotiations with the health funds (private health insurance) and the cost 
pressures we’re under”’ (reported in Speedy 2000).  International ratings agency 
Standard and Poor’s had placed Mayne Nickliss’s corporate ratings ‘on credibility 
watch’, profitability had dropped, and share prices which had been trading above 
$8 in August 1998 had slipped to well below $4 in early 2000 (CT 1999;  Ready 
2000).10 
 
Since his retirement in September 1999 Tony Harris, the Auditor-General who 
reported so critically on this private hospital contract in 1996, has several times 
commented on relevant issues in his personal capacity.  He has made it plain that 
he believes privatisation is often justified, but that he is strongly opposed to 
privatising action driven by ideology and taken without thorough prior analysis of 
all available options for service delivery.  Clearly he believes this has too often 
happened in Australia.  Of BOO and BOOT schemes generally, he writes that he 
has ‘no doubt that the provision of private sector toll roads in Sydney is a second-
best solution that has cost Sydney road users dearly’.  Turning to hospitals, he 
asserts that ‘patients in public hospitals are not customers’, and that we should be 
wary of applying ‘private sector management principles and practices’ to such 
patients:  ‘they are not there because of the profits they allow’.  His argument is 
hard to counter:  in hospitals we have an obligation to provide service to the last 
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applicant, to treat all members of the public consistently, and not to distinguish 
between them on the basis of criteria that are not relevant to the particular public 
service (Harris 1999, pp 33, 35, 37; also 2000). 
 
NOTES: 
 
1.  All Australian citizens, permanent residents and some categories of visitors have a right to be treated as ‘public’ 
(ie Medicare) patients, which provides them with free treatment (at the point of service) in public hospitals 
throughout Australia.  This right has been extended to free treatment in hospitals which have a contract to provide 
for ‘public patients’.  It is encapsulated in the Medicare Agreement, an agreement between the state/territory 
governments and the Commonwealth government, under which the latter provides funding for the provision of 
hospital services.  (Medicare is partly funded through a levy on taxable income from all taxpayers.  Private hospital 
insurance can be an additional purchase choice for consumers, but even privately insured patients retain the right to 
be treated as public patients.) 
 
2.  Political and administrative commentaries usually assume an identity between a minister and the department he 
or she heads.  This case is unusual in that the evidence forces us to make a separation in the period of the 
Greiner/Fahey Liberal-Conservative government.  At ministerial level this department was aligned with the 
government itself and with the Premier's and Treasury Departments, whereas the evidence suggests strongly that 
many officials within the department took a very different line. 
 
3.  Another unusual feature is that, at a critical time in the unfolding of this case, there were two Health Ministers in 
the NSW cabinet.  In a mid-1991 cabinet restructure designed to separate policy from management, Premier Greiner 
appointed John Hannaford as Minister for Health and Community Services, and Ron Phillips as Minister for Health 
Services Management.  However the system of ‘split ministries’ did not survive long after John Fahey replaced 
Greiner as Premier:  in July 1992 Phillips became full Minister for Health, with newcomer Jim Longley as Minister 
for Community Services and Assistant Minister for Health.  At the time and reflecting on the personalities, Labor 
leader Bob Carr responded that the decision to reunite the portfolios under Ron Phillips meant 'a continuation of 
hospital privatisation'. (From CT 1991, 1992.) 
 
4.  We are using this method of citing comments or information received in interview from participants in the events 
being described, several of whom asked particularly not to be identified. 
 
5.  This situation does not apply to Visiting Medical Officers (specialist doctors) who receive the same rates as at 
other public hospitals.   
 
6.  The reasoning was that privately insured patients who had basic table insurance and entered private hospitals 
were required to pay additional expenses, whereas private patients in public hospitals found that their premiums 
covered all their bills (Forde & Malley 1992, p. 275).   
 
7.  This Select Committee was described in the ‘Chairman’s Foreword’ to its first report as a ‘Public Accounts 
Committee special committee’, and it was serviced by the regular PAC staff (SC 1992). 
 
8.  The purchase of the land for the hospital provided one example of the costliness of this privatisation.  The Health 
Department had purchased the site from the Hastings Council in 1989 for $550,000, but then sold it to the new 
PMBH management for $1.2m.  However, rather than receiving this money from the management to offset the 
project costs, the department allowed it to include the land purchase in its availability charge.  After the demise of 
the initiating Liberal-National Coalition government, the Auditor-General concluded that, in effect, the department 
had borrowed $1.2m from PMBH and was repaying it with interest (AG 1996, p. 426).  Elsewhere he was making 
clear his general concern that, through these infrastructure contracts, private profits were coming directly from 
public losses (eg Harris 1996). 
 
9.  The basic proposition that the cost to the state of running the hospital under the contract arrangement was 30% 
more than the cost of running otherwise comparable public hospitals was repeated in many statements by Refshauge 
as Minister for Health (also Refshauge 1997).  A request to NSW Health in 1997 under FOI legislation for a copy of 
their evaluation produced a large document with about 1/3 of the pages blacked out.  All information on the 
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comparative costs of PMBH was effectively deleted.  NSW Health’s explanation for this censorship was that, under 
the terms of the contract, the information could only be provided with the agreement of HCoA, and that the 
company had refused permission.  HCoA’s explanation for the censorship was that NSW Health had declined to 
give permission.  Further assistance from the company on this, or any other aspect of our research project, was 
refused.  
 
10.  There was some recovery in Mayne Nickless share prices in mid-2000, after announcement of the appointment 
of a new managing director:  Peter Smedley, formerly chief executive of of the private financial institution Colonial 
(which had bought the State Bank from the NSW government in a trade sale several years before, and had just 
merged with the also privatised Commonwealth Bank of Australia), had just accepted this position.  But the share 
prices then hovered around $3.40, much less than the 1998 level of above $8 (CT 2000). 
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